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ABSTRACT 
The establishment of the Qing Dynasty Consulate in South Africa, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, marks the earliest official diplomatic contact between what could be 
considered the preceding states to modern-day China and South Africa. 1  In light of the 
importance of the recent diplomatic relations between China and South Africa, it is pertinent 
to examine the situation which led to the initial diplomatic contact between the precursors of 
these two states. It is also important to consider what challenges these relations faced at this 
early stage.  
The Qing Dynasty Consulate in South Africa was established initially in response to the 
importation of a large body of indentured Chinese labourers into the Witwatersrand area.2 The 
arrival of somewhere near 60 000 indentured Chinese labourers between 1904 and 1907 led to 
a series of legislative actions in the Cape and Transvaal, which specifically targeted the Chinese 
for discrimination.3 Foremost among these were the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act, the Labour 
Importation Ordinance and the Asiatic Registration Act. The well-documented historical 
apathy of the Qing Dynasty towards their overseas subjects has often led to a lack of 
examination of what efforts were made, at an official level, by the Dynasty to assist Chinese 
populations in overseas colonies.4 Often, instead, the Dynasty was simply assumed to have 
remained apathetic to its distant subjects for its entire existence. This is the case for the Qing 
Dynasty’s involvement with the governments of the Cape Colony, Transvaal and Union of 
South Africa.5  
1 National Archives Repository (Public Records of former Transvaal Province and its predecessors as well as 
magistrates and local authorities.) (TAB) Governor of the Transvaal Colony (GOV) 69 01 GEN 695/04: 
“Appointment of Mr Lew Yu Ling as Chinese Consul-General for the Transvaal,” 1905. 
2  Cape Town Archives Repository (KAB) Government House (GH) 23/89 298: “General Despatches. 
Appointment of Mr Liu Yu Ling to act as Chinese Consul-General for the British Colonies in South Africa,” 19 
October 1905. 
3 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, pp. 202-203. 
4 L. Anshan, T. Chee-Beng, (ed): Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora: China’s African policy and the 
Chinese immigrants in Africa, p. 60. 
5 P. Snow: Star Raft: China’s Encounter with Africa, p. 48; R. Bright (ed): Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-
1910, Race, Violence, and Global Spectacle, the Palgrave Macmillan Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-
1910, pp. 104-106. 
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The active resistance of the Chinese themselves against this discrimination has been analysed 
before, particularly in the comprehensive works of Karen Harris6, but the role played by the 
Consul-Generals of the Qing Dynasty has been usually under-examined or ignored.7 Evidence 
clearly indicates that the Consul-Generals Liu Yu Lin and Liu Ngai played an active role in 
supporting the Chinese communities, both free and indentured, within South Africa during their 
tenure. Through an analysis of the actions taken by these two Consul-Generals in both the Cape 
Colony and Transvaal Colony the extent of their support for the Chinese within South Africa 
becomes clear. Although their efforts would, ultimately, have little substantive effect on the 
discrimination the South African Chinese faced, it did create an institution which would be 
consistently utilized by future generations of South African Chinese to resist prejudice.8 
6 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912; The Construction of Otherness: A History of 
Chinese Migrants in South Africa; BEE-ing Chinese in South Africa: A Legal Historic Perspective; K. L. Harris: 
“‘Strange Bedfellows’: Gandhi and Chinese Passive Resistance 1906-1911,” Journal of Natal and Zulu History, 
13, (2), 2013; K. L. Harris: “Paper trail: Chasing the Chinese in the Cape (1904-1933),” Kronos Southern African 
Histories, (40), 1, November 2014, pp. 133-153. 
7 L. Anshan, T. Chee-Beng, (ed): Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora: China’s African Policy and the 
Chinese Immigrants in Africa, p. 60. 
8 K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, 
China’s Rise and the Chinese Overseas, pp. 93-94. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
As of late, the study of Sino-African relations has become a more prominent field. As a result, 
the study of the economic, sociological and political relations between Africa and China has 
become increasingly popular. By the same merit, interest in the historical nature of these 
relations has also grown. Further, South Africa has the largest concentration of Chinese within 
Southern Africa, granting an additional dimension to the study of the Chinese in South Africa.1 
Falling within the ambit of this topic are the relations between the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and the Republic of South Africa. Although official relations between South Africa and 
the PRC only began in January 1998, under the authority of South Africa’s young post-
apartheid government, the origins of Chinese diplomatic representation, and contact, with 
South Africa unsurprisingly predates this moment.2 The earliest official diplomatic contact 
between these two regions occurred during the beginning of the twentieth century, when the 
confluence of a mass Chinese migration and the demand for cheap labour on the mines of the 
Witwatersrand (present day Johannesburg and surroundings), led to the establishment of 
official relations under the auspices of the British Empire.3 The year 1905 saw the appointment 
of the Qing Dynasty’s first ever Consul-General to the British Colonies of South Africa, the 
first substantial diplomatic mission by a Chinese state in South Africa.4 
 
This early contact can be described as the genesis of South African and Chinese relations.  
However, it had the misfortune of coinciding with a rising anti-Sinicism (a sentiment against 
Chinese) throughout South Africa at the time. This sentiment found political expression 
through legislation such as the Transvaal Immigration Restriction Act of 1902, the Cape 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904 and, later, the Transvaal Asiatic Registration Act of 1907.5 
                                                 
1 I. Taylor: China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise, p. 127. 
2 www. mandela.gov.za (12th August 2017), Statement by President Nelson Mandela on South Africa's Relations 
with the Greater China Region, 27 November 1996. 
3 (KAB) GH 1/451 7: “Papers Received from Secretary of State, London. General Despatches. The Issue of 
Exequaturs to Consular Officers Appointed by the Chinese Government,” 31 January1891. 
4 (KAB) GH 23/89 298: “General Despatches. Appointment of Mr. Liu Yu Ling to Act as Chinese Consul-General 
for the British Colonies in South Africa,” 19 October 1905. 
5 Ordinances of the Transvaal, 1904, Labour Importation Ordinance; Statutes of the Transvaal, Act 2 of 1907, 
Asiatic Law Amendment Act; Statutes of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, Act 37 of 1904, The Chinese 
Exclusion Act. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3 
 
These legislative measures served both to curb and minimize the Chinese populations in South 
Africa and subjected those Chinese who remained to onerous and repressive conditions.6 Thus 
upon the arrival of the first Qing Dynasty Consul-General there existed already a population 
of Chinese seeking some form of assistance to alleviate their circumstances. Although the 
struggle and efforts of the South African Chinese against such discrimination has been 
thoroughly examined in the works of several authors, most prominently Karen Harris, the role 
played by the Qing Dynasty government, via its Consul-Generals, has remained comparatively 
unexplored.7 The efforts made by the Consul-Generals to support and assist the South African 
Chinese have not been covered in detail, leading to an unfortunate tendency to minimize the 
role played by the Dynasty in this affair, or simply to cast it as having been neglectful of its 
overseas subjects in South Africa.8 This lacuna will form the crux of the following analysis. 
 
As part of this analysis, the presence of the Chinese in South Africa must be set in its wider 
context. From the mid-nineteenth century up to the early twentieth century there was a massive 
movement of peoples out of China and into other countries.9 This large-scale migration of 
Chinese became possible due to an easing of the Qing Dynasty’s policies and legislation 
surrounding the matter of migration. The Qing Dynasty regime ruled China proper from 1644 
until it’s collapse in 1912. Traditionally the Qing Dynasty had maintained a very strict set of 
rules concerning the ability for Chinese to travel abroad, almost completely forbidding it.10 It 
should be noted that this aversion to the movement of Chinese subjects out of China, 
particularly by sea, was not exclusively a policy of the Qing Dynasty, but a continuation of the 
preceding Tang and Ming Dynasties own policies. However, migration had formed a historical 
part of the development of the Chinese state, even despite attempts by some Dynasties to 
prevent it. A consistent trend of southern migration, from central and northern China, had 
played an integral part in the growth of China, and attempts at forbidding migration would 
never fully prevent this further southern migratory pattern.11 The Qing Dynasty, however, did 
tighten existing regulations on migration in response to fears that Chinese mariners could 
                                                 
6 Y. J. Park: "Living In Between: The Chinese in South Africa," Migration Policy Institute, 12 January 2002.  
7 L. Anshan, C. Tan (ed): Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora: China’s African Policy and the Chinese 
Immigrants in Africa, p. 60. 
8 Ibid. 
9 H. K. Norton: The Story of California From the Earliest Days to the Present, pp. 283–284. 
10 K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, 
China’s Rise and the Chinese Overseas, pp. 87-88. 
11 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 72. 
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become pirates.12 As a result, up until 1688, the official stance of the Qing Dynasty on the 
matter of Chinese subjects moving overseas largely amounted to permitting only officials and 
soldiers, who had governmental approval, to do so, whilst any other Chinese subject who did 
so would be subjected to execution upon return to China.13 A relaxation of this policy did occur 
during the eighteenth century, but overall the Dynasty’s official stance on migration was still 
to distinctly oppose it and, moreover, the Dynasty remained opposed to assisting any Chinese 
subjects overseas.14 This reluctance to assist or intervene on behalf of its Chinese subjects was 
exemplified in the aftermath of events such as the 1740 Batavia Massacre, in which the 
authorities of the Dutch East India Company (DEIC), in conjunction with native Indonesians, 
massacred at least 10 000 Chinese immigrants in Indonesia. Despite the severity of this event 
the Emperor of the Qing Dynasty at the time reacted, primarily, by expressing anger at the 
Chinese immigrants themselves, saying of them: 
 
They disgracefully abandoned their ancestors to gain fortune in an alien country, 
so they would be abandoned and receive no sympathy or support from the 
government.15 
 
However, in time foreign intervention would result in this policy against immigration being 
coercively altered. Following China’s defeat in the Opium Wars (1st Opium War: 4 September 
1839 – 29 August 1842; Second Opium War: 8 October 1856 – 24 October 1860) and the series 
of treaties which followed -  most important of which was arguably the Sino-British 
Convention of Peking (24 October 1860) -  permitted Chinese subjects to immigrate and move 
into other countries without fear of any consequence or persecution from the Qing Dynasty.16 
By the end of 1860, the dominant Western powers had largely opened the Qing Dynasty up to 
immigration, through a combination of both diplomacy and force and had created the 
conditions which helped permit the  large-scale migration of Chinese into other states. 
However, the interference of the Western powers was only a single factor in this migration. 
                                                 
12 I. Shen: A History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practices, 
p. 188. 
13 Ibid. 
14 R. L. Irick: Ch'ing Policy Towards the Coolie Trade, 1874-1878, p. 390. 
15 I. Shen: A History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practices, 
p. 177. 
16 C. P. Fitzgerald: The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People, p. 5. 
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Widescale civil conflict and economic difficulties also served to motivate numerous Chinese 
to seek opportunities abroad.17  Impoverishment followed as a result of droughts and famine, 
exacerbated by civil unrest such as the Taiping Rebellion (December 1850 – August 1864) and 
Boxer Rebellion (2 November 1899 – 7 September 1901), which devastated southern China.18 
Furthermore, the Western powers sought access to a large and cheap labour force, with which 
to drive the further exploitation of recently discovered resources, in their colonies, and their 
own industrialization.19 The concatenation of these factors, working together, saw the massive 
migration of Chinese into overseas Western states and colonies, such as Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and, for our purposes most importantly, the British Colonies of South Africa. 
 
Although the earliest Chinese in South Africa arrived largely as debtors from Batavia, 
imprisoned by the Dutch in the Cape Colony, the numbers of these Chinese remained very low, 
rarely exceeding even 100 individuals.20 From the 1860’s onwards the easing of the Dynasty’s 
regulations on migration, as well as the draw of the mines in South Africa, would attract a 
larger number of Chinese.21 However, initially the conditions of immigrating and living in 
South Africa proved arduous, and unindentured Chinese were not able to be  employed on 
mines due to restrictive legislation.22 As a result, many of them instead turned to becoming 
traders and merchants. 23  The attractiveness of South African mines as possible business 
opportunities for Chinese only worsened as the incumbent authorities, not yet under the 
authority of the British Empire, in the Boer Republics passed further legislation targeting 
Chinese immigrants between 1888 and 1899.24  Following the Anglo-Boer War (1899 – 1902), 
and the annexation of the two Boer Republics by the British Empire, the matter of Chinese 
immigration into South Africa would become a contentious topic.  From 1902, with the British 
Empire now having secured South Africa’s mineral wealth, the question of adequate, and 
always cheap, labour to be used in the exploitation of these mines, came up. Drawing upon 
prior experience, and after an inquiry by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, the 
                                                 
17 K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, 
China’s Rise and the Chinese Overseas, pp. 89-90. 
18 H. K. Norton: The Story of California From the Earliest Days to the Present, pp. 283–284. 
19 R. Skeldon: “Migration from China,” Journal of International Affairs, (49), 2, pp 434-444.  
20 D. Man & M. Yap: Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa, p. 510. 
21 Y.J., Park: "Living In Between: The Chinese in South Africa," Migration Policy Institute, 12 January 2002. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 I. Shen: A History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practices, 
p. 145. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6 
 
decision taken by the colonial commission was that Chinese labourers would be most suited to 
importing and using on these mines.25 British officials at the time were already aware that there 
would be a public backlash in response to the arrival of large numbers of Chinese, and went 
out of their way to attempt to convince the public of South Africa of the benefits of Chinese 
labourers, describing them in, frankly, rather bizarre ways: 
 
The heathen Chinese has a large and highly developed brain, the push and 
resource of a live Yankee, the financial and business ability of the Jew, the 
coolness and acquisitiveness of the canny Scot, and the patient and temperate 
habits of the Turks, all rolled into one. He has the strength and toughness of a 
mule, the appetite and digestive powers of an ostrich and the staying qualities 
of a steam engine.26 
 
Regardless of the anti-Chinese sentiment within the South Africa colonies, the British Empire 
went ahead and arranged a contractual agreement with the Qing Dynasty for the importation of 
indentured Chinese labour to the Transvaal.27 This process was legalized and then regulated  
under the Transvaal Labour Importation Ordinance of 1904 and was to set in motion for the 
arrival of some sixty-five thousand Chinese indentured labourers into the Transvaal Colony.28 
This Ordinance proscribed the nature of the Chinese labourers’ contracts and it was later 
amended to make allowance for the provision of the position of the Chinese Consul-General to 
South Africa.29 Thus the Ordinance also opened official diplomatic relations between the 
colonies of South Africa and the Qing Dynasty.  
 
As mentioned above, from the outset of the creation of the post of Chinese Consul-General the 
issue of legislation, which specifically targeted Chinese, existed. As a result, the Qing Dynasty 
                                                 
25 I. Shen: A History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practices, 
p. 145. 
26 Ibid, pp. 146-147. 
27 (TAB) Official Publications of the Transvaal Government (AMPT PUBS) 47 CD1956: “Africa No. 6 (1904). 
Convention Between the United Kingdom and China Respecting the Employment of Chinese Labour in British 
Colonies and Protectorates. Signed at London, May 13, 1904. 
28 Y.J., Park: “Living In Between: The Chinese in South Africa” Migration Policy Institute, 12 January 2002. 
29 (KAB) GH 23/89 298: “General Despatches. Appointment of Mr Liu Yu Ling to Act as Chinese Consul-General 
for the British Colonies in South Africa,” 19 October 1905. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
7 
 
was confronted with a situation in which a number of its subjects were negatively affected by 
legislation in South Africa. This legislation was largely motivated by fears among the dominant 
minority group of European citizens of South Africa, in many ways resembling similar panics 
among European colonists, from America to Australia to New Zealand, in response to the 
prospect of large numbers of Chinese entering their states. From the 1870s onwards numerous 
countries such as  Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA to name but a few, all passed 
legislation designed specifically to prevent large numbers of Chinese from entering and 
remaining in the country.30 This was often motivated by public outcry or fear at the prospect 
of large numbers of Chinese entering the respective countries themselves.31 The presence of 
Chinese labourers, fears concerning cultural differences, disease, morality or assimilation or 
the threat they posed to “white settlers” became highly political questions in such states. The 
reaction against Chinese immigration also became an important feature of political collusion 
between middle class and working-class whites in South Africa, as it did in Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand, all sharing a broad anti-Chinese sentiment.32 In Australia, these policies 
were enacted by the 1850s already, followed by both Canada and New Zealand in the 1880s.33 
By contrast South Africa’s harshest exclusionary legislation began later, in 1904, due to the 
large influx of indentured Chinese into the Transvaal in that same year.  Up until this time, 
evidence indicated that the Qing Dynasty’s official position on this would be apathetic, but in 
South Africa, from the period at which the position of a Chinese Consul-General was created 
in 1905, the Dynasty did make efforts to assist and improve the situation of Chinese peoples in 
South Africa.34  
 
This then leaves the question of what exactly was the response of the Qing Dynasty to the 
treatment of the Chinese along with the legislation in South Africa? The response can be 
divided into various phases. Initially the Dynasty offered little protest, or aid, during the years 
before the introduction of the Transvaal Ordinance of 1904, even though  a second wave of 
                                                 
30 K. L. Harris: “Paper Trail: Chasing the Chinese in the Cape (1904-1933),” Kronos Southern African Histories, 
(40), 1, November 2014, p. 133. 
31 C. Price: The Great White Walls Are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australasia 1836-
1888, pp. 123-124. 
32 M. van der Linden & J. Lucassen (eds.): Racism and the Labour Market: Historical Studies, p. 355. 
33 T. E. Boswell: “A Split Labor Market Analysis,” American Sociological Review, (51), 3, pp. 366-367. 
34 Y. Hwang: Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese During the Late Ch'ing Period 
(1851-1911), p. 347. 
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Chinese immigration to South Africa had already begun in the 1880s.35 As mentioned the Qing 
Dynasty’s efforts to lobby on, or promote the cause of the Chinese in South Africa,  only 
occurred after the creation of the position of Chinese Consul-General in 1905. It should, 
however, be remembered that there was no official representative of the Dynasty within any of 
the South African states prior to 1905. This would offer some obvious physical barriers to the 
Dynasty’s involvement with the Chinese in that area. It did not however, change the reality that 
the Dynasty remained almost completely detached from its overseas subjects in South Africa 
until 1904. From 1904, however, the Chinese Consuls did pay attention to and petition on 
behalf of Chinese in South Africa.36 This was in line with a general trend in the Dynasty’s final 
years, to attempt to become more involved in the affairs of the overseas Chinese population.37 
An important point that should also be made is that although the original role of the Chinese 
Consul-General was envisioned purely as one to provide oversight over the indentured Chinese 
labourers, by 1905 its ambit had been expanded to encompass the small number of free Chinese 
residing in South Africa as well, effectively making the Consul a form of representation for all 
Chinese in South Africa.38  
 
As will become apparent, despite the interventions made by the respective Consul-Generals 
there was little positive substantive change in the circumstances of the South African Chinese. 
In general, the Transvaal, Cape and later Union governments rebuffed or resisted any 
compromise or change regarding their desire to exclude the Chinese from South Africa. Despite 
some successes overall the Qing Dynasty failed in its efforts to alleviate the hardships of the 
South African Chinese. This is can be seen in the 1913 Immigration Law of the Union of South 
Africa, passed just after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, which almost completely halted 
further Chinese immigration into South Africa until the 1960’s.39 Although it can safely be said 
that the Qing Dynasty did not achieve many of its objectives, with regards to its lobbying on 
behalf of Chinese subjects in South Africa, this must not be seen as translating into a lack of 
attempting to do so, nor reflect a general apathy. It is clear that the Dynasty, in its closing days, 
primarily through its Consul Generals, did make a serious effort at attempting to assist Chinese 
                                                 
35 Y. Hwang: Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese During the Late Ch'ing Period 
(1851-1911), p. 347. 
36 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 250. 
37 Y. Hwang: Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese During the Late Ch'ing Period 
(1851-1911), p. 347. 
38 K. L. Harris, C. Tan (ed): The Chinese in South Africa, Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora, p. 181. 
39 Ibid, p. 183. 
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subjects – both free and indentured – in South Africa. However, these efforts largely met with 
failure, and must be considered in the light of the Qing Dynasty’s own, social, political, 
economic and military weakness, as well as the resistance of the South African authorities. 
Thus, there were few options or methods through which the Qing Dynasty could have managed 
to effect any serious change on the policy of South Africa.  
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
The circumstances of the Chinese in South Africa, during the closing stages of the Qing 
Dynasty, is not an unexplored topic by any measure. The discussion surrounding it already 
exists in impressive detail, and South African scholars have helped contribute insights to both 
the history of Chinese immigrants into South Africa and Africa as a whole. In particular Karen 
Harris has made a comprehensive and extensive contribution to the history of the Chinese in 
South Africa, detailing their history from their arrival in the original Dutch colony.40 Through 
multiple works she has covered the free Chinese communities within South Africa, as well as 
the indentured Chinese labourers, and has made an extensive examination of their situations 
and circumstances within South Africa as well as how they resisted the discrimination they 
suffered.41 Her works have also served to bring to light the often overlooked role the Transvaal 
Chinese Association played in resistance to the Asiatic Registration Act.42 Her extensive work 
concerning the circumstances of the Chinese in South Africa were crucial to creating the 
context of this argument. Harris’s work on the history of Chinese in South Africa touches 
directly upon many of the key issues already mentioned, containing detailed analysis of the 
type of prejudicial legislation the Chinese overseas found themselves facing. Her work also 
considers the measures and efforts they took to try to change these circumstances. It goes into 
                                                 
40 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912. 
41 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, The Construction of Otherness: A history of 
Chinese Migrants in South Africa, BEE-ing Chinese in South Africa: A Legal Historic Perspective. 
42 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912; The Construction of Otherness: A history of 
Chinese Migrants in South Africa; BEE-ing Chinese in South Africa: A Legal Historic Perspective; K. L. Harris: 
“‘Strange Bedfellows’: Gandhi and Chinese Passive Resistance 1906-1911,” Journal of Natal and Zulu History, 
13, (2), 2013; K. L. Harris: “Paper Trail: Chasing the Chinese in the Cape (1904-1933),” Kronos Southern African 
Histories, (40), 1, November 2014, pp. 133-153. 
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extensive detail about the history of the Chinese at the time in question, and touches upon the 
effects that the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act had upon these communities.43 
 
Yoon Park, a sociologist, also provided extensive insight into the circumstances of the South 
African Chinese, assisting in fleshing out the context in which the Consul-Generals acted.44 
Her sociological study on the lives of the Chinese currently within South Africa also assisted. 
The work of Linda Human, Melanie Yap and Diane Man also provided an additional insight 
into the circumstances of the Chinese in South Africa.45 The archival records concerning the 
South African Chinese impart only the official stances and perspectives as recorded by state 
players or delivered petitions, and rarely give a wide variety of personal insights from the 
Chinese themselves. Due to the connections Melanie Yap and Diane Man had with members 
of the Chinese communities, their work provides some degree of a perspective from the South 
Africa Chinese themselves, as opposed simply to the view of the South African authorities on 
their actions.  
 
The work of Peter Richardson was utilized when studying the indentured Chinese labourers. 
Richardson has written extensively on Chinese indentured labour on the mines, providing an 
insight into their treatment and conditions, as well as expounding on their resistance to 
persecution.46 His extensive work concerning the recruitment and treatment of the indentured 
Chinese on the mines proved invaluable.47 His work on the indentured labourers was further 
supplemented by the works of Harris on the topic, as well as that of Gary Kynoch.48  
 
Wang Gungwu’s works on the Chinese overseas informed the analysis of the South African 
Chinese, as well as providing context for the historical migration of the Chinese abroad 
                                                 
43 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912. 
44 Y. Park: A Matter of Honour: Being Chinese in South Africa. 
45 D. Man, M. Yap: Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa. 
46 P. Richardson: Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal. 
47 P. Richardson: “The Recruiting of Chinese Indentured Labour for the South African Gold-Mines, 1903-1908,” 
The Journal of African History, (18), 1, 1977, pp. 85-108. 
48 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, G. Kynoch: “Controlling the Coolies: Chinese 
Miners and the Struggle for Labor in South Africa, 1904-1910,” International Journal of African Historical 
Studies, 36, (2), 2003. 
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between the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.49 Furthermore Gungwu’s work 
concerning the Chinese overseas and the loaded nature of the term ‘sojourners’ has been used 
to inform and clarify the position of the South African Chinese.50 Yen-ching Hwang’s Coolies 
and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese During the Late Ch'ing Period (1851-
1911) is wide in scope, and thus does not provide too much in the way of exact detail or in 
depth analysis of South Africa’s situation. However, it still provides an impressive and 
informative overview of the Qing Dynasty’s general policy and attitudes towards its overseas 
subjects, giving some insight into the Consul-Generals.51 His works help to place the actions 
of the Consul-Generals within the greater context of the Qing Dynasty’s changing attitude 
towards their overseas subjects. I-yao Shen and Li Anshan’s works assisted in providing some 
information into the lives of the Consul-Generals themselves. 52  Li Anshan’s work is 
particularly useful due to his translation of the works of Chen Hansheng, particularly his A 
Compilation of Historical Documents, which collates numerous governmental 
communications by Liu Yu Ling and Liu Ngai during their tenure as Consul-Generals.53  
 
In addition to these, and looking further back, Philip Snow’s The Star Raft: China’s encounter 
with Africa is a slightly older work, but still has relevant and useful information about the early 
interactions between China and South Africa.54 In particular, the book has no small amount of 
historical information concerning the lifestyle and behaviour patterns of Chinese immigrants 
in South Africa during the early twentieth century. It gives deep insight into their 
circumstances, albeit with little information concerning the Qing Dynasty’s own role in their 
affairs.55 There were a number of other scholarly works which focused on the systematic 
persecution suffered by Chinese immigrants between 1860 and 1912. Often these studies did 
not have a specific focus on South Africa, and their overview of the situation was brief, but 
still contained relevant information, such as the works of Glen Petersen and Ian Taylor.56 
                                                 
49 W. Gungwu: “Greater China and the Chinese Overseas,” The China Quarterly, 136, 1993, Maritime China in 
Transition, Diasporic Chinese Ventures: The Life and Work of Wang Gungwu. 
50 W. Gungwu: “Greater China and the Chinese Overseas,” The China Quarterly, 136, 1993, pp. 927-928. 
51 Y. Hwang: Coolies and Mandarins: China’s protection of Overseas Chinese during the late Ch’ing period 
(1851-1911). 
52 I. Shen: History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practises, 
L. Anshan: A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911. 
53 L. Anshan: A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911. 
54 P. Snow: The Star Raft: China’s Encounter with Africa. 
55 Ibid. 
56 I. Taylor: China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise, G. Petersen: Overseas Chinese in the People’s 
Republic of China. 
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Rachel Bright’s work in the Palgrave Macmillan Chinese Labour series includes a wide array 
of works which provided information on the Qing Dynasty’s situation, particularly its decline, 
and also shed further light on the Consul-General’s relationships with the indentured Chinese 
within the Transvaal.57 
 
As indicated, the archival sources at the Cape Town Archive and National Archive Repository 
in Pretoria were vital in providing official information on the actions and statements of the 
Consul-Generals. The National Archive Repository was specifically important for providing 
several notes, letters and exchanges, in which Consul-Generals made explicitly clear their 
objection and distaste for the exclusionary and discriminatory legislation in South Africa.58 
These records also contained explicit evidence of the Qing Dynasty’s own, official, 
condemnation of such legislation, and also numerous cases of attempts by the Consul-Generals 
to petition the Transvaal, Cape and British governments to change or overturn discriminatory 
legislation.59 The archival sources also contained a wealth of letters written by the Consul-
Generals in support of Chinese seeking permits to enter or return to the Cape Colony.60 
Government records were the most extensive and important of archival documents used, 
containing information on foreign representatives as well as  correspondences concerning 
them. Supplementing these, the Rand Daily Mail online archive hosted by Readex provided a 
wealth of information concerning the reaction and reception of the Chinese in the Transvaal at 
the time. It further contained information regarding the Consul-Generals Liu Yu Ling and Liu 
Ngai not contained within the archival record. 
 
The literature on the Chinese in South Africa is relatively limited. There are thus only a handful 
of publications that deal with aspects related to this study. These include primarily historical 
                                                 
57 R. Bright (ed): Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-1910, Race, Violence, and Global Spectacle, the Palgrave 
Macmillan Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-1910. 
58 National Archives Repository (Public Records of Central Government since 1910.) (SAB) GG 900 01 15/706, 
15/557, 37/45, 15/724: “Asiatics: Chinese. Forwards Note by Chinese Minister in London on Subject of Treatment 
of Chinese in South Africa and Requests Minister’s observation,” 28 April 1914. 
59 (SAB) GG 900 01 15/706, 15/557, 37/45, 15/724: “Asiatics: Chinese. Forwards Note by Chinese Minister in 
London on Subject of Treatment of Chinese in South Africa and Requests Minister’s observation,” 28 April 1914; 
(SAB) GG 1320 37/42: “Transvaal Draft Municipal Ordinance: Protest by Chinese Minister in Against Provisions 
as Affecting Chinese Residents of Transvaal,” 1911, KAB GH 23/117 117: “General Despatches. Regarding 
Correspondence with Acting Chinese Consul-General Regarding Disabilities Under which Chinese Subjects 
Labour in Cape Colony,” 1908.   
60 K. L. Harris: The History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 250. 
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works on the free and indentured Chinese in the Transvaal and Cape colonies at the start of the 
twentieth century along with other sociological and popular works on the Chinese in South 
Africa. Other sources that deal with the overseas Chinese, legislation and the Qing Dynasty in 
a much broader context are also of relevance but are fairly limited. Thus, to date, no study has 
looked specifically at the Qing Dynasty Consul-Generals in South Africa in detail. It is thus to 
this issue that this study turns. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
The primary methodology employed was an analytical examination of a specific period. The 
period selected - 1860 to 1912 – was the time window during which Chinese immigration to 
South Africa increased, and during which most of South Africa’s initial anti-Chinese legislation 
was promulgated. It is, of course, necessary to both contextualise and provide background 
information to this by exploring events prior to this period. Because the main concern is the 
official actions of the Qing Dynasty within South Africa, the collapse of the Dynasty serves as 
a terminus point for the analysis.  
 
The most important aspect of the methodology was to secure primary sources, detailing the 
actions, statements, and expressions made by the Qing Dynasty, at an official level, on this 
subject. To this end the use of South African archival sources to determine the actions of the 
Qing Dynasty’s representatives in South Africa, the Consul-Generals, was of particular 
importance. Supplementing these, however, was also the use of existing secondary literature 
on the history of South African Chinese for the period between 1860 and 1912. The 
groundwork already laid out by academics such as Harris, Richardson, Wang and Hwang was 
important to contextualise the argument within wider South African Chinese history. The use 
of the Rand Daily Mail to further explore the reactions to the Consul-Generals, and their 
presence within the news media of the time within the Transvaal, also assisted in strengthening 
the evidence of this argument.  
 
Using these it was possible to provide explicit evidence that the Qing Dynasty did, at a 
governmental level, make concerted efforts from 1905 onwards, to assist and represent the 
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concerns of the South African Chinese to both the Transvaal and Cape governments, as well 
as the authorities of the British Empire. The particular cases of their intervention and assistance 
were examined and discussed in more detail, as well as their own explicit sentiments contained 
in their letters of protest to both governments. The fact that these efforts by the Qing Dynasty 
mostly failed will also be made evident. However, an important point to be made is that this 
apparent failure does not translate into a lack of effort or concern by the Qing Dynasty. It will 
be shown that the Dynasty did take reasonable measures within the parameters of their political, 
economic and social constraints. This is not only of significance within the historical context, 
but also pertinent to the more recent debate South Africa found itself in at the end of the 
twentieth century regarding the matter of its relations with the two different Chinese states; the 
PRC and Republic of China (ROC). 
 
The primary methodological challenges encountered can be divided into four parts: the issue 
of language translation; the lack of detailed archival sources from the Qing Dynasty itself; the 
matter of inherent bias in the official documents of the time; as well as the issue of a lack of 
insight into opinions or feelings of the Chinese in South Africa as to the efforts made by the 
Qing Dynasty to assist. These posed differing degrees of challenge but are aspects of the 
methodology that could not be ignored. 
 
The issue of language is, of course, nothing new. The problem of translating a language into 
another often means that intention, purpose, meaning and such can all be lost. When translating 
Chinese, particularly traditional Chinese as was used by the Qing Dynasty, there always exists 
the potential for mistranslation or incomplete translations. As this is primarily an English 
analysis and examination, it was used as the language in which to translate and provide any 
information, including quotes by Chinese individuals, and the veracity and accuracy of these 
statements cannot be guaranteed to be anything approaching certainty.  
 
A further complication with language rests on the fact that for many of the Chinese in South 
Africa, including aides to the Chinese Consul-Generals, English was not necessarily a language 
they were highly versed in, creating a space for reasonable doubt that their actual intentions 
were not always accurately reflected in their letters and notes. A further difficulty lay in gaining 
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access to the Qing Dynasty’s own records concerning their Consul-Generals in the Cape and 
Transvaal. Unsurprisingly, as a polity existing for more than 200 years, the Qing Dynasty did 
leave behind a relatively large amount of archival information, albeit somewhat disorganized. 
Lack of access due to distance, cost and time led to a greater reliance and dependence on the 
archives contained in South Africa. This, of course, results in a situation where there is an 
excess of South African archival material on this subject being used, compared to 
documentation from the Qing Dynasty. However, access to a portion of Chen Hansheng’s A 
Compilation of Historical Documents, as well as an online copy of the 1904 Emigration 
Convention between Great Britain and the Qing Dynasty, did help to slightly ameliorate this 
problem.61 
 
As always, the use of official government documents results in the need to keep in mind 
preconceptions, beliefs and interests which resounded with the said states at the time of the 
document’s creation. Of course, the purpose of this analysis is not to make judgements 
regarding these, so it is important also not to allow such bias to influence the argument. Lastly, 
and similarly, because this analysis largely deals with the decisions and actions of state actors, 
there is a noticeable absence of information as to how the Chinese subjects in South Africa, at 
the time, felt themselves, or interpreted, the actions of the Qing Dynasty during this period.  
 
1.4 Structure 
 
Chapter one serves as an introduction to the context of the primary argument being made: that 
the Qing Dynasty government did earnestly attempt to assist Chinese in South Africa in the 
face of several discriminatory pieces of legislation. It intends to provide evidence of explicit 
cases of the rendered assistance. This chapter begins with an overview which states this primary 
argument of the work and also provides contextual information placing it first within the wider 
context of the mass migration of Chinese labour during the mid-nineteenth century, its relation 
to European colonial economic concerns of the time, and then placing it more narrowly within 
the scope of existing South Africa history concerning the South African Chinese population. 
Following this overview, a review of a selection of some of the existing literature is included. 
                                                 
61 L. Anshan: A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911, Treaties, Conventions etc. between China and 
Foreign States: Emigration Convention between Great Britain and China, 1904. 
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The importance of secondary sources which have already created a discussion on this subject, 
is presented, but also pointing out that a focus on the Qing Dynasty’s own policies, or roles, 
has been relatively minimal. This review also mentions the primary sources (archival 
documents and newspaper sources) used, detailing the actions taken by Consul-Generals with 
regards to the discrimination faced by Chinese in South Africa. The methodology used, as well 
as the four methodological challenges facing this study, are also indicated within the 
Introduction. Finally, the Introduction also includes an outline of the six proposed chapters.  
 
Chapter two focuses on the matter of the Qing Dynasty and its historical relation and position, 
with regard to immigration of its subjects. It outlines the strict punishments the Dynasty both 
inherited and inflicted during its initial existence, along with some of the motivations for this 
position. It also details the transition towards a more open position on immigration brought 
about in 1860, following its defeat in the Second Opium War. The nature of the changes the 
Qing Dynasty’s immigration policy saw after 1860 are also provided, as well as the ensuing 
mass migration of Chinese out of the Dynasty’s territory to other destinations during the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. The reasons for this mass migration are detailed and divided into 
two sections. The first section focuses on the demand by Western powers for large bodies of 
unskilled labour that could be exploited and paid cheaply. The second section deals with the 
growing impoverishment of Chinese subjects, connected to agricultural decline and the Boxer 
and Taiping Rebellions between 1850 and 1901. It then considers the role of Impoverishment, 
which served as a key motivation for Chinese subjects to seek work and employment 
elsewhere, having now been afforded for the first time the chance for comparatively easy 
migration. It concludes by providing a brief overview of the history of Chinese in South Africa 
prior to 1904. 
 
Chapter three narrows the context of the thesis down to the actual area of the argument, which 
is South Africa between 1860 and 1912. This chapter provides an explanation concerning South 
African anti-Chinese sentiment. It also considers the role the British annexation of the two Boer 
Republics and their mines played in creating the discriminatory legislation. Most of the relevant 
legislation for this analysis only occurred in the aftermath of 1902, in response to the British 
Empire’s decision to import massive amounts of Chinese labour into South Africa. Further 
context is provided by exploring the difference between Chinese indentured labour and the 
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small group of free Chinese residents in South Africa. Furthermore, the analysis of these free 
Chinese is divided between the communities in the Cape Colony and the communities in the 
Transvaal. Chapter three then focuses on exploring the two Consul-Generals, Liu Yu Ling and 
Liu Ngai. It provides biographical information on both, as well as an outline of the period 
during which they served as Consul-Generals. 
 
Chapters four and five form the main thrust of the research and together focus on the efforts of 
the Consul-Generals to render aid to the South African Chinese. This is achieved by examining 
these two individuals in the context of their geo-political actions whilst serving as Consul-
Generals for the Qing Dynasty. 
 
Chapter four focuses on the efforts of Liu Yu Ling and Liu Ngai within the Transvaal Colony, 
and later Transvaal province of the Union of South Africa. These efforts are divided between 
the indentured Chinese labourers and the free Chinese community of the Transvaal. In the case 
of the indentured Chinese labourers the Labour Importation Ordinance which regulated them, 
as well as the repressive character of its provisions, are described and explained. Further the 
resistance of the indentured Chinese to their treatment on the mines, and the regulations of the 
Ordinance are described. Liu Yu Ling’s efforts to assist the indentured Chinese are detailed 
along with his role in the Special Committee on the Control of the Chinese Indentured 
Labourers. The matter of the assistance of Liu Yu Ling to the free Transvaal Chinese is also 
focused on and assessed.   
 
Chapter five builds on chapter four by advancing the argument that the Consul-Generals made 
significant efforts to assist the South African Chinese. It focuses on the efforts of the Consul-
Generals within the Cape Colony, first providing an overview of the emergence of anti-
Sinicism within the Colony during 1904, spurred by the arrival of the indentured Chinese 
labourers in the Transvaal. The significance of the Chinese within the politics of the Cape at 
the time is also contemplated, as is the provisions and effects of the Cape Chinese Exclusion 
Act upon the Chinese community within the Cape. The actions taken by Consul-General Liu 
Yu Ling to assist the Cape Chinese is explored as is his open critique of the Exclusion Act in 
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1911.62 However, the fact that the Exclusion Act became incorporated within the legislation of 
the Union, and remained in force up until 1933, indicates that the Consul-Generals’ efforts to 
assist were limited.63 Chapter five ends by appraising the legacy of the Consul-Generals for the 
South Africa Chinese.  
 
Chapter six is the conclusion. It assesses the efforts made by the Consul-Generals to both relay 
complaints concerning legislative discrimination against Chinese in South Africa, and their 
own, independent, action to protest, or suggest solutions, concerning said pieces of legislation. 
Although the Qing Dynasty’s position towards its overseas subjects was traditionally regarded 
as apathetic, in the case of South Africa, between 1904 and 1912, this was clearly not the case. 
It is important to note what efforts were made by the Dynasty. At the same time, it is also 
important to note the conditions and circumstances of the Dynasty, in terms of its own political, 
economic, social and military instability and weakness of the time.   
 
 
  
                                                 
62 (SAB) GG 900 01 15/706, 15/557, 37/45, 15/724: “Asiatics: Chinese. Forwards Note by Chinese Minister in 
London on Subject of Treatment of Chinese in South Africa and Requests Minister’s Observation,” 28 April 1914. 
63 Statutes of the Union of South Africa, Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 1933. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
Chapter 2: Too little, Too late: The Migration Policies of the Qing Dynasty 
 
Chapter two provides an overview of the Qing Dynasty’s historical position on migration. It 
focuses on the shifts which occurred in this position over the course of the Qing Dynasty’s 
existence by dividing the Dynasty’s approach to migration into three distinct phases. Initially 
the Qing Dynasty inherited an isolationist stance from the preceding Ming Dynasty, 
perpetuating its opposition to the migration of its subjects. The Qing would, however, double 
down on this policy, establishing a regime even more hostile to migration of any sort, and 
displaying an apathy to the suffering of any of its subjects overseas. The role of internal 
difficulties, as well as the pressure applied by Western powers to force the Qing Dynasty to 
permit migration following 1860, is then explored. The final phase of the Qing Dynasty’s 
stance on migration, its fleeting attempt to engage with its overseas subjects and assist them, is 
then acknowledged as well as explained as being motivated by the rational self-interest of the 
Dynasty. Finally, the chapter provides an explanation of the mass Chinese migration which 
occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century and examines the historical arrival of the 
Chinese in South Africa. 
 
2.1 History of Neglect: The Qing Dynasty and its Subjects Abroad 
 
The Qing Dynasty was China’s last dynastic Empire. It was a multicultural Empire, which 
lasted for roughly three centuries from 1644 to 1912. It had the unique distinction of being the 
longest lasting of any of the so-called conquest Dynasties. A conquest Dynasty, quite simply, 
refers to a Dynasty founded by a non-ethnic Chinese group as was the case in the Yuan Dynasty 
and Qing Dynasty.1 The Qing Dynasty began when the Jurchen, an ethnic group from within 
the Chinese region of Manchuria, successfully exploited a period of rebellion and unrest within 
the preceding Ming Dynasty to establish themselves as the rulers of China.2 It was under the 
rulership of the Qing Dynasty that the boundaries of the modern Chinese state were finally 
created. These are the boundaries inherited by the PRC (1949 to the present) and the ROC 
(1912-1949). Although the rulers of the Qing Dynasty were, technically, a different ethnic 
                                                 
1 W. Gungwu: China and the World Since 1949: The Impact of Independence, Modernity and Revolution, pp. 3-
4.  
2  K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 64. 
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group to the predominant Han Chinese ethnic group of the Empire, they were committed to 
maintaining the traditions and Confucian norms of the preceding Chinese imperial states.3 An 
important example of an area where the Qing Dynasty remained committed to the norms of its 
predecessor Dynasty was on the matter of emigration. Emigration, of course, has existed within 
the bounds of China as it has everywhere else in the world. Indeed, emigration had long formed 
a key aspect of the expansion of the historical Chinese state, as migrants moved further afield.4 
The Qing Dynasty was, after all, the inheritor of a succession of conquests, emigrations, and 
expansions to which itself contributed, and which created the boundaries of what was thought 
of, and is thought of, as China.  
 
However, the Qing Dynasty did attempt to continue the former Ming Dynasty’s tradition of 
isolationism.5 An important aspect to this was the limiting of emigration, particularly by sea 
travel, for all subjects. The primary motivation for this was due to fears that Chinese moving 
outside the borders of the Empire might be prone to forming bandit or rebel groups, threatening 
the Empire.6 This same fear had been the motivation for the Ming Dynasty’s own stance against 
emigration.7 Fundamentally the officials of the Qing Dynasty simply did not believe that 
Chinese people would wish to permanently depart their homeland, and Chinese who travelled 
abroad were described as huaqiao, or sojourners, with the implication that any Chinese subject 
who did leave the Empire would always return.8 This concept was encapsulated in a common 
Chinese saying, used when discussing emigrants: 
 
 A tree may grow to a thousand feet, but its leaves fall back to its roots.9 
 
It is important to note that the specific term, huaqiao, began to be used in 1890. Though often 
translated simply as “overseas Chinese” the exact translation is, as stated, closer to “Chinese 
                                                 
3 K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, 
China’s Rise and the Chinese Overseas, pp. 87-88. 
4 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 73. 
5 Y. Hwang: Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Chinese overseas During the Late Ch'ing Period 
(1851-1911), p. xiv. 
6 Ibid. 
7 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 65. 
8 D. Lary: Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas Over Four Millennia, p. 98. 
9 Ibid. 
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sojourner”, with the meaning of the term being that the individual will return to China at a 
certain point.10 The word’s meaning differed from that of a word like immigrant, as huaqiao 
implied that the cultural ties and loyalty of the individual remained with China.11 Of course, 
this assumption was incorrect, and a distinction between those Chinese who fell into the 
category of sojourners, that is to say worked abroad but ultimately intended to and did return 
to China, and those who were simply individuals of Chinese ethnicity who lived in other states 
is important to draw. Although the term sojourners is useful when discussing Chinese 
migratory labour of the early twentieth century, there is no commonly accepted term to refer 
to all individuals of Chinese ethnicity living abroad.12 To follow the example of Professor 
Wang Gungwu the simple term “Chinese overseas”, as opposed to the more loaded “overseas 
Chinese”, is used when referencing any and all Chinese outside of China itself.13  
 
The Dynasty’s approach to its subjects would change with time. The pattern which would come 
to emerge was one in which the Dynasty’s interests in its subjects abroad was linked to its own 
power. Whilst the Dynasty remained a hegemonic force, to at least some degree, it largely 
neglected and actively repressed any Chinese who moved abroad. However, once its own 
power base began to weaken, and it sought ways to address the causes of this weakness, it 
altered its policies to become more supportive and inclusive of the Chinese overseas.14 Over 
time this took on three different approaches, which will be detailed below. 
 
2.2 Phases of the Qing Dynasty’s Migration Policies 
 
The Qing Dynasty’s policies regarding Chinese overseas can be broken down into three 
periods. The first of these periods, encompassing the Qing Dynasty’s policies concerning 
Chinese overseas prior to 1860, can rather charitably be described as “restrictive”. Inheriting 
the already isolationist stance of the former dominant polity, the Ming Dynasty, the Qing 
                                                 
10 G. Petersen: Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China, p. 28. 
11 Ibid. 
12 W. Gungwu: “Greater China and the Chinese Overseas,” The China Quarterly, 136, December 1993, pp. 927-
928. 
13 Ibid. 
14 S. K. Ong: “‘Chinese, but not quite Chinese,’: Huaqiao and the Marginalization of the Overseas Chinese,” 
Journal of Chinese Overseas, 9, (2013), p. 5.  
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Dynasty saw the question of its subjects moving abroad, out of the Empire, purely as a threat.15 
The Qing Dynasty shared the fears of the Ming Dynasty, that any number of subjects existing 
outside the borders of the Empire would, invariably, present a problem either as rebels or as 
bandits or pirates.16 The Qing Dynasty would introduce even more punitive legislation than its 
forebear had and enacted legislation to, effectively, sentence to death any subjects of the 
Empire who travelled abroad without the express permission of the government.17 The Dynasty 
would attempt to enforce this legislation, even going so far as to issue an edict requesting 
foreign countries to repatriate all Chinese within their borders back to the Empire so they could 
face execution.18 Beyond the simple aspect of seeking to prevent potential threats to their rule, 
the Qing Dynasty was also, to an extent, motivated by a belief that Chinese who travelled 
abroad were violating the moral and cultural standards they were expected to be held to.19 One 
of the clearest examples of this was the reaction by the Qing Dynasty to the 1740 Batavia 
Massacre in Indonesia. This mass killing saw somewhere in the vicinity of 10 000 ethnically 
Chinese inhabitants killed by the combined efforts of Dutch colonial troops and native 
collaborators. Yet despite the high death toll, the Qing Dynasty’s Emperor was largely 
unconcerned, and primarily blamed the Chinese overseas for their own situation, stating: 
 
They disgracefully abandoned their ancestors to gain fortune in an alien country, 
so they would be abandoned and would receive no sympathy or support from 
the government.20 
 
However, even in the face of such harsh legislation, and the knowledge that their homeland’s 
government was unlikely to provide them any assistance once they were overseas, emigration 
still increased in the period before 1860.21  
 
                                                 
15 L. Anshan: A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911, p. 81. 
16 Y. Hwang: Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Chinese overseas During the Late Ch'ing Period 
(1851-1911), p. xiv. 
17 M. R. Coolidge: Chinese Immigration, p. 16. 
18 K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, 
China’s Rise and the Chinese Overseas, pp. 87-88. 
19 Ibid. 
20 I. Shen: A History of Chinese Immigration and Exclusion Worldwide: Legal Acts and Discriminatory Practices, 
p. 70. 
21 R. L. Irick: Ch'ing Policy towards the Coolie Trade, 1874-1878, p. 390. 
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The Qing Dynasty’s desire to restrict the movement of their subjects would, however, not 
manage to survive the economic realities of the later nineteenth century. Between the Dynasty’s 
own faltering economy, which left numerous subjects impoverished, and the pressure applied 
by Western powers, the Qing Dynasty would find its attempt to forbid emigration out of the 
Empire forcibly halted in the second half of the nineteenth century. Between 1840 and 1860 
the Qing Dynasty fought two separate Opium Wars against the British Empire and the French.22 
Both wars were fought with an intention, on behalf of the European states involved, to forcibly 
further open up China to economic penetration.23 As a result, the first of these wars forced the 
Qing Dynasty to open up more of its ports to commercial use by foreign nations.24 In the 
aftermath, the Western  powers continued to exert political pressure on the Qing Dynasty to 
allow for further mass movement of Chinese subjects abroad.25 However, irrevocable change 
to the Qing Dynasty’s traditional policies on emigration only came about in 1860, after the 
Qing Dynasty’s defeat in the Second Opium War.26 The conclusion of the War left the Qing 
Dynasty with little political or military capability to refuse the demands of the Western states 
and this was reflected in the conditions of the resulting Peking Convention which was signed 
at the conclusion of the Second Opium War.27 The Convention effectively required the Qing 
Dynasty to remove legal restrictions on Chinese emigration, allowing its subjects to move 
abroad without fear of persecution from the government.28 Article five of the Convention 
permitted Chinese subjects freedom from any legal restriction when traveling abroad on British 
vessels.29 At the same time the Convention did, technically, grant the Qing Dynasty the right 
to have “oversight” of its subjects within British colonies. A combination of the Qing Dynasty’s 
apathy for its overseas subjects, as well as a lack of political clout, meant that initially this 
“oversight” was hardly exercised.30 It should be noted that from the outset the Qing Dynasty’s 
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softening of its stance related only to the exit of its subjects, and Chinese who travelled abroad 
from the Empire were not allowed, legally, to re-enter the Empire until as late as 1893.31 
 
This marked the beginning of the next period of the Qing Dynasty’s policies on migration, 
namely a period in which emigration from the Dynasty abroad was remarkably easier than at 
any other time in the Dynasty’s preceding reign. During this period, Western powers engaged 
in contractual agreements with Qing Dynasty officials, usually at a provincial and local level, 
to organize for large groups of Chinese to be transported to colonies, usually to serve as an 
unskilled workforce within the colony.32 This contractual system was usually governed by 
treaties between the Qing Dynasty and the recruiting state, but extortion or exploitation of the 
legislation was not uncommon. At times the colonial powers would simply not agree to 
legislative measures taken by the Qing Dynasty. In the 1866 Labour Agreement, which the 
Qing Dynasty signed with the French and British Empires, the Dynasty had specified within 
its Article Nine that the contract period for which a Chinese subject could be hired would not 
exceed five years, and that it was the responsibility of the employer to organize return fare for 
the Chinese subject once his contract period was concluded.33  Both Britain and France refused 
to agree to this Article.34 However, the two nations still ratified the Agreement, simply forcing 
the Qing Dynasty to accept it without the desired Article Nine in place.35  
 
As previously stated, this new pattern of emigration, in which the movement of large bodies of 
Chinese subjects was decided upon contractually between the Qing Dynasty government and 
other Western governments, was technically also subject to oversight by the Dynasty. This 
aspect played a role in a new policy of the Dynasty, which was the opening up and broadening 
of its political representation in foreign states. The Qing Dynasty was slow in establishing 
representation and sources of assistance for Chinese overseas, but it gradually began the 
process of opening embassies, and consulates, in various states. These were frequently 
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countries to which Chinese subjects emigrated.36 Starting with London and Singapore in 1877, 
and then later in Washington and Tokyo in 1878, the isolationist political position of the Qing 
Dynasty began to change, as the Dynasty sought, or felt forced to seek, greater political 
engagement with other states. The year 1875 marked the point at which the Qing Dynasty 
accelerated its efforts to engage in diplomatic relations with overseas states.37 On June 17 of 
1875 the Qing Emperor gave his consent to a memorial by his ministers requesting for a 
collection of individuals within the Dynasty with knowledge of foreign states to be sent 
abroad. 38  In 1877 the first of China’s legations was established in London marking the 
beginning of this new period in the Qing Dynasty’s foreign relations.39 
 
However, even though the Qing Dynasty did become more proactive in its engagement with 
foreign powers following the Opium Wars, this did not mean a complete revocation of its 
earlier apathy for the circumstances or difficulties of Chinese overseas. As mentioned above, 
it was only in the closing years of the nineteenth century that the Dynasty at last allowed 
subjects from abroad to return to China without fear of some sort of punitive measure. Although 
the embassies and consulates the Qing Dynasty established in foreign countries did have a legal 
authority and a duty to oversee and inspect the conditions of Chinese subjects within these 
foreign countries, the Dynasty did little to provide any kind of substantive help towards these 
communities until the beginning of the twentieth century.40  
 
The final period of Chinese emigration under the Qing Dynasty can then be described as one 
during which the Dynasty continued to allow relatively free emigration out of the Empire, but 
also began attempting to render limited assistance and aid to the overseas populations of 
Chinese. This third period roughly extends through the 1880s until the collapse of the Dynasty 
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in 1912.41 Thus, even though the Qing Dynasty’s complete ban on migration was overturned 
by 1860, it took the Dynasty almost twenty years before it even began to try to engage in a 
substantive manner with its overseas subjects.42 However, this period would be a brief one, 
ending with the Dynasty’s collapse in 1912. This came after a protracted period during which 
requests for assistance from the Chinese overseas populations had largely been ignored by the 
Qing Dynasty. The Dynasty did on occasion begin to attempt to assist its overseas subjects, but 
in many cases, this was only after they had suffered extensively.43 
 
Furthermore, the Dynasty’s capacity to render assistance was hamstrung by its own political 
weakness. This weakness left the Qing Dynasty in a position where agreements and contracts 
concluded between it and the Western powers were often deeply unfair, either favouring the 
Western power to a significant extent or simply granting the Qing Dynasty very little power in 
whatever contractual relationship they governed. One example of this was the Labour 
Protection Treaty signed by the Qing Dynasty and British Empire in 1904. The purpose of this 
Treaty was a belated reaction to complaints by Chinese overseas about their treatment and was 
also an attempt to secure certain guarantees for their rights. The chief negotiator on behalf of 
the Qing Dynasty, their royal ambassador to Britain, was Zheng Deyi, who attempted to have 
clauses forbidding any employer from hitting Chinese labourers as well as forbidding 
employers selling or loaning out the services of a Chinese labourer to another party.44 The 
British Empire refused to accede to these requirements and, with no real military, economic or 
political might to leverage, the Qing Dynasty was largely forced to abide by whatever terms 
the British Empire felt suitable. This resulted in a treaty which granted the British Empire a 
significant degree of liberty when contracting labourers from China.45 These liberties permitted 
the British Empire to select the port from which labourers would depart; the compensation they 
would receive; as well as the contents of their recruitment contracts; which the British Empire 
further did not need to divulge to the Qing Dynasty officials per their agreement.46 
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Despite this impotence, the late nineteenth century did still see the Qing Dynasty making more 
of an effort to assist its overseas subjects, as can be seen simply by its efforts to negotiate 
treaties intended to safeguard them. The 1904 Labour Treaty served to further entrench this 
new attitude towards the Chinese overseas, by specifically granting the Qing Dynasty the 
capacity to send representatives to any British colony containing Chinese labourers. In the 
official document itself, the role of these officials, consuls and vice-consuls, was specified as 
being to protect and render assistance to Chinese labourers in foreign states, leaving little doubt 
as to the Dynasty’s explicit goal of, as last, providing some form of aid to its overseas subjects: 
 
The Emperor of the Da Qing Nation can dispatch consuls or vice consuls to a 
British territory or a British protected area where Chinese laborers inhabit, to 
oversee and protect the interests and comfort of the local Chinese citizens and 
laborers; the consuls and vice consuls shall enjoy the same rights as consuls of 
other nations.47 
 
However, the change in the Qing Dynasty’s policy towards those Chinese who went abroad 
was not the result of some moral epiphany or desire to help those it had so long ignored. 
Although on an individual level it is possible that some among the Qing Dynasty’s government 
were motivated by a desire to render aid, the overall change in the Dynasty’s longstanding 
position on emigration came about due to more pragmatic concerns. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, and the beginning of the twentieth century, the political expansion the Qing 
Dynasty had begun to bring it into deeper contact with communities of Chinese overseas. As 
embassies and consulates were established in the wake of the two Opium Wars, the financial 
worth of the Chinese overseas began to become clearer to the central government of the 
Empire.48 The wealth possessed by these overseas communities formed an incentive for the 
Qing Dynasty to render aid to them, with the goal of having that wealth eventually channelled 
back into China itself. In pursuit of this goal, in 1877, the Dynasty enacted a policy to allow it 
to officially solicit Chinese overseas for money.49 An important part of this solicitation was the 
sale of imperial titles and honours to Chinese overseas, particularly wealthy and affluent 
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merchants.50 Among some parts of the Qing government it was hoped that, eventually, the 
funding and support of Chinese overseas communities could assist the Dynasty in overcoming 
the financial dependence it had developed on the Western powers.51 The financial contributions 
of the Chinese overseas saw them portrayed positively by the officials of the Qing Dynasty. 
According to Ong, the officials began to refer to the Chinese overseas metaphorically as “the 
goose that lays the golden egg.”52 
 
Along with this financial incentive, a political motive for the Qing Dynasty to ingratiate itself 
with its overseas subjects also existed. By the end of the nineteenth century the Qing Dynasty 
was embattled against growing unrest within the Empire itself, with the threat of a revolution 
usurping power being a very real fear for the rulers of the Dynasty. Thus, they sought any and 
all support they could attain, including support from the overseas communities, hoping that by 
becoming more proactive in assisting them, and being seen as defending them, this would 
endear itself to them. The hope was that this would be enough to motivate the Chinese overseas 
to assist the Qing Dynasty as opposed to any revolutionary forces. 
 
A further consideration that motivated this change in policy towards the Chinese overseas was 
the Qing Dynasty’s desire to utilize the skills learned by the Chinese overseas to modernize 
itself.53 Following its defeat in the two Opium Wars, and the protracted period of time it had 
now existed under the coercion of the more technologically advanced Western powers, the 
Dynasty had a keen interest in recruiting Chinese overseas who had learned these skills. To 
this end, Qing Dynasty officials were instructed to locate Chinese overseas with certain skills 
– the use or creation of European firearms, machinery and such – and to ensure their return to 
the Empire, so that these skills could be disseminated.54 As part of this same initiative, the 
Dynasty began to establish schools for Chinese overseas throughout South-East Asia, intent on 
turning this segment of its population it had long ignored into an asset for the Empire’s own 
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further development. One of the more dramatic steps the Qing Dynasty took as part of its 
greater integration with the Chinese overseas was the passing of the Qing Nationality Law in 
1909.55 This law held that any individual born to a father who was Chinese would be considered 
a citizen of the Qing Dynasty regardless of which country he or she was born in.56 Beyond 
creating a problematic situation for many Chinese born during the period of its existence, due 
to a confusing circumstance of dual citizenship arising, the law was also a further effort by the 
Qing Dynasty to secure for itself access to the potential benefit represented by its overseas 
subjects. Ultimately, regardless of individual intent, the change in the Dynasty’s policies and 
approach to its subjects abroad was driven by the Dynasty’s seeking advantage in them. In this 
the Qing Dynasty was much like every other government that has ever existed.  
 
Echoing this shift in the Dynasty’s policies and attitudes towards its overseas subjects, who it 
now at last recognized as subjects rather than traitors, was the very language used by the Qing 
Dynasty to refer to the Chinese overseas communities. By the late nineteenth century, the 
Dynasty adopted more official and precise terms when referring to Chinese subjects abroad. 
The Dynasty began to refer to them as huárén which translated simply as “Chinese people”, as 
opposed to the previously popular, and more offensive, term yu-min, which effectively 
translated to “unproductive people”, reflecting the long-held view that those Chinese who did 
travel abroad were essentially not members of the Empire.57  
 
The onset of the last of these two periods, following the 1860 Convention the Qing Dynasty 
was coerced into signing, also promoted a massive emigration of Chinese subjects out of China 
and abroad into other parts of the world. This mass migration would prove to have a dramatic 
effect on numerous states, most importantly for the purpose of this argument, it would see the 
arrival of a significant number of Chinese labourers into the British colonies that would, in the 
future, form South Africa.  
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2.3 The Nineteenth Century Chinese Migrations 
 
The aftermath of the Opium Wars, when the Qing Dynasty’s policies towards emigration were 
forcibly shifted to be more permissive, unsurprisingly had a number of consequences for the 
state of the world at the time. Among these as indicated was the beginning of a massive wave 
of emigration out of China and into foreign states. Although large numbers of Chinese did 
immigrate into other states within South-East Asia, and were already doing so by the eighteenth 
century, it was only in the latter half of the nineteenth century that a truly substantial body of 
Chinese began to emigrate out of China.58 This wave of migration saw Chinese overseas 
communities forming in many Asian states near to China, in European colonies, and in states 
within the two American continents.59 Between the years of 1869 and 1911 over 6 000 000 
Chinese would emigrate out of China proper.60 
 
This large-scale migration built on the preceding, smaller, migrations that had already begun 
towards the beginning of the nineteenth century.61 The majority of these emigrants came from 
the southern parts of China, from what are now the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong.62 The 
sheer amount of migratory workers from these regions resulted in numerous families within 
southern China expecting, and depending on, migratory labour to survive. Male children 
usually knew that, unless they were an only child, they would as adults travel out of the country 
to provide financial support for their families back home.63 Over 8 000 000 Chinese emigrants 
came from Guangdong alone during this period, representing more than half the total Chinese 
overseas community of the nineteenth century.64 The fact that the southern regions of China 
were usually coastal, and home to the treaty ports that served to channel Chinese overseas to 
colonial states, obviously also played a role in allowing them to more easily opt for migratory 
work as a solution to any impoverishment they were facing.65  Furthermore, the Chinese 
emigrants often worked to assist those who came after them, forming organizations and 
associations that allowed for a form of “chain migration”, in which established Chinese 
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immigrants helped bring more Chinese over after them, and also assisted these Chinese once 
they arrived in foreign lands.66 Philip Kuhn has argued, in his work, that this phenomenon of 
Chinese migration is best understood within the context of China’s historical expansion, that 
its migratory patterns overseas have some resemblance to its centuries-long expansion via 
migration over land.67 Before the major wave of migration in the late nineteenth century the 
majority of Chinese immigrants had moved into nearby states still within Asia, usually states 
that were themselves colonial possessions of a Western state. However, the massive wave of 
migration that followed saw the Chinese moving further abroad, to locations in North America, 
Africa, Canada and Australasia, resulting in the formation of Chinese overseas communities in 
a diverse number of states.68 The demand for labour within the colonial holdings of the Western 
powers created opportunities for employment within those regions.69 Importantly the migration 
of the Chinese was rarely a private or individual undertaking, and this era of mass migration 
was characterized extensively by the direct involvement of states within the organization of 
migrations, achieved mostly through the contractual agreements between the Qing Dynasty 
and Western states. This resulted in states and colonies such as Canada, the United States of 
America, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa all seeing a considerable increase in the 
number of Chinese within their borders.70 
 
This mass migration was the result of four primary factors. First, unsurprisingly, was simply 
that the Qing Dynasty’s previous punishment of any emigration had been reversed, making it 
easier for subjects of the Empire to emigrate. The other three factors were more complex: the 
demand by Western colonies and states for unskilled labour; the revolution in world 
transportation technology; and the economic and social situation within China itself being 
problematic and difficult for many of its subjects.71 
 
To elaborate first on the matter of the Western demand for unskilled labour, the nineteenth 
century saw an adjustment in the world economy. With slavery largely being abolished by all 
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the major empires of the nineteenth century there existed a demand for cheap, unskilled labour 
by most of the Western powers.72 This was further compounded by the discovery of valuable 
resources in numerous colonial holdings of Western powers, as well as within the boundaries 
of Canada and the United States. These resources had not yet been extensively exploited and 
would require a large and intensive workforce, preferably a cheap one, to profitably and 
successfully extract.73  
 
In addition to the discovery of resources in need of extraction, the nineteenth century also saw 
an expansion of transportation networks in the form of railways, the expansion of construction 
projects in the form of dams, and growth of plantations in South-East Asia, all of which 
required intensive labour on large scale, preferably for little compensation.74 A solution to this 
conundrum, at least from the perspective of the Western states, existed within the borders of 
China. Not only was the population of China large, a necessity when looking for a massive 
workforce, but the Western states also held a belief that the Chinese were particularly suited to 
serving as a workforce. It was a bizarrely, although not for the time, common belief amongst 
the Western powers that the Chinese, as a race, made the best labour force, as well as the least 
problematic one.75 The situation many of the migrant Chinese labourers found themselves in 
was somewhat akin to the slave labour they were replacing, if not identical.76 Typically these 
labourers were indentured to their employers, unable to move freely or seek employment 
elsewhere; they were also only to be paid, often, at the end of their entire contract. However, 
during the term of their contract money was deducted from their eventual payment for other 
costs they might incur, from transportation to gambling, and at times Chinese labourers were 
simply forced to stay on past the end of their contract based on fictious criminal charges.77  
 
It should be clear, if unsurprising, that as a general rule these Chinese migrant workers were 
exploited and treated poorly, often forced into dangerous occupations for very little financial 
compensation. One stark example of this was the guano harvesting industry in Peru, which had 
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typically relied on slave labour. The process involved labourers being dangled precariously 
over cliffs, to hack at guano, and was far from a safe venture. However, after Peru abolished 
slavery in 1854, there was a need to find a new labour force to harvest guano, a need that was 
met by the importation of masses of Chinese labourers from Guangdong.78  
 
For the Western powers the manpower represented by China’s enormous population was its 
own form of economic asset, particularly due to the high demand for unskilled labour in many 
of their colonies.79 The heightened demand for labour within the West was the result of several 
factors. As indicated, the abolition of slavery had reduced the capacity for Western powers to 
simply import large, cheap, workforces and, at the same time, the spread of colonial empires 
had opened considerable resources needing labour forces to be exploited.80 The Western states’ 
desire to exploit a potential labour boom from China was certainly a factor in the two Opium 
Wars. This is apparent when considering the treaties signed in the aftermath of the War that 
directly dealt with forcing the Qing Dynasty to repeal its earlier legislation against emigration 
as well as creating the basis for a system by which the Western states would be able to recruit 
large numbers of Chinese labourers for use in their colonies.81  
 
Spurred on further by the 1839 Indian decision to curtail the recruitment of labour from the 
subcontinent, as well as a prevailing belief among many of the European powers that the 
Chinese, as a people, were well-suited to use as a labour force, the Opium Wars served to 
achieve the primary economic goals the Western powers had with regard to China.82 The use 
of Chinese labour in South East Asian colonies had left a lasting impression on the Western 
powers, who considered the Chinese to be an effective and cheap workforce.83 Hence the 
Western powers were quick to swoop in and follow in Britain’s wake, concluding their own 
treaties to allow for the importation of Chinese labour.84 In sum, the population of China 
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represented a potential economic asset, a labour force in this case, and to the Western powers, 
desperately wanting more labour, finding means to facilitate a massive migration out of China 
and into their colonies was simply lucrative. As a result, the Western states helped to drive the 
migration, by offering financial incentive to Chinese labourers to migrate abroad, as well as by 
forcing the Qing Dynasty itself into treaties to help facilitate their acquisition of Chinese 
labourers.85 
 
This mass migration would not have been possible, regardless of incentive, had the technology 
of transportation not advanced sufficiently. It was only due to the existence of more rapid, safe, 
and consistent movement across the world’s oceans and land due to steamships and railways, 
that this migration was possible in the first place.86 Railways, in particular, were vital for the 
rapid movement of resources and supplies across great distances, and for connecting 
infrastructure and urban centres. As the nineteenth century advanced the demand for more 
railways in Western states and their colonies required labour to meet this demand, labour that 
could no longer be extracted from slavery and was unlikely to be met by the actual Western 
inhabitants of the states as the work was dangerous, unhealthy, and paid very poorly.87 Once 
again, the Chinese were deemed by many Western powers to be the ideal labour force for this 
kind of work. From North America, the Trans-Siberian railway, and the Panama Canal, Chinese 
migrant labourers were called for by the colonial powers.88  
 
However, the role played by Western coercion and technological development was far from 
the sole cause of this migration. As indicated above, events internal to China at the time also 
played an important role in creating the mass Chinese migration of the late nineteenth century. 
A series of factors coincided to accelerate the decline of the Qing Dynasty. Its economic power 
steeply fell following its integration into the wider Western markets, resulting in a dependence 
on Western nations to support it financially.89 As a result of its disintegrating economy the 
Dynasty struggled to maintain its own infrastructure and assert political control over its 
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territory.90 The declining economy soon resulted in difficulties for the peasant populations of 
rural China, particularly northern China, as the Dynasty became incapable of maintaining 
adequate counter-measures to flooding and drought, resulting in a period of impoverishment 
for the northern Chinese peasants.91 The result of this was a series of famines which devastated 
the Qing Dynasty throughout the nineteenth century. These famines had a significant effect on 
the population of China, between 1876 and 1879 killing more than 9 000 000 Chinese.92 The 
population spike the Qing Dynasty experienced during the nineteenth century, with its 
population growing from 150 000 000 in the seventeenth century to over 400 000 000 by the 
mid-eighteenth century, only worsened the effects of these famines.93  
 
Coupled with this, the Qing Dynasty suffered numerous military invasions during this time. 
On top of its military defeats at the hands of both European powers and Japan, the Qing Dynasty 
was forced to cede more and more of its territory to foreign powers. 94  Taiwan, Macau, 
Stonecutter’s Isle, Hong Kong, Kowloon and Inner Manchuria were all ceded to Western 
powers throughout the nineteenth century, and China’s role as the dominant power within 
Korea was usurped following its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War.95 The most well-known 
of the Qing’s defeats in this period are the two Opium Wars fought against the British Empire 
predominantly, although the French participated in the Second Opium War as well. The Qing 
had suffered defeat at the hands of the British before; the 1842 Anglo-Chinese war forced the 
Dynasty to concede Hong Kong to the British and open six ports to British trade.96 The Opium 
War would conclude with the Convention of Peking, ceding control of Kowloon to the British 
Empire, whilst the Russian Empire took advantage of the Qing Dynasty’s weakness to 
negotiate control of much of Manchuria for itself as well. 97  The final blow to the Qing 
Dynasty’s hegemony came in 1895, with its defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War.98 This defeat 
marked the first time regional dominance within South-East Asia changed hands from China 
to Japan, and singled the end of the hegemonic dominance of the Qing Dynasty within the 
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region.99 Exacerbating this situation, the widespread poverty and military conflict resulted in 
numerous peasant uprisings and rebellions, such as the Boxer rebellion of 1899, resulting in 
further disruption of the Qing Dynasty’s economy and political order.100 The faltering economy 
of the Qing Dynasty also meant that the populace had little chance for assistance from their 
nominal rulers. Compounding this issue was the disintegrating political control of the Qing 
Dynasty, which along with the encroachment by European powers and the influential Japanese 
Empire saw sections of the Dynasty, such as Manchuria and Tibet, largely cease to be under 
its own authority.101 As numerous different leaders of factions and fiefdoms emerged, conflict 
between them emerged as well, creating a situation in which many of the Empire’s subjects 
saw emigration as a method of finding escape from conflicts within their own homeland.102  
 
This created an environment in which emigration was, for many Chinese peasants, the only 
way to find a potential escape from crushing poverty. As a result, the employment opportunities 
offered by overseas states to the Chinese, following 1860, found a receptive population also 
seeking to move abroad. The combination of these factors would bear fruit: between 1850 and 
1875 over 1 280 000 Chinese were shipped abroad as indentured labourers, with a further 750 
000 following between 1876 and 1900.103 This combination of seeking to escape chaos within 
their own homeland, whilst also needing to find a method to financially provide for themselves 
and their families, made the offers for work in foreign colonies an attractive one, if not a simple 
necessity born of desperation. By the late nineteenth century some of the most common 
destinations for these migrant workers were the United States of America, New Zealand, 
Australia, Canada, and South Africa. In all of these states large gold reserves had been 
discovered and now required exploitable labour.104 Thus at the end of the nineteenth century, 
a large influx of Chinese labourers came to the British colonies in South Africa, where they 
would receive a rather hostile reception from the settlers already established there. 
 
 
                                                 
99 S.C.M Paine: The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy, p. 3. 
100 P. Richardson: Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, p. 110. 
101 D. Lary: Chinese Migrations: The Movement of People, Goods, and Ideas over Four Millennia, p. 94. 
102 K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, 
China’s Rise and the Chinese Overseas, p. 89. 
103 L. Anshan: A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911, p. 49. 
104 Ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
 
 
2.5 The Early Years: The Arrival of the Chinese in South Africa 
 
It is, however, important to understand that the Chinese did not first enter South Africa in the 
twentieth century, nor was the massive wave of migrations that issued out of the Qing Dynasty 
after 1860 the very first contact Chinese had had with the disparate groupings of polities that 
would later on become South Africa. As early as 1652 Jan Van Riebeeck, the man in charge of 
the very first Dutch outpost within the Cape, in an official correspondence with the Dutch East 
India Company, requested Chinese free farmers to be used for the establishment of this 
outpost.105 Van Riebeeck also made persistent reference to the idea that the Chinese would be 
well-suited to use as a large, unskilled, poorly paid workforce, sentiments which would be 
echoed later by Western officials in the nineteenth century.106 Van Riebeeck was not alone in 
this sentiment and desire for Chinese labourers to be sent to the Cape. Many of his successors 
reiterated similar opinions during the period of Dutch control of the Cape.107  
 
However, no action to answer these pleas manifested at the time. But there were still Chinese 
in South Africa, albeit not in the numbers requested by some of the Dutch Commanders. In 
general, these were Chinese convicts from other parts of the Dutch colonial possessions, sent 
into exile in South Africa, although occasionally some of them might have been free Chinese 
who disembarked from a ship at the Cape.108 For the most part, these Chinese prisoners were 
treated akin to slaves within the Colony, their sentences not seeing them imprisoned but instead 
simply working on the Colony.109 Ultimately, they remained a minute part of the population, 
and were largely treated in a similar vein to the existing slave labour, or simply classified as 
free blacks.110 Despite their small numbers several of these early Chinese inhabitants of South 
Africa experienced a degree of success. Some were listed as slave owners, a sign of wealth, 
and no small number were profitable merchants or owners of restaurants.111 In a manner that 
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almost foreshadowed the exclusionary legislation targeting Chinese in the twentieth century, 
even this modest success by a relatively small population was sufficient to stoke fears and 
concerns among Dutch settlers that the Chinese endangered their economic wellbeing and were 
a threat to the morals of the society.112 Despite the miniscule numbers of the Chinese within 
the Cape Colony during the eighteenth century, the Dutch settlers still took issue with them 
and on numerous occasions petitioned their authorities to enact legislation hampering the 
Chinese’s capacity to trade.113  
 
After the British took over from the Dutch, the question of using Chinese labourers to accelerate 
development of the colonies in South Africa was again brought up by different British officials. 
As in the case of the Dutch, there were a number of British officials who requested, or put forth 
for consideration, the option of organizing for Chinese to be brought into South Africa. Early 
in 1804 the British official John Barrow stated that the simplest way to improve the Cape 
Colony would be the introduction of Chinese into it, suggesting that the British government 
allow Chinese to settle on and rent land within the Colony.114 Barrow put his opinion of the 
positive effects the introduction of the Chinese to the Cape might have as: 
 
[t] en thousand Chinese, transported to the Cape of Good Hope, would prove a 
more valuable gold mine to the colony, than those which are supposed to 
exist.115 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed by British officials and settlers within the Cape throughout 
the early years of the nineteenth century.116  There were scattered, small-scale, efforts to 
introduce the Chinese into the Cape Colony, such as the importation of some hundred Chinese 
to build  a railway between Cradock and Colesburg in 1880.117 But these actions failed to 
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materialize into any large-scale migration up until the late nineteenth century.118 It must be 
emphasized, though, that up until the so-called “Chinese indentured labour experiment” which 
began in 1904 that the presence of Chinese in South Africa was miniscule by any numerical 
measurement. By the count of the 1891 Census for the Cape Colony there were only 215 
Chinese males inside the colony, and absolutely no females at all.119 Although there was a 
substantial increase in the local Chinese population by 1900, reaching a total of approximately 
1 300, it remained for the most part a low-profile minority within the South African colonies.120  
 
At the outset of the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, however, 
South Africa did see a major influx of Chinese. Like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United States before it, South Africa proved to be an attractive destination for Chinese 
labourers due to the untapped, and relatively recently discovered, mineral resources within it.121 
Compared to the other British colonies such as Australia or New Zealand, the immigration of 
Chinese labourers to work in mines occurred later, largely because the Anglo-Boer War, which 
finally gave control of South Africa’s mineral resources to the British Empire, only concluded 
in 1902, forcing all the existing independent South African colonies to accept British rule and 
control. However, the mining industry of South Africa faced consistent shortages of labour, 
which meant that the recently discovered mineral wealth was not being exploited to its fullest 
extent.122 The British Empire determined as early as 1903 that the use of Chinese labour could 
assist in resolving this issue, dispatching officials to examine similar use of Chinese for mining 
purposes in California.123 In pursuit of this goal, the British Empire introduced the Labour 
Importation Ordinance to the Transvaal Legislative Council in 1904, intending to lay the 
groundwork for beginning further labour importation.124  
 
However, at the same time as this experiment with indentured Chinese labour was introduced 
and the enactment of discriminatory legislation targeting them, South Africa also saw the 
                                                 
118 D. Man & M. Yap: Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa, p. 90. 
119 D. Man & M. Yap: Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South Africa, p. 214. 
120 Ibid., p. 220. 
121 K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, 
China’s Rise and the Chinese Overseas, p. 90. 
122 J. S. Crush, A. Jeeves & D. Yudelman: South Africa's Labor Empire: A History of Black Migrancy to the Gold 
Mines, pp. 4-5. 
123 P. C. Campbell: Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire, p. 171. 
124 Ibid., p. 173. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
40 
 
enaction of its first diplomatic representation from China itself. A consular office, and consul, 
was directly appointed by the Qing Dynasty, initially with jurisdiction over the inspection of 
the indentured Chinese labourers only, although this was later expanded to include all Chinese 
within the South African region.125 Through this, the Qing Dynasty’s primary connection with 
the South African Chinese was created, as well as the only real connection between the small 
community of Chinese who had already been living in South Africa before the twentieth 
century and the large body of indentured Chinese. The first of these Consul-Generals, Liu Yu 
Ling, arrived in 1905, and created the first official channel for those Chinese protesting their 
treatment within South Africa to actually address the Qing Dynasty in some manner.126 In 1905 
then, for the first time, the Chinese in South Africa did have some form of actual support, 
officially, from the Qing Dynasty. Despite the longstanding apathy, and general reputation the 
Dynasty had regarding its treatment of its overseas subjects, the Consul-Generals in South 
Africa did show that the Qing Dynasty, in its final decade, made an attempt to support and 
defend its subjects abroad, if only as part of  pragmatic efforts to enhance its own failing power.  
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Chapter 3: The Qing Consul-Generals and the Chinese in South Africa, 1904-1912 
 
Chapter three examines the situation and circumstances of three different groups of Chinese 
who resided in South Africa between 1904 and 1912. Rather: the first of these three groups is 
the indentured Chinese labourers, who were brought over to the Transvaal in 1904. By 1910 
the majority of these indentured Chinese had been repatriated to China.1 The second and third 
groups of Chinese under examination are the small communities of Chinese who resided in the 
Cape and Transvaal prior to 1904. These communities are referred to as the free Chinese, as 
they were not indentured, and although legislation passed by the governments of the Transvaal 
and Cape would lead to a sharp decline in their numbers, these two communities continued to 
exist in South Africa well past the collapse of the Qing Dynasty. The chapter ends by 
introducing the two Consul-Generals for the Qing Dynasty, first Liu Yu Ling and then Liu 
Ngai, and giving an overview of biographical information concerning them. 
 
3.1 A New Direction for the Qing Dynasty, 1890-1911 
 
The Qing Dynasty, for most of its existence, did not have a practice precisely comparable to 
the Western institution of establishing consulates, legations or embassies in foreign states. The 
emergence of its first dedicated representation, at an official state level, to foreign polities only 
began late in the nineteenth century. Although the Qing Dynasty had been aware of the practice 
of consulates for some time, having as early as 1842 been forced by several Western states to 
permit them to open consulates within its territory after its defeat in the Opium War, the 
Dynasty itself would as indicated only open its own first consulate in 1877.  The Consulate in 
question was the Singapore Consulate and was largely intended to assist the Qing Dynasty in 
diplomatic relations with the British Empire as, at that time, Singapore was still controlled by 
the Empire. The opening of the Singapore Consulate, however, was the beginning of a process 
that played out throughout the final years of the nineteenth century and the first years of the 
twentieth century, during which the Qing Dynasty sought to increase its diplomatic and 
political representation in foreign states. The Dynasty, specifically, proceeded to open 
consulates in states that already had significant populations of Chinese within them, at times 
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due to treaty regulations with the host nations, which accorded the Qing Dynasty the right and 
responsibility of oversight over these Chinese, but also due to the Dynasty’s own desire to 
improve its relations with the overseas Chinese during this period.2 
 
Interestingly, it was the coercion of the Qing Dynasty by Western imperialistic motives into 
signing treaties permitting the establishment of diplomatic representation on its shores, and to 
permit the immigration of Chinese labour abroad, that helped establish the Qing Dynasty’s own 
foreign diplomatic relations. This was due to the principle of reciprocity, which most of the 
treaties the Qing Dynasty was coerced into signing with the Western powers contained. This 
then permitted the Qing Dynasty to oversee the safety and wellbeing of its foreign subjects who 
now moved abroad.3 Although the Qing Dynasty was slow to actually begin executing this 
responsibility, this principle would eventually be the basis for the establishment of numerous 
Qing Dynasty consulates in polities with overseas Chinese communities. 4 In the case of South 
Africa, for example, the Qing Dynasty’s consulate was initially established in order to oversee 
the wellbeing and conditions of the Chinese miners who immigrated there, and to ensure they 
would not be exploited or mistreated.5  The Qing Dynasty already took a noticeably more 
proactive role in the negotiations of the Transvaal Labour Importation Ordinance than it had in 
the importation of Chinese to Australia, Canada, New Zealand or the United States.6 The 
Chinese Minister in London, Chang Ta-Jen, specifically emphasized to his British counterpart 
that the Qing Dynasty wanted to ensure there would be no mistreatment of its subjects if they 
were brought to work in the Transvaal.7 To this end the Minister stressed that negotiations on 
the treatment of the Chinese should be done strictly between the British Empire and Qing 
Dynasty directly, and that the Transvaal Colony was not to be involved.8 
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Thus, the opening of the Qing Dynasty’s Consulate in British South Africa in 1905 took place 
against this backdrop of increased efforts by the Qing Dynasty to safeguard its overseas 
subjects. As the Qing Dynasty’s traditional apathy towards its overseas subjects gave way to 
an attitude of both seeking to cultivate better relations with them, and elicit financial support 
from them, the Dynasty began to pursue the process of sending some form of diplomatic 
representation on its behalf to those states with Chinese populations. In South Africa, this 
representation only came after the Labour Importation Ordinance, the agreement between the 
British Empire and Qing Dynasty which saw over 60 000 Chinese labourers brought into 
British South Africa between 1902 and 1910 to work on the gold mines in the Witwatersrand 
area, owing to the lack of sufficient local labour to optimally exploit these mines. The small 
community of Chinese who already existed in British South Africa prior to this, only 
numbering approximately 1 000 individuals,9 had not previously received any form of aid or 
assistance from their former homeland but, additionally, had largely been ignored within the 
boundaries of South Africa as well, with a few exceptions.10 However, the arrival of the 
Chinese migrant labourers thrust the local community of free Chinese in South Africa into the 
attention of the dominant European population.11   
 
Despite the consulate being established predominantly for the purpose of overseeing and 
providing safeguards for the Chinese migrant labourers entering British South Africa, it was to 
have a profound effect on the community of free Chinese already in British South Africa as 
well. The opening of the consulate in British South Africa was, for the Chinese living there, a 
reversal of the Qing Dynasty policy they had always known. They had largely always been 
ignored by the Dynasty, regardless of their circumstance, but with the arrival of the Qing 
Consul-General the free Chinese community in British South Africa gained a form of 
representation from their government at last. Perhaps more importantly, they gained an official 
channel for communication with both the Qing Dynasty and, via the Consul-General, the 
governments of British South Africa as well.  
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The origin of the Qing Dynasty consulate in British South Africa, then, rested with the 
Transvaal Labour Importation Ordinance. Representing an agreement between the British 
Empire and the Qing Dynasty, the negotiations around the Ordinance involved both Alfred 
Milner, as the High Commissioner of South Africa, and also Chang Ta-Jen, as a Minister 
representing the Qing Dynasty in the matter.12 Initially there was no part of the Ordinance that 
would have created a consulate for the Qing Dynasty in South Africa, but Chang Ta-Jen would, 
during the negotiations, propose five additions to the Ordinance.13 The first of these was the 
ground for the creation of a consulate to fulfil the Qing Dynasty’s obligations towards its 
subjects’ wellbeing: 
 
...make representations to the authorities on the subject of any matter affecting 
the comfort and well-being of the immigrant that may appear to him necessary.14 
 
Initial suggestions by the Minister would have seen a local Chinese, from the small free 
Chinese community, appointed to fulfil this function on behalf of the Qing Dynasty, but this 
notion was rejected by Alfred Milner who instead insisted that the appointment by the 
Transvaal government of a state official as Protector of Indentured Labourers would be 
sufficient and that, were any local Chinese appointed to also fulfil a similar function, it would 
lead to friction between the free Chinese community and the Transvaal government. 15 
However, it was conceded by the British Empire in the negotiations that if an official Qing 
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Dynasty representative, not a local free Chinese, were to be appointed as a Consul-General to 
British South Africa, that this would be acceptable to the British Empire.16 The appointment of 
the Consul-General was not met with unanimous support in South Africa. The Chamber of 
Mines was opposed to the Qing Dynasty’s proposition, in particular the appointment of a 
Consul-General to ensure the wellbeing of the indentured Chinese. 17  The Transvaal 
government itself would be less pleased with the appointment and, in the future, would clash 
and complain to the Empire concerning the appointed Consul-Generals on a few occasions. 
But it was made clear by Alfred Lyttleton, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, that 
the Qing Dynasty would not approve the Importation Ordinance without the appointment of a 
Consul-General, and so the matter was agreed to by the British authorities.18 This compromise 
resulted in stipulations within the final draft of the Ordinance, so that when it was signed in 
1904 it empowered the Qing Dynasty to both dispatch a Consul-General to British South 
Africa, and also for this Consul-General to have a responsibility and right to oversee the 
wellbeing of the immigrant Chinese indentured labourers who would arrive in British South 
Africa per the Ordinance.19 This right to ensure the wellbeing of the indentured labourers was 
conferred in Article Six of the Emigration Convention between Great Britain and China, 1904, 
which stated that: 
  
For the better protection of the emigrant, and of any other Chinese subjects who 
may happen to be residing in the Colony or Protectorate to which the emigration 
is to take place, it shall be competent to the Emperor of China to appoint a consul 
or vice-consul to watch over their interests and well-being, and such consul or 
                                                 
16 (TAB) AMPT PUBS 51 CD 2026: “Transvaal. Further Correspondence Relating to the Transvaal Labour 
Question. Coolie and Chinese Labourers. 1) Recruiting 2) Contracts of Service 3) Transfer of Labourers 4) 
Passages of Labourers to South Africa 5) Arrival of the Labourers at Durban 6) Care and Treatment of the 
Labourers when Sick 7) Wages 8) Women and Children 9) Return of Labourers to China,” May 1904. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 (TAB) AMPT PUBS 47 CD1956: “Africa No. 6 (1904). Convention Between the United Kingdom and China 
Respecting the Employment of Chinese Labour in British Colonies and Protectorates. Signed at London, May 13, 
1904; (TAB) AMPT PUBS 51 CD 1986: “Transvaal. Further Correspondence Relating to the Transvaal Labour 
Question. Coolie and Chinese Labourers. 1) Recruiting 2) Contracts of Service 3) Transfer of Labourers 4) 
Passages of Labourers to South Africa 5) Arrival of the Labourers at Durban 6) Care and Treatment of the 
Labourers when sick 7) Wages 8) Women and Children 9) Return of Labourers to China,” 1904. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
vice-consul shall have all the rights and privileges accorded to the consuls of 
other Nations.20 
 
In 1904, the exchequer empowered the very first Consul-General, Liu Yu Ling, to serve in 
British South Africa. This involvement of the Qing Dynasty in the wellbeing of its subjects, as 
well as its commitment to safeguarding them, continued to reinforce that, at the close of the 
nineteenth century, the Qing Dynasty did attempt to act as a guarantor for the safety of its 
overseas subjects, due to its own pragmatic self-interest. This notion is further enforced by the 
Qing Dynasty’s actions in 1905, when the Emperor of the Qing Dynasty expanded the 
responsibilities of the Consul-General in British South Africa.21 In addition to their existing 
duties regarding the Chinese indentured labourers brought to British South Africa per the 
strictures of the Transvaal Labour Ordinance, the Consul-General of the Qing Dynasty was 
also empowered to oversee and represent on behalf of the pre-existing community of free 
Chinese in British South Africa.22 Even though the initial reason for the Consul-General’s 
appointment had been to protect the wellbeing of Chinese indentured labourers, it was this 
additional responsibility over the free Chinese which would, in future, play an important part 
in the treatment of Chinese in South Africa, the Consul-General becoming a channel of 
communication through which the free Chinese in South Africa would seek to be heard and, 
further, cooperate closely with in attempting to combat the prejudice and discrimination they 
would face in South Africa. 23  Although their reason for establishing the consulate was 
undoubtedly part of a wider pragmatic effort to revitalize and strengthen their own diminishing 
economic, political, and military influence, the result was that in 1904 the Qing Dynasty 
changed its course regarding its relations with all Chinese living in British South Africa, both 
the indentured labourers and the pre-existing community of free Chinese.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20  https://archive.org/stream/treatiesconvent01chin#page/n9/mode/2up/search/transvaal (12th February 2017): 
Treaties, conventions, etc., between China and foreign states, Published by Order of the Inspector General of 
Customs, p. 644. 
21 (PRO) CO 291/89, 6533: “Chinese Consul General. Mr Lui Yu-Lin,” 13 February 1905. 
22 Ibid. 
23 W. Gungwu: China and the Chinese Overseas, p. 113. 
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3.2 The Chinese and the Transvaal, 1902-1912 
 
By 1904, preparations were well in place for the arrival of the Chinese migrant labourers into 
British South Africa. The Transvaal suffered a consistent shortage of labour on its mines during 
this time, which played a role in motivating the Chamber of Mines and British Empire’s desire 
for the indentured Chinese labour.24  Furthermore, the confluence of commercial interests 
meant that both British officials and members of the mining corporations cooperated 
extensively to create the impression of public support by South Africa’s white population for 
the Importation Ordinance.25 The relationship between the British authorities and Chamber of 
Mines at this point has usually been construed as one of close collusion, although the exact 
extent of this collusion has been debated.26 What is clear is that in the matter of the indentured 
Chinese labour the British government was consistently supportive of the demands of the 
Chamber of Mines.27 In 1903 the Transvaal Labour Commission, established by Milner to 
determine the need for Chinese labour, concluded that there was simply insufficient labour to 
fully exploit the mines within the Transvaal and overwhelmingly recommended the 
importation of further labour.28 
 
Milner considered the matter of opposition to Chinese migrant labour in the Transvaal to be 
settled completely by 1905, when the mayor of Johannesburg – and one of the staunchest 
opponents of the Ordinance, Mr J.W. Quinn – seemed to give up his opposition to the arrival 
of the Chinese indentured labourers.29 However, even though it had been passed the Labour 
Importation Ordinance remained very unpopular among the citizenry of the Transvaal.30 This 
unpopularity would not be sufficient to sway the designs of the British Government or mining 
establishment, not until 1910 at least, particularly in light of a report in December 1904 that 
found that the number of white labourers on mines continued to decrease and was, by 1905, 
                                                 
24 P. Richardson & K. Saunders (ed.): Chinese Indentured Labour in the Gold Mining Industry, 1904-1910, 
Indentured Labour in the British Empire 1834-1920, p. 262. 
25 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 121. 
26 A. H. Jeeves, “The Control of Migratory Labour on South African Gold Mines in the Era of Kruger and Milner,” 
Journal of Southern African Studies, (2), 1, 1975, p. 5. 
27 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 28. 
28 E. Katz: A Trade Union Aristocracy: A History of White Workers in the Transvaal and the General Strike of 
1913, p. 122. 
29 (TAB) Lieutenant Governor (LTG) 166 TEL 1248: “Introduction of Chinese Labour Re Despatch to from 
Governor, Cape,” 1904. 
30 W.T. Stead: “South Africa and its Problems: The Chinese Question,” Review of Reviews, p. 311. 
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projected to result in an imbalance of seven black African labourers on the Transvaal mines for 
every one white labourer.31 Faced with a diminishing labour force, the introduction of the 
Chinese indentured labourers was pushed through despite the misgivings of the populace.  
 
In preparation for the arrival of the Chinese indentured labourers the Emigration Convention 
between the British Empire and Qing Dynasty had sought to put several safeguards in place for 
the indentured Chinese labourers. Beyond the appointment of the Consul-General, as detailed 
in Article Six, some of the suggestions made by the Chinese Minister during negotiations had 
also been addressed. Amongst these was Article Nine of the Convention, which required the 
appointment of an officer, or officers, within British South Africa who would have a duty to 
ensure that the Chinese indentured labourers had adequate access to the courts of the 
Transvaal.32 Concerns of corporal punishment had also been specifically addressed to Milner 
during negotiations. The British Empire had assured the Qing Dynasty that such measures 
would only be enacted upon Chinese indentured labourers under impartial law, applying 
equally to all individuals living inside of the Transvaal, and only after a court determined if it 
were applicable or not.33 Further, the Foreign Labour Department of the Transvaal was created 
specifically to oversee the Chinese indentured labourers, created as a distinct political body 
that had responsibility, to an extent, for the Chinese indentured labourers on the mines.34 An 
important complication to this matter was that the Qing Dynasty was not simply in negotiations 
with a single polity. Although the Convention on Labour was signed between the Qing Dynasty 
and the British Empire, it was the Transvaal which the indentured Chinese labourers were 
dispatched to. The Foreign Labour Department of the Transvaal was a unique political body to 
the Transvaal and was not an official instrument of the British Empire.35 
                                                 
31 (TAB) GOV 70 GEN 756/04: “Increase in the Numbers of White Labourers on the Witwatersrand Mines in 
October Amounted to 82,” 1904. 
32  https://archive.org/stream/treatiesconvent01chin#page/n9/mode/2up/search/transvaal (12th February 2017): 
Treaties, conventions, etc., between China and foreign states, Published by Order of the Inspector General of 
Customs, p. 647. 
33 (TAB) AMPT PUBS 51 CD 1986: “Transvaal. Further Correspondence Relating to the Transvaal Labour 
Question. Coolie and Chinese Labourers. 1) Recruiting 2) Contracts of Service 3) Transfer of Labourers 4) 
Passages of Labourers to South Africa 5) Arrival of the Labourers at Durban 6) Care and Treatment of the 
Labourers when Sick 7) Wages 8) Women and Children 9) Return of Labourers to China,” 1904. 
34 (TAB) GOV 990 PS 37/17/06: “Confidential Report of Mine Managers Appointed by the Transvaal Chamber 
of Mines to Consider Means to be Adopted for Securing the Better Control of Coolies on Mines,” 1906. 
35 (TAB) AMPT PUBS CD 2026 51: “Further Correspondence Relating to the Transvaal Labour Importation 
Ordinance,” May 1904. 
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The general managers of the Chamber of Mines provided advice to the Foreign Secretary of 
the British Empire in preparation for the arrival of the indentured Chinese to the Transvaal.36 
It was also advised that, as the currency in use in British South Africa was markedly smaller in 
physical size than the currency the Chinese would be used to, that the exchange had to be 
properly prepared to explain to the Chinese that they were not being cheated of the value of 
their coins.37 Further it was advised by the Chamber of Mines that goods on sale to the Chinese 
indentured labourers, in both the Cape Colony and the Transvaal, have their prices fixed at a 
low level, so as to motivate the Chinese indentured labourers to spend their money.38 The 
Chinese labourers themselves would nearly exclusively work unskilled positions on the mines 
during their time in the Transvaal.39 By 1906, when there were some 50 000 Chinese labourers 
already in British South Africa, only some 2 000 were employed in occupations which did not 
require them to work underground.40 The Chinese labourers were required to work every day 
of the week barring Sundays, with the exception of holidays, for ten hours and, during this 
time, they were limited to, and disallowed from leaving, the mining complexes they stayed in.41 
On those days they did not work, if they were able to acquire permits, the Chinese were allowed  
to leave the mining complexes but were disallowed, by the Labour Importation Ordinance, 
from leaving the Witwatersrand district, keeping the vast majority of the Chinese labourers 
within the area.42  
 
Within these compounds the indentured Chinese sought to create for themselves a familiar 
world. The celebration of traditional festivals, as well as performances of Chinese theatre, were 
common activities for these labourers.43 The indentured Chinese also found time to enjoy a 
range of leisure activities, such as picnics and forming bands, alongside more common 
distractions such as gambling and visiting brothels.44 Despite their dislocation from their home, 
                                                 
36 (TAB) Foreign Labour Department (FLD) 281 1534/04: “Labour Importation Agency. Circular Number 232. 
Letter from Mr. Perry to the General Manager, Labour Importation Agency, Urging a Point in the Dealing with 
Local Coinage brought by Chinese Coolies,” 1904. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 (TAB) FLD 24 2706/06: “Walter Bagot, General Manager. Chamber of Mines Labour Importation Agency to 
the Superintendent, Foreign Labour Department,” 1906. 
40 G. Kynoch: “Controlling the Coolies: Chinese Mineworkers and the Struggle for Labor in South Africa, 1904-
1910,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 36, (2), (2003), p. 311. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., p. 312. 
43 K. L. Harris: The History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, pp. 169-170. 
44 Ibid. 
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and the strange environment they were in, the indentured labourers were able to somewhat 
create a home for themselves in the compounds.45 
 
However, life on the mining compounds was also tightly controlled. The Labour Importation 
Ordinance’s regulations effectively determined much of the lives of the indentured Chinese 
whilst they were in the Transvaal. Whilst on the compounds, the Chinese fell under the 
authority of white overseers, but most of the direct officials the Chinese labourers would have 
contact with during their stays were fellow Chinese mine police. 46  These were Chinese 
individuals who were employed to act as agents for the white overseers and managers, having 
the ability to more easily communicate with the Chinese labourers due to understanding their 
language. 47   The nature of the work the indentured Chinese were expected to perform, 
specifically the intensive underground mining, came as a surprise to many of the Chinese. It 
transpired that during their recruitment the Chinese labourers had often either not been fully 
informed of the work expected of them or, in some cases, had been purposefully misled 
thereover.48 A combination of misunderstandings caused by language barriers, unscrupulous 
practices when seeking to attract employees as well as a simple misunderstanding concerning 
the action of mining, which in China had typically only been performed on the surface level, 
not necessitating that the miner go underground, resulted in many Chinese indentured labourers 
initially being resistant to mining underground, as was expected of them.49  
 
Compounding this was also the matter of safety, as the work in the underground mines saw 
approximately 3 192 Chinese indentured labourers die between 1904 and 1910.50 Work on the 
mines also included the threat of serious injury or even death. The dangerous nature of the work 
the indentured Chinese were doing is attested to by records concerning the causes of their 
deaths. On the Witwatersrand Deep mine the single largest cause of death for Chinese was 
                                                 
45 M, Carter: Voices from Indenture: Experiences of Indian Migrants in the British Empire, p. 100. 
46 (TAB) Clerk of the Executive Council (EC) 86 82/06: “Lord Selborne to the Colonial Office,” 1906. 
47 (TAB) EC 86 82/06: “Lord Selborne to the Colonial Office,” 1906. 
48 (TAB) FLD 240 76/7: “Complaints by Chinese labourers: Wit Deep Limited, Translation of Petition of 7 Wit 
Deep Coolies,” 1906; FLD 240 76/8: “Complaints by Chinese Labourers: South Nourse Limited, Petition 
to the Superintendent Foreign Labour Department,” 2 April 1906. 
49 (TAB) FLD 241 76/19: “Complaints by Chinese labourers: Jumpers Deep Limited, The Petition of Chinese 
Controller,” 10 April 1908; PRO CO 291/85 33492/05: “Chinese labourers, Maintenance of order among,” 28 
August 1905. 
50 D. Man & M. Yap: Colour, Confusion and Concessions. The history of the Chinese in South Africa, p. 177. 
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“shock”, a term which referred to death as a result of physical trauma, and fractures of the skull 
and neck. 51  Together these constituted 79 deaths between 1905 and 1906 alone on the 
Witwatersrand Deep mine, three times more than the next largest cause of death which was 
opium poisoning, which accounted for only 14 deaths. 52  The working conditions of the 
indentured Chinese then posed a legitimate threat to their lives. Contributing to this was the 
fact that many of the Chinese labourers were unfamiliar with the tools utilized on the mines.53 
Particularly this was true with regard to explosives and the inexperience of Chinese labourers 
with explosives, which lead to several fatal accidents.54 
 
The majority of the indentured Chinese hailed from the northern provinces of China, 
particularly the Chihli and Shantung provinces, modern-day Hebei and Shandong provinces 
respectively, and were comprised primarily of the impoverished segments of those provinces’ 
populations.55 This would lead to a difficulty within the compounds as the majority of the 
Chinese mine police, as well as those mine officials who spoke Chinese, spoke southern 
dialects, and so struggled to communicate with the majority of the indentured labourers..56 As 
a result, miscommunication was a consistent difficulty.57 As stated previously, the migration 
of Chinese abroad in this period was only partly facilitated by the coercion of Western powers, 
as numerous Chinese subjects sought to escape famine, droughts, and political instability 
within their homeland that had left their economic and health prospects bleak at best. As a 
result, they had, mostly, come in search of work that they could use to alleviate their financial 
woes. Most of them, additionally, were working to support their wider families back home in 
China, rather than simply supporting themselves. For this reason, the matter of remittance was 
an important consideration as the indentured Chinese were effectively working to provide for 
their families back in China as well. The importance that remittance had for the Chinese 
indentured labourers can also be gleaned from the fact that the only personal letters by Chinese 
                                                 
51 A. Meyer & M. Steyn: Chinese Indentured Mine Labour and the Dangers Associated with Early 20th Century 
Deep-level Mining on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines, South Africa, p. 7. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., p. 16. 
54 Ibid., p. 16. 
55 P. Richardson: Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, p. 272. 
56 T. Chen: Chinese Migration, p. 139. 
57 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 140. 
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labourers retained within the Transvaal Archives both concern the remittance of money to 
China.58  
 
This monetary incentive for the Chinese was so substantial that when discussion began in 1906 
of overturning the migrant labour system there were petitions from the Chinese themselves 
against it.59 The financial gains they managed to make as labourers in the Transvaal simply 
exceeded what many of them had access to in China at the time and, thus, they were determined 
to be able to continue to work there.60 This was despite the fact that the monthly wages of the 
Chinese labourers was set at the same level as that of black adolescent labourers, unsurprisingly 
below that of white labourers, but also adult black labourers.61 Per the advice of Lyttelton, the 
Chinese minimum wage was set at 30 shillings per month, compared to the minimum wage of 
45 shillings for adult blacks.62 This was partly due to a belief, expressed between Lyttelton and 
Milner, that voluntary work offers would allow the Chinese labourers to, despite their minimum 
wage, in actuality make closer to 50 shillings in a month.63 This was also motivated by a 
pervading belief held by the white populace of British South Africa that Chinese were able to 
survive off lower wages than a European, or even a black, a belief which allowed them to more 
easily excuse to themselves the allotment of smaller minimum wages to the Chinese 
labourers.64  
 
As was often the case, racism served as a convenient ideology to excuse the poor treatment of 
a specific group in a thoroughly unequal manner. The matter was complicated by political 
considerations, as expressed to Milner by Lyttleton, as in the British House of Lords there was 
a strong sentiment that the Chinese could not fairly be expected to have lower wages than that 
already being paid to black labourers, nor was it considered right to reduce the minimum wage 
                                                 
58 (TAB) FLD 188 40/1: “Transmission of Chinese Letters, East Rand Propriety Mines Limited, Loose Leaf Letter 
Enclosed,” 1909; TAB FLD 189 40/17: “Transmission of Chinese Letters, Durban Roodepoort Deep, Loose Leaf 
Letter Enclosed,” 1909. 
59 (PRO) CO 291/121 23767/07: “Chinese Coolie Repatriation,” 5 July 1907. 
60 Ibid. 
61 (TAB) LTG 169 TEL 3008: “Average Wage of Chinese,” 1904. 
62 Ibid. 
63 (TAB) AMPT PUBS 51 CD 1986: “Transvaal. Further Correspondence Relating to the Transvaal Labour 
Question. Coolie and Chinese Labourers. 1) Recruiting 2) Contracts of Service 3) Transfer of Labourers 4) 
Passages of Labourers to South Africa 5) Arrival of the Labourers at Durban 6) Care and Treatment of the 
Labourers when Sick 7) Wages 8) Women and Children 9) Return of Labourers to China,” 1904. 
64 Transvaal Leader, 17 February 1903; 4 August 1903. 
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of the black labourers in response to the incoming Chinese labour.65 However, this lower 
minimum wage did not initially seem to create any troubles for the mine owners. The Chinese 
labourers were largely satisfied with their salaries at the start of the experiment and it was 
widely agreed by sources reporting on the poverty in China at the time that the wages the 
Chinese indentured labourers would receive in the Transvaal still exceeded, by a considerable 
margin, their prospects in China itself.66 However, this halcyon period would be short, as 
following the first six months of the experiment the question of wages would become a 
flashpoint for numerous Chinese riots and disturbances on the Transvaal mines.67 
 
Ultimately the Chinese experiment in the Transvaal Colony would end by 1910. 68  The 
incredibly strong anti-Chinese sentiment within the Transvaal had never abated and, rather, 
became a key political concern of the 1907 elections within the Transvaal, after it had been 
granted responsible government by the British Empire.69 The incumbent Progressive Party, 
which supported the ongoing use of indentured Chinese labour, was defeated by the Het Volk 
party in the 1907 Transvaal election.70 Het Volk was staunchly opposed to the continuation of 
the indentured Chinese experiment and had used that opposition to drawn support to itself in 
the election from the disgruntled populace.71 As a result, shortly after coming to power, the Het 
Volk party began the dismantling of the importation of indentured Chinese labour and, by 1910, 
the vast majority of all the indentured Chinese had been repatriated.72 
 
Alongside the indentured Chinese a community of free Chinese existed within the Transvaal. 
The small community of Chinese that formed in the Transvaal had done so over the last decades 
of the nineteenth century, formed by individual Chinese usually seeking to establish their own 
enterprises within Johannesburg. 73  Predominantly they were single men seeking better 
                                                 
65 Transvaal Leader, 17 February; 4 August 1903. 
66 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, pp. 164-165. 
67 (TAB) LTG 166 TEL 1361: “Chinese Labourers – Outbreak at Jumpers Deep Mine,” 1905; TAB GOV 81 GEN 
730/05: “Disturbances on the Witwatersrand Deep Mine,” 1905; TAB GOV 180 GEN 1046/05: “The Subject of 
the Disturbance which Occurred at the New Croesus Gold Mine,” 1905; TAB GOV 76 GEN 333/05: “Report on 
the Disturbances at the North Randfontein Mine: Sir A Lawley,” 1905. 
68 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, p. 166. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 200. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
54 
 
opportunities for wealth then they could find in their homeland.74 For the most part, the Chinese 
seem to have managed to establish themselves fairly well, mostly operating small businesses.75 
Although the exact records on this matter are scarce, evidence collected by Harris does suggest 
that from 1850 onwards a small population of Chinese in the Transvaal were able to become 
relatively affluent merchants and traders within the urban centres.76 The community began to 
grow noticeably after the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand.77 However, as Transvaal 
legislation prohibited any Chinese from mining or prospecting, their increased arrival was 
likely due to the larger market created by the discovery of the gold, as opposed to an actual 
interest in finding mining opportunities.78  
 
The small free community of Chinese in the Transvaal were not explicitly affected by the 
Labour Importation Ordinance, although as shown by Harris the Importation Ordinance, and 
the arrival of the indentured Chinese, had an impact on the free Chinese of the Transvaal as 
well as the Cape.79 Prior to the arrival of the indentured Chinese there were already a number 
of laws which constrained the free Transvaal Chinese. One such act required the Transvaal 
Chinese to renew an annual pass at the value of £20 in order to allow them to move within the 
boundaries of the Transvaal. 80  They were, further, disallowed from owning any form of 
property outside of specific districts and areas delineated for such purposes for them by the 
Transvaal government.81 A Transvaal law in 1899 also forbade the free Chinese from any sort 
of mining endeavour or activity, ironically just a few short years before the Witwatersrand 
would be inundated with Chinese indentured labourers to work on these very same mines their 
free Chinese compatriots were disallowed from.82 They faced similar restrictions in the Orange 
Free State and Natal, usually suffering discrimination under the same general laws which 
restricted all individuals identified as “Asiatic” within British South Africa. Although it was 
clear that, even before 1904, the free Chinese community had been subject to a number of 
                                                 
74 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 266. 
75 (SAB) Indian Affairs (IND) 879, E 16005, “Pon Siers.” 1910.  
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77 K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, 
China’s Rise and the Chinese Overseas, pp. 90. 
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restrictive measures, these were only to increase in their severity with the arrival of the 
indentured Chinese labourers. The arrival of the Consul-General in the Transvaal had been 
anticipated for some time by the free Chinese community there. Since their arrival they had 
already petitioned and sent letters to the Chinese Minister in London seeking the appointment 
of an official to assist them in the Transvaal.83 
 
It is a reality that little connection existed between the free Transvaal Chinese and the Chinese 
indentured labourers. The two groups did not interact extensively and showed no sign of 
cooperation or solidarity. 84  Although unintentional, the arrival of the indentured Chinese 
labourers would serve to significantly worsen the treatment of the free Chinese in both the 
Transvaal and the Cape Colony, their presence transforming the topic of halting Chinese 
immigration to South Africa into a political objective of the authorities. Though these free 
Transvaal Chinese had, by no means, been treated equally within the polity before, the presence 
of the Chinese indentured labourers brought sinophobic fears and prejudices to the fore in 
political discussion. However, whilst the Chinese labour experiment would end by 1910, and 
the vast majority of all the Chinese indentured labourers would be deported, the free Transvaal 
Chinese who remained in the Transvaal would have to contend with legislation such as the 
Asiatic Registration Act. Despite this situation one development that the Chinese indentured 
labour experiment initiated would prove beneficial to the free Transvaal Chinese: the creation 
of the post of Consul-General. 
 
3.3 The Chinese and the Cape, 1902-1912 
 
The community of less than 1 000 free Chinese living in the Cape Colony by the beginning of 
the twentieth century had been largely ignored by the European populace and authorities up 
until the discussion to import Chinese indentured labourers began in the aftermath of the 
Anglo-Boer War.85 The discussion roused by the Labour Importation Ordinance spread to the 
Cape Colony as well, where the Cape Chinese community was thrust into the politics of the 
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region.86 During the course of the nineteenth century there had been a consistent trickle of 
Chinese arriving within the Cape Colony, usually via Port Elizabeth.87 These Chinese hailed 
predominantly from the southern, coastal, provinces of the Dynasty and spread out through the 
Colony’s urban centres, usually operating their own small businesses.88 The number of Chinese 
entering the Cape rose dramatically during the closing years of the nineteenth century.89 Harris 
speculates that one of the potential causes of this sharp increase is the movement of significant 
numbers of Chinese from Johannesburg into the Cape. 90  Many Chinese had entered 
Johannesburg, drawn by the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand.91 Harris speculates that 
it is possible that the tensions between the Transvaal and British Empire in the closing years of 
the nineteenth century might have motivated numerous Chinese to move down into the Cape 
to escape potential hostilities.92 Prior to 1904, when the indentured Chinese labour experiment 
engendered a strong anti-Chinese sentiment within the Cape, the Chinese had enjoyed fairly 
equitable treatment. Many of them had established themselves as affluent merchants and some 
were even allowed to participate in the elections of the Cape Colony.93  
 
Although the Cape was not the intended destination for any of the indentured Chinese, the 
white population of the Colony feared that the importation of so many Chinese into the 
Transvaal would lead to many of them entering the Colony regardless, and lead to a rapidly 
expanding population of Chinese within the Cape.94 As in the Transvaal, the possibility of 
Chinese entering the Cape Colony was met with fear and resistance by the white population.95 
As it was, before the large-scale migration of Chinese had even entered South Africa, petitions 
and agitation for legislation to restrict them were in process.96 The same fears that were present 
in the Transvaal: economic competition and “immorality” dominated the discourse concerning 
the Chinese in the Cape. Those opposed to the entry of the Chinese also pointed out the fact 
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that British colonies and other Western states that experienced similar surges in Chinese 
immigration had, by then, mostly passed legislation intended to curtail, if not exclude, any 
further Chinese immigration.97 The politics of the Cape Colony was soon involved with the 
question of the Chinese immigrants, a matter which dominated both the elections of 1903 and 
1904, as well as the elections of 1907 and 1908.98 In these elections, however, there was 
consensus among all competing parties that the Chinese had to be excluded from the Cape 
Colony, only the question of how severe the measures taken to achieve this result should be 
existed. The solution devised by the political authorities of the Cape to this problem was to 
craft legislation to largely halt the entry of any Chinese into the Colony. Act Number 37 of 
1904 would be the first of these, the first piece of legislation in the history of South Africa’s 
white polities that exclusively targeted a single group based on their race.99  
 
3.4 Liu Yu Ling and Liu Ngai, Qing Consul-Generals to South Africa 
 
It was in this relatively hostile environment that the first two Chinese Consul-Generals were to 
be appointed to South Africa. The first Consul-General for the Qing Dynasty in South Africa 
was a veteran of the Qing Dynasty’s foreign politics, and an advocate for modernization within 
the Dynasty as well. Born on 11 September 1862, to Liu Fuqian and Zheng Huiquan, Liu Yu 
Ling hailed from the city of Xiangshan in Guandong Province.100 During his early twenties Liu 
Yu Ling was one of a number of Chinese who studied in the United States of America, learning 
English and preparing himself better for service in European states. He graduated from the 
Phillips Academy in Andover in 1882.101 Liu Yu Ling was part of what was known as the 
Chinese Educational Mission, an initiative launched by the Qing Dynasty from 1872 till 1881. 
The mission had been organized by one Yung Wing, the first Chinese to ever graduate from 
Yale University, who attempted to convince the officials of the Qing Dynasty that it would be 
beneficial for them if they could send students abroad to learn the modern techniques and 
technologies prevailing in the Western world at the time. To this end, the mission sought to 
send Chinese students to study in the United States of America in the hope that, when they 
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(40), 1, November 2014, pp. 142-143. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Statutes of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, Act 37 of 1904, The Chinese Exclusion Act. 
100  http://www.cemconnections.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=107, Chinese Educational 
Mission Connections, Liu Yulin. 
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returned to the Qing Dynasty, they would bring with them modern technological and, 
particularly, military developments. As part of this mission, Liu Yu Ling would stay with a 
Miss L.S. Hulbert in Winsted, Connecticut.102 He was apparently only thirteen years old when 
he departed for the United States.103 
 
Before he came to hold the post of Consul-General to British South Africa, he had already 
passed through a number of diplomatic positions. Although he began with a simple assignment 
to the Tianjin Telegraph and Medical Colleges, reflecting the Qing Dynasty’s interest in its 
citizens who had studied abroad imparting the knowledge they gained to Chinese within the 
Dynasty, he was to serve as a translator for the Chinese Consulate in New York in 1884.104 By 
1887 he became the Vice-Consul in New York and in 1889 rose to the Washington Legation, 
the central diplomatic representation of the Qing Dynasty in the USA, once more serving as a 
translator. From there, in 1895, he would be appointed the Secretary of the Chinese Consulate 
in Singapore, a vital role, before being appointed Acting Consul-General and then Consul-
General of the Singapore Consulate between 1897 and 1899. By now Liu Yu Ling had already 
served in some of the Qing Dynasty’s most important foreign offices and was to hold an even 
more prestigious role in late 1897, when he accompanied the Chinese Minister as a secretary 
to attend Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee. Finally, in 1900, he became a Secretary at the 
Chinese Legation in London, arguably the most important Legation of the Qing Dynasty, 
before becoming the Charge d’Affaires in Brussels.  
 
Before coming to South Africa, Liu Yu Ling also received several honours from the Russian, 
Belgian, German, and Italian governments. Of these his most important honour was his 
Chevalier of the Order of Leopold Honour, granted to him by King Leopold of Belgium.105 He 
was also, curiously, a Freemason, or at the very least reported to have belonged to a Freemason 
Lodge during his time in New York.106 He served as a steward of Eureka Lodge.107 It was only 
after this, in 1904, that he was appointed as the first Consul-General to South Africa and the 
                                                 
102  http://www.cemconnections.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=107, Chinese Educational 
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105 North China Herald, January 13, 1905, p 44. 
106  http://www.cemconnections.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=107 Chinese Educational 
Mission Connections, Liu Yulin. 
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sheer wealth of experience, and influential positions he had held prior to this posting, indicate 
that the Qing Dynasty considered the matter of their representation in British South Africa to 
be a significant concern. Liu Yu Ling’s presence in British South Africa, between 1905 and 
1908, proved to be important enough that he was even included in the 1905 edition of the Men 
of the Times, Pioneers of the Transvaal almanac, no doubt, in part, due to the importance of 
the Chinese labour question at the time.108  
 
In 1905 Liu Yu Ling arrived in Johannesburg, accompanied by his daughter.109 Liu Yu Ling, 
his daughter and staff, were exempt from the existing pass laws regulating the movement of 
Chinese in British South Africa and were housed in a two-storey mansion on Hospital Hill in 
Johannesburg.110 During the Qing Dynasty’s remaining existence, until 1911, Liu Yu Ling 
would serve as one of only two Qing Dynasty Consul-Generals to British South Africa, being 
succeeded by Liu Ngai in 1907.111 Liu Yu Ling’s arrival was noted by the Rand Daily Mail, 
and it was stated that the Consul-General was welcomed on his arrival in Johannesburg by 
several hundred members of the Transvaal Chinese community.112 In 1907, however, Liu Yu 
Ling was reassigned by the Qing Dynasty, appointed to head an investigation into the Opium 
trade inside of Peking. 113  He informed the authorities of his departure and also that his 
successor would be the former Vice-Consul, Liu Ngai.114 One of his final actions, before 
departing, was to petition the South African authorities to allow him to take another Chinese 
man back with him, Cheng Tak Shin, who he had come to employ as a retainer, and who wished 
to return to China as well. 115  He would go on to serve as Extraordinary Minister and 
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to Great Britain in 1911.116 Liu Yu Ling would also 
be elected as the representative for the Republic of China to the 1909 International Opium 
Convention in Shanghai, leading to the first international drug control treaty.117 From 1923 
onwards, he lived on the island of Macau, being appointed the official Chinese Representative 
                                                 
108 Men of the Times, Pioneers of the Transvaal and glimpses of South Africa, p. 312. 
109 (TAB) EC 53 EC844/203/04: “Acting Assisting Colonial Secretary. Appointment of a Chinese Consul-General 
at Johannesburg,” 1905. 
110 (TAB) EC 1074 AG2084/05: “Consul-General Liu Ying Lin,” 1905. 
111 (TAB) GOV 1065 PS20/13/07: “Chinese Consul Appointments,” 1907. 
112 Rand Daily Mail: Rand Chinese, Consul-General Arrives, 5 May 1905, p. 7. 
113 New York Times, 20 December 1907, p. 3. 
114 (TAB) GOV 1065 PS20/13/07: “Chinese Consul Appointments,” 1907. 
115 (TAB) EC 1492 AG3347/07: “Proposed Engagement by the Chinese Consul of an Indentured Labourer as 
Servant to Accompany him to China,” 1907. 
116  http://www.macaumuseum.gov.mo/w3ENG/w3MMnews/NewsC.aspx?newsId=222 Museu De Macau, 
Macao Museum presents Donation Certificate to Lew Yuk Lin’s descendant, (30 October 2018). 
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of the island’s General Assembly during his stay.118 Liu Yu Ling would die at the age of 80 
years, on October 27 1942, on Macau where he was also buried.119 
 
Liu Ngai would prove to be initially a less prestigious appointee than Liu Yu Ling had been, 
but would continue in the same vein as his predecessor, attempting to assist the Chinese 
community in South Africa. During his time as Consul-General Liu Ngai became a member of 
the Witwatersrand Kennel Club and even won an award in 1909 during one of the Club’s dog 
shows.120  He, however, earned a reputation for himself, particularly in connection to his 
vociferous opposition to certain pieces of legislation, and his departure in the 1930s was 
commented on by the Rand Daily Mail. 121  Born in 1874 in Chi Kiang, Liu Ngai was 
accompanied to South Africa by his wife, son and daughter.122 He graduated from the Tientsin 
University in China and was described as a regular feature of social meetings and gatherings 
within the country.123 Beyond serving as the final Qing Dynasty Consul-General to South 
Africa he would also serve as the Republic of China’s first Consul-General.124 Liu Ngai would 
only finally leave South Africa in 1932, after having served more than twenty years as a 
representative of China, first on behalf of the Qing Dynasty, and then on behalf of the ROC.125 
Compared to Liu Yu Ling there is a paucity of information concerning Liu Ngai’s life after his 
departure from South Africa. 
 
During their time in South Africa both Consul-Generals would intercede on behalf of the 
Chinese population of South Africa on a number of occasions. The actions the Consul-Generals 
took in support of the South African Chinese can be divided between their involvement with 
the Chinese within the Transvaal, and their involvement with the Chinese within the Cape. In 
the case of the Transvaal this involvement can further be divided between the indentured 
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Chinese labourers and the free Chinese community. This forms the focus of the following two 
chapters. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
62 
 
Chapter 4: Well-intentioned Impotence: The Case of the Transvaal 
 
Chapter four examines the situation of the two groups of Chinese within the Transvaal during 
the period between 1902 and 1912. These two groups were the indentured Chinese labourers 
imported under the auspices of the 1904 Transvaal Labour Importation Ordinance and the small 
community, numbering only a thousand or so individuals, of free Chinese within the Transvaal. 
Both groups are examined and, in particular, the hardships and discriminatory legislation they 
suffered are analysed. In the case of the indentured Chinese the repressive character of the 
Labour Importation Ordinance is explicated, as are other difficulties they faced, such as 
mistreatment, lowering of wages and recruitment under false pretences. The resistance of the 
indentured Chinese to their treatment via actions such as desertion and riot are also analysed, 
along with the assistance rendered by Consul Liu Yu Ling. The potential difficulties he had in 
communicating with the indentured Chinese labourers is examined as is his role on the Special 
Committee on the Chinese indentured labourers in 1906. Following this the Asiatic 
Registration Act, and the resistance against it mounted by the free Transvaal Chinese is 
examined. The role of the Consul-Generals, predominantly Liu Ngai, in rendering aid to the 
free Chinese in this endeavour, and the eventual compromise they reached, is used as evidence 
of the Consul-General’s active support for the Chinese in South Africa. As becomes apparent 
across the two chapters a pattern forms in which Liu Yu Ling and Liu Ngai will seek to channel 
the complaints of the South African Chinese to the authorities, sometimes suggesting solutions, 
but are largely met with indifference from the different governments.  
 
4.1 Collapse of the Qing Dynasty 
 
The year 1911 marked the end of the Qing Dynasty’s Empire.1 Although the Qing Dynasty had 
from the start of the twentieth century, faced growing unrest and civil conflict within its 
borders, the final dissolution of the Dynasty was only achieved in 1912. This was after 
negotiations between the Dynasty and the to-be Republic of China. Importantly, the dissolution 
of the Qing Dynasty did not result in a smooth transfer of power to its successor state and, 
following 1911, China would endure a period of internecine conflicts between various factions 
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and states within its borders. This would only come to an end after the conclusion of the Second 
World War in 1945 with the final victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the eventual 
establishment of the PRC in 1949.  
 
Beyond its obvious ramifications for a consular service in its name, the collapse of the Qing 
Dynasty is also pertinent for highlighting the difficulties faced by the Dynasty during the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Wracked with internal conflicts and struggles, the Qing 
Dynasty did not have a great deal of power – political, economic or military – with which to 
leverage or coerce foreign states such as the British Empire or the British South African 
territories. This impotence can be seen in how direct protests, from Consul-Generals to 
Ministers, rarely managed to engender any sort of change in the foreign policy or treatment of 
Chinese by Western powers.2  
 
The final year of the Qing Dynasty also marked an important occasion in the relationship 
between the Qing Dynasty and the young Union of South Africa, one a state soon to cease to 
exist, the other a state only recently created. It was in that year that Liu Yu Ling, the man who 
had been the first Consul-General on behalf of the Qing Dynasty to South Africa, was 
appointed to the position of Minister of the London Legation. In the first year of his office Liu 
issued a direct critique of the treatment of the Chinese in South Africa, claiming that the 
Chinese were afforded insufficient dignity and respect within the country.3 In his 1914 protest 
to the authorities of the British Empire, Liu Yu Ling would go so far as to say: 
 
Unless some remedy can be found for these grievances, their existence, if 
persisted it must, it is to be feared, sooner or later, impair the good relations 
which exist between the peoples of our two countries.4 
                                                 
2 (SAB) GG 900 01 15/706, 15/557, 37/45, 15/724: “Asiatics: Chinese. Forwards Note by Chinese Minister in 
London on Subject of Treatment of Chinese in South Africa and Requests Minister’s Observation,” 28 April 1914. 
2 (SAB) GG 1014 20/93: “Mr. Hui Ngai Notifies of his Departure on Leave Inquires if there is any Objection to 
his Nominating Mr. Gunsaulus American Consul to Act in his Stead,” 1911. 
3  (SAB) GG 1320 37/42: “Transvaal Draft Municipal Ordinance: Protest by Chinese Minister in Against 
Provisions as Affecting Chinese Residents of Transvaal,” 1911. 
4 (SAB) GG 900 01 15/706, 15/557, 37/45, 15/724: “Asiatics: Chinese. Forwards Note by Chinese Minister in 
London on Subject of Treatment of Chinese in South Africa and Requests Minister’s Observation,” 28 April 1914. 
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Whilst Liu Yu Ling had moved on to an office as Minister in London, Liu Ngai remained as 
Consul-General for the Qing Dynasty in South Africa. But, in light of the Dynasty’s collapse, 
and confusion as to the political system within China at the time, late in 1911 Liu Ngai would 
inform the authorities of South Africa that he had been recalled to China.5 With his departure 
he also informed them that he would be leaving with no other Chinese Consul-General being 
appointed to take his place in his absence.6 Liu Ngai thus served as the final Consul-General 
for the Qing Dynasty to South Africa, as the Qing’s collapse meant that when diplomatic ties 
were next opened between the two regions it would not be under the purview of the Dynasty. 
Political ties between South Africa and China would only resume, directly, in 1919. This was 
when the Republic of China, established in 1912, would once more assign a Consul-General 
for China to what was then, the Union of South Africa.7 Interestingly, Liu Ngai would serve as 
the Republic of China’s first Consul-General to South Africa, returning in 1919 and serving as 
Consul-General until 1930.8  
 
However, between 1911 and 1919 there was not a complete lack of consular representation on 
behalf of the Qing, and the later Republic of China, to the authorities in South Africa. Upon 
his departure, Liu Ngai authorized the American Consulate in South Africa, specifically the 
American Vice-Consul Edwin Gonsaulus, to serve and act as a representative on behalf of 
Chinese interests in South Africa.9 Briefly, in 1913, Edwin Gonsaulus was forced to take a 
leave of absence himself, during which time consular representation for the Chinese in South 
Africa became the responsibility of the consular official C.B. Henderson.10 This role seems to 
mostly have extended only to communicating on behalf of the Chinese government with the 
South African government, as little evidence exists of Gonsaulus or Henderson commenting or 
                                                 
5 (SAB) GG 1014 20/93: “Mr. Hui Ngai Notifies of his Departure on Leave Inquires if there is any Objection to 
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8 (SAB) GG 1046 01 20/1844: “Consuls: China. Johannesburg: Return of Mr. Liu Ngai to China and Appointment 
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intervening in any way on matters concerning the Chinese in South Africa. Further, no records 
or letters exist of the Chinese community in South Africa communicating or petitioning these 
temporary representatives. 
 
The Qing Dynasty’s collapse meant that it only had consular representation in South Africa for 
approximately ten years, from 1902 until 1911. Yet in that decade there is ample evidence that 
the Consul-Generals considered the treatment of the Chinese in South Africa to be problematic 
and attempted to assist them.11 Over the course of their tenure both Liu Yu Ling and Liu Ngai 
would make several efforts to assist the Chinese in South Africa against legislative 
discrimination and obstacles. They furthermore acted to pass on and direct complaints and 
petitions for the Chinese in South Africa, creating for them a channel of communication 
through which their grievances could be officially transmitted.12 However, the sobering reality 
was that both Consul-Generals managed to achieve little substantive change during their 
tenures, their efforts resulting in few changes to discriminatory legislation targeting Chinese in 
South Africa. The actions of neither Consul-General were able to substantively alter the 
enactment of discriminatory legislation such as the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act or Transvaal 
Asiatic Registration Act.13  
 
It is important to stress, though, that the lack of substantive success does not mean there was 
no resistance or no attempts by the Chinese in South Africa to improve their situation and 
combat restrictive or repressive measures targeted at them. As shown through the Consul-
Generals, efforts were made to try to improve the situation of the Chinese in South Africa – to 
try to resist measures that were repressive to them – but these efforts were simply unable to 
translate into substantive change during the tenure of the Qing Dynasty’s relatively brief 
engagement with South Africa. This was often due to the simple unwillingness of the South 
African authorities to acquiesce or consider ameliorating the harsh conditions applied to 
Chinese in South Africa. Achieving success was not simply a question of effort on behalf of 
the Chinese in South Africa, or their Consul-Generals, as the intransience and resistance of the 
                                                 
11 (SAB) GG 900 01 15/706, 15/557, 37/45, 15/724: “Asiatics: Chinese. Forwards Note by Chinese Minister in 
London on Subject of Treatment of Chinese in South Africa and Requests Minister’s Observation,” 28 April 1914. 
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Desember 1963. 
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South African governments left them with little to no potential for success. Despite the lack of 
success, there is clear evidence that the Chinese community in South Africa did take action 
against the discriminatory legislation that targeted them, most actively during the first decade 
of the twentieth century, and that they received support and assistance in these measures from 
the Consul-Generals.14  
 
The role of the Chinese in resistance against discriminatory legislation has been, for the most 
part, underexamined compared to that of other groups’ struggles in the history of South Africa. 
But it remains the case that there is ample evidence of resistance by both the Chinese on mining 
compounds and free Chinese.15 Harris has written extensively on the matter of the resistance 
by both the free Chinese community in the Transvaal and Cape, as well as that of the Chinese 
indentured labourers on the mining compounds. Furthermore, one can simply look at Gandhi’s 
own comments concerning the participation of the free Chinese in resisting discriminatory 
legislation in South Africa: 
 
There are now, I think, more Chinese than Indian passive resisters in jail. I am 
quite sure that General Smuts will not expect Indian passive resisters to desert 
their Chinese fellow sufferers. They naturally ask for the same protection for 
the Chinese passive resisters as for themselves.16 
 
Although it is true that Gandhi’s estimation of the number of imprisoned Chinese passive 
resisters was most likely overstated it is clear evidence that one of the key leaders of resistance 
among Asiatic groups in South Africa did consider the Chinese to have played a substantial 
role. Consul-General Liu Ngai himself would, reciprocally, approve explicitly of Gandhi’s own 
passive resistance techniques when they were employed in South Africa by both Indian and 
Chinese.17 The role played by the Consul-Generals in the resistance by the South African 
Chinese to discrimination has been, comparatively, unexplored, and an assumption of apathy 
                                                 
14 K. L. Harris & T. Chee-Beng (ed.): Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, China’s Rise 
and the Chinese Overseas, pp. 93-94. 
15 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 261. 
16 Indian Opinion, 27 May 1911, p. 49. 
17 K. L. Harris: “‘Strange Bedfellows’: Gandhi and the Chinese Passive Resistance,” Journal of Natal and Zulu 
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as a lingering result of the Qing Dynasty’s longstanding policies towards its overseas subjects 
continues to at times contaminate the perception of the Qing Dynasty Consul-Generals.  
 
The actions of the Consul-Generals in contesting, or assisting local Chinese to contest, 
discriminatory legislation in South Africa can be divided between their efforts in the Transvaal 
and Cape Colony. The Transvaal and Cape were the two regions of South Africa most 
significantly affected by the presence of the Chinese, being the only regions with anything 
approaching sizeable Chinese populations. As a result, the activities and the efforts of the 
Consul-Generals focused almost exclusively on these two regions and examining them 
separately from each other creates a clear indication of the Consul-Generals intentions to assist, 
but also the repeating pattern of their intentions failing to translate into a substantive change. 
When examining such resistance, it is important to keep in mind that both the indentured 
Chinese and free Chinese sought to resist discrimination with the assistance of the Consul-
Generals, but that these two groups largely did so in isolation from each other.18 As the location 
of the indentured Chinese labour experiment, the Transvaal would prove to be one of the most 
important areas for the Consul-Generals. In the Transvaal the two most pertinent matters on 
which the Consul-Generals intervened was that of the indentured Chinese labourers’ situation 
and circumstances, as regulated by the Labour Importation Ordinance, and the later Asiatic 
Registration Act which prompted some of the most intense resistance by the free Chinese in 
South Africa’s history. Following on, chapter five will examine the role of the Consul-Generals 
in assisting the free Chinese of the Cape Colony, in particular in their struggle against the Cape 
Chinese Exclusion Act. 
 
4.2 Protection of the Indentured Chinese 
 
It is unwise to generalize when discussing history, as even two situations that can on the surface 
seem incredibly similar, may in fact, and often are, considerably different. That being said, one 
can note, if only idly, that there was a rather consistent nature in how Western states and 
colonies who experienced a sudden influx of Chinese migrants in the nineteenth century 
reacted. This reaction effectively amounted to an imagined fear, that the numbers of Chinese 
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would result in them taking over the country or degrading the morals of the state through their 
supposed “immorality”, or a more realistic fear that the Chinese would deprive the citizens 
already in the state from finding employment.19 As a result of these fears among the populace, 
often at odds with the business leadership who predominantly saw advantage in large Chinese 
labour populations, a set of similar legislations were enacted throughout numerous Western 
colonies and states during the nineteenth century.20 Although the exact naming conventions 
and specifics of the various pieces of legislation differed from state to state, once again 
reminding us that it is unwise to generalize, they all shared a rather similar set of goals: 
excluding Chinese from the state and finding ways to curb the numbers of Chinese entering the 
state.21  So it was that between 1880 and 1900, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
States of America all promulgated and passed some form of legislation designed to restrict the 
movement of Chinese immigrants into, and their presence within, these states.22 In some cases, 
such legislation was enacted even in contravention of agreements between the Qing Dynasty 
and the state in question. An example of this was the United States of America’s passage of 
restrictive legislation targeting Chinese, initially only in California, where many had been 
drawn due to the discovery of gold, but later expanded into a federal law. This was in 
contravention of the earlier 1868 Burlingame Treaty between the two states, which had 
established that both states would allow free and uninhibited passages for their citizens.23 
However, as was already the case elsewhere, the Qing Dynasty simply lacked any power or 
influence through which it could meaningfully object or seek to coerce some form of 
compensation from the United States, as with the other dominant Western powers of the time.24 
 
In the broadest possible terms, a similar sequence unfolded in South Africa at the very 
beginning of twentieth century. A large number of Chinese labourers entered the Transvaal, 
brought there at the behest of the British Empire’s commercial interests to exploit the resources 
discovered predominantly on the Witwatersrand.25 The presence of these Chinese then excited 
fear amongst the dominant white, European, population of settlers, who in turn would 
                                                 
19 H. Samuel: “The Chinese Labour Question,” Contemporary Review, (85), 1904, p. 457. 
20 C.K. Cooke: “Chinese Labour: Its Moral, Economic, and Imperial Aspects,” The Empire Review, 1904, p. 205. 
21 P. Richardson: Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, p. 35. 
22 D. R. Gabaccía & D. Hoerder: Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific 
Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s, p. 403. 
23 M. Ip: Home away from Home: Life Stories of Chinese Women in New Zealand, p. 177. 
24 L. Anshan: A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911, p. 161. 
25 K. L. Harris & T. Chee-Beng (ed.): Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, China’s Rise 
and the Chinese Overseas, pp. 89-90. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
69 
 
eventually galvanize the political system in South Africa to grow increasingly hostile towards 
these Chinese migrant labourers, passing legislation that did, in the end, achieve its goal of 
sharply reducing the number of Chinese living within South Africa’s borders.26 
 
British officials were aware of the fact that the white population of the Transvaal remained 
predominantly opposed to this notion, and thus embarked on a project of attempting to drum 
up support for their motion by insisting that the importation of further labour was a necessity 
for the economic situation of the colony. 27  In order to quash further fears of economic 
competition, the officials went to great lengths to assure the white population that all labour 
imported would be unskilled, and thus not be able to compete for jobs with the dominant white 
population.28 This was laid out in the Importation Ordinance itself, which stipulated that no 
Chinese labourer would be allowed to do any work which was not unskilled in 
nature.29Although the Importation Ordinance still remained deeply unpopular amongst the 
dominant white population of the Transvaal, any form of official opposition to it had largely 
ended. white citizens of the Transvaal were not the only portion of the population to fear the 
importation of Chinese labour though. Amongst the black population, though less uniform, 
there was considerable consternation and fear over what the implications of a large population 
of Chinese moving into the South African colonies would entail. In The Native Opinion of 
South Africa, the first newspaper in South Africa established and owned by blacks, an article 
was published in 1903 warning its readers that the arrival of the Chinese was the worst crisis 
the colonies could possibly face.30 The newspaper went on to include an open letter and petition 
to King Edward of Great Britain, asking him to prevent the proposed importation of Chinese 
labour on the grounds that it would be hamper and interfere with the rights of the black 
population of South Africa: 
 
They feel that the introduction of a class of labourers with no idea of any rights, 
and with morals and habits unlike those of the European races, in which your 
                                                 
26 K. L. Harris: “Paper Trail: Chasing the Chinese in the Cape (1904-1933),” Kronos Southern African Histories, 
(40), 1, November 2014, p. 146. 
27 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 28. 
28 C. K. Cooke: “Why Asiatic Labour is Necessary for the Rand: The Facts and Figures," The Empire Review, (3), 
November 1903, pp. 361-363. 
29 Ibid, p. 366. 
30 (TAB) Secretary of Native Affairs (SNA): 188 NA313/03, Cutting from the “South African Native Opinion,”, 
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petitioners have been hitherto trained, will be, in the highest degree, prejudicial 
to the future of their race in its struggle for advancement in Christianity and 
civilization.31 
 
Further evidence of hostility to the indentured Chinese from the black population can be found 
in an official protest made by Chief Bathoen of Bangwaketse tribe.32 The Chief raised the same 
concerns of employment, expressing the belief that the arrival of the Chinese would force his 
subjects out of their jobs on the mines.33 Ultimately, this strong antipathy amongst the populace 
meant that, when the details of the Labour Importation Ordinance were being finalized, the 
British officials and local government had to insure to incorporate numerous legislative 
measures designed only to curtail the potential for Chinese immigrants competing for work 
with white citizens, thus assuaging the economic fears.34 The result of this was a large number 
of restrictive sections within the Labour Importation Ordinance, with 17 of the 35 total sections 
dealing purely with legislative and regulatory limitations on Chinese arriving in South Africa.35 
Among these, some of the most important stipulations were ones that limited any Chinese 
migrant worker to a contract of three years at most, after which time they had to be repatriated 
back to China.36 Options did, however, exist for the Chinese labourers to renew or apply for an 
extension of their contracts.37 Under such an extension they were permitted to work a further 
three years.38 After this, however, they would be repatriated, and no option for remaining in 
any region of South Africa beyond their contracts were allowed. When the more than 50 000 
Chinese indentured labourers arrived in South Africa, it was to an environment that was already 
hostile and fearful of their presence there.39 
 
As has already been mentioned, the indentured Chinese labour experiment, despite only lasting 
for just under a decade, would prove to have a sizeable effect on the immigration policy of 
South Africa with regards to Chinese individuals. The glut of discriminatory legislation 
                                                 
31 (TAB) SNA 188 NA313/03, Cutting from the “South African Native Opinion,” 1903. 
32 Rand Daily Mail: From the Cape to Zambesi, Weekly Summary of South African News, 16th April 1904, p. 12. 
33 Ibid. 
34  K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 134. 
35 D. J. N. Denoon: “The Transvaal Labour Crises, 1901-1906,” Journal of African History, (8), 3, 1967, p. 489. 
36 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 135. 
37 Ibid, p. 113. 
38 Ibid. 
39 W. H. Hutt: The Economics of the Colour Bar, pp. 45-46. 
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specifically targeting Chinese in South Africa, which was enacted during the years in which 
the indentured Chinese labour experiment played out, serve as a testament to the degree to 
which the South African regions, for a myriad of reasons, sought to repress the indentured 
Chinese labourers. The primary legislation which governed the fate of the indentured Chinese 
whilst they were within South Africa was the Labour Importation Ordinance. Coming into 
force in May of 1904 this Ordinance would represent the regulations which applied to the 
indentured Chinese labourers entering the Transvaal per the Convention between the Qing 
Dynasty and British Empire.40  
 
As stated above, the regulation of this Ordinance bound the Chinese indentured labourers to 
three-year contracts, after which they were, without exception, to be deported back to China, 
and offered for them no means by which they could remain in South Africa following the 
expiration of their contract.41 In addition to containing numerous other provisions concerning 
what the indentured Chinese labourers would be allowed to do, where they were allowed to 
stay or move, it was clear that the goal of the Ordinance was to minimize the contact the 
indentured Chinese would have with anyone in South Africa, seeking to restrict them as much 
as possible to the Witwatersrand area and to mining. That the Labour Importation Ordinance 
was a restrictive piece of legislation was acknowledged even in its own time, and among 
opponents of the Ordinance within the political circles of both the Transvaal and the British 
Empire. It was at times equated to permitting slavery of the indentured Chinese labourers: 
 
…what difference there was between Chinese contract labour under this 
Ordinance and Negro chattel slavery as it existed in the Southern States of 
America, all to the advantage of the negro.42 
 
The regulations of the Ordinance bound the indentured Chinese labourers to the mine premises 
on which they worked and their only means for moving beyond these premises were by 
                                                 
40  https://archive.org/stream/treatiesconvent01chin#page/n9/mode/2up/search/transvaal (12th February 2017): 
Treaties, conventions, etc., between China and foreign states, Published by Order of the Inspector General of 
Customs, Preamble. 
41 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 113. 
42 Ibid, p. 130. 
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temporary permits that would not exceed two days in length, allowing for very little movement 
by the indentured Chinese in South Africa.43 Furthermore, the indentured Chinese were only 
permitted to occupy positions of unskilled labour, and even then over 50 other potential 
occupations were specifically barred from being held by any indentured Chinese labourer.44 
The Ordinance was also amended in 1905, after the bulk of the indentured Chinese labourers 
had arrived. Many of the amendments made served to increase the repressive nature of the 
Ordinance. This included expanding the list of crimes for which the Chinese could be held 
accountable and increasing the power of the Foreign Labour Department’s inspectors to punish 
and assign guilt in cases involving the Chinese indentured labourers.45 Some regulations of the 
Ordinance were not wholly repressive though, partly due to the involvement of the Qing 
Dynasty in its formulation.46 An example of this lay in the prohibition on corporal punishment 
included in the Ordinance, inserted at the request of the Qing Dynasty, as well as the creation 
of the office of the Consul-General itself. It is worth noting that the office was created 
specifically under the auspices of the Labour Importation Ordinance initially, the first 
responsibility ever assigned to the Consul-Generals was the inspection of the indentured 
Chinese labourers.47 
 
Beyond the onerous regulations of the Ordinance, the indentured Chinese labourers also 
experienced repressive treatment on the mining compounds themselves. Regardless of the 
regulations, differing levels of physical abuse, flogging as well as certain torture methods were 
employed not infrequently on the mines to coerce the indentured Chinese labour.48 Much like 
the black labour, the Chinese indentured labourers were exploited by the mining interests 
involved. They existed as an incredibly cheap workforce with a, seemingly small capacity to 
defend their own interests or resist exploitation once on the mining compounds. The treatment 
they were subjected to was far from pleasant. As detailed before, this treatment resulted in 
resistance from the indentured Chinese labourers, initially, and most noticeably, in the form of 
                                                 
43 Ordinances of the Transvaal, No. 17 of 1904, Labour Importation Ordinance, Section 15, p. 81; Section 18, p. 
82; Section 19, pp. 82-83. 
44 Ordinances of the Transvaal, No. 17 of 1904, Labour Importation Ordinance, Section 9, a, p. 79; Schedule 1, 
p. 93. 
45 Ordinances of the Transvaal Colony, Ordinance 27 of 1905. 
46 P. Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, p. 35. 
47  (SAB) BEP 575 G18/54: “Raadpleging en Koordinasie met Ander Instansies: Sjinese Organisasies,” 7 
December 1963. 
48 (TAB) AMPT PUBS CD 2819 89: “Transvaal, Further Correspondence Relating to Labour in the Transvaal 
Mines,” 1906. 
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the many riots that unfolded during the period between 1902 and 1906, before the change in 
the policies of the mining compounds brought about by the Special Committee on the Control 
of Chinese Labourers. Desertion, rioting or refusal to work were all common forms of 
resistance utilized by the Chinese indentured labourers in response to a wide range of 
difficulties, from low wages to excessive physical punishment by their white superiors.49  
 
Desertion was a crucial issue. Throughout 1902, up to 21 000 desertions were noted, almost 
half of the 50 000 Chinese labourers who would come over, reflecting a significant 
dissatisfaction with both the work and mining compounds experienced by the indentured 
Chinese labourers.50 Desertion was one of the only true options the Chinese labourers had if 
they wished to seek an escape from this work. Unlike the black labourers or white labourers, 
the indentured Chinese were largely immobile, by law, being barred by legislation from seeking 
employment anywhere else in the country, they were bound closely to three-year contracts.51 
The only legal recourse they had to leave the employment of the mines was to make an upfront 
payment equalling the cost of their repatriation back to China, a sum of money impractical for 
most of the impoverished labourers to manage, and thus an unreasonable method for most of 
them to use.52 As a result, the indentured Chinese labourers had very few practical options if 
they wished to halt their work, desertion being the only valid choice for many of them and, as 
seen, clearly a choice many of them chose to embrace.  
 
Desertion was not always even the result of an intentional choice by the Chinese indentured 
labourers. The numbers of desertions were inflated by the fact that many of the Chinese, 
unaccustomed to their new surroundings, genuinely became lost at times when attempting to 
return to the mines they were supposed to be working in.53 However, desertion was rarely a 
viable solution to the troubles faced by the indentured Chinese labourers. Unlike their 
                                                 
49 G. Kynoch. “Controlling the Coolies: Chinese Mineworkers and the Struggle for Labor in South Africa, 1904-
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50 (TAB) Secretary to the Law Department (LD) 1163 AG 5415/05: “Annual Report Foreign Labour Department, 
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52 Ibid. 
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counterparts, black or white labourers, the Chinese indentured labourer had nowhere to safely 
go in the Transvaal. Black labourers could, if unsatisfied with the conditions of their labour on 
the mines, withdraw and seek employment elsewhere, or return to their homes, a tactic common 
enough that it was well understood by the white mine owners of South Africa. 54 
Unsurprisingly, white miners had even more options than both the black labourers and Chinese. 
By contrast, the Chinese, even though it is true they did desert in large numbers, had no method 
to easily return home, and no area in the South African territories they could safely reside in. 
As a result, despite the high percentage of desertions, the majority of these deserters were, 
eventually, captured or returned to the mining compounds they had sought to escape from.55 It 
must be noted that this does not mean the black labourers were treated well, or in anyway not 
subjected to discrimination themselves; they most certainly were.56 Yet it does remain a fact 
that there were more options open to the black labourers, in terms of escaping or improving 
their conditions, than were available to the indentured Chinese labourers on the Rand mines. 
As a result, desertion as a tool of resistance did not achieve the goal of allowing Chinese 
indentured labourers a form of escape from their working conditions. Any reprieve granted by 
it was, in the vast majority of cases, only temporary.  
 
The numerous uprisings and riots throughout the labour experiment, and particularly the period 
between 1902 and 1906, also attest to the dissatisfaction experienced by the Chinese indentured 
labourers, and their efforts to resist these conditions or attempt to engender some form of 
improvement in their circumstances. As the Foreign Labour Department only recorded riots 
that required external police services, the number of smaller uprisings or rebellious actions 
potentially taken by the Chinese indentured labourers is difficult to ascertain.57 But between 
1902 and 1906 alone there were some 25 different incidents of rebellion by Chinese indentured 
labourers on mining compounds severe enough to necessitate the use of police forces. The most 
extreme of these was the 1905 riot on the North Randfontein mine, which began with a petition 
by the Chinese labourers to have their minimum monthly wage increased to 50 shillings.58 The 
management of the mine sought to appeal to the headmen of the labourers, offering a deal 
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which would not meet the demands of the labourers but would increase the wages of the 
headmen themselves.59  This was roundly rejected by the Chinese labourers who began a 
systematic protest on the mines by doing only the minimum necessary work to fulfil their 
contractual obligations.60 In response the owners of the mine involved the external police 
forces to arrest the Chinese headmen suspected of leading the protest, specifically not involving 
the Foreign Labour Department and requesting that the Department not involve itself in the 
matter because: 
 
…the principle involved was of such vital importance to the mining industry 
that he considered it advisable to try to allow the employers to show the coolies 
that they had power enough to settle the matter for themselves without the 
intervention of the government.61 
 
For the most part such rebellions were officially explained as being the result of improper 
communication, due to a lack of sufficiently qualified translators available, between the white 
mining employers and their Chinese employees. Indeed, the Chamber of Mines staunchly 
rejected any notion that wage disputes or poor treatment of the indentured Chinese labourers 
played a significant role in these uprisings.62 The rebellious collective actions, usually resulting 
in riots or uprisings on the mines, were able to achieve some measure of success, at times. For 
example on the North Randfontein Mines, the staunch resistance of the Chinese indentured 
labourers to their decreasing wages, and the largescale riot that resulted, did see a large number 
of those Chinese labourers involved punished.63 At the same time, it did also successfully 
incline the authorities of the mine to increase the wages of the labourers somewhat, in order to 
prevent a similar scenario from reoccurring.64 Other small victories of the Chinese labourers’ 
resistance was the establishment of a more effective system for communicating grievances: 
locked boxes were supplied into which petitions and complaints could be anonymously placed 
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and addressed to the authorities on the mining compounds.65 The violent nature of the riots, 
and their equally violent suppression by the police, should not be misunderstood, however, as 
some effective solution that succeeded in granting the indentured Chinese labourers anything 
close to comparable treatment by their white employers. But it should be acknowledged that 
the threat of collective disobedience by the indentured Chinese labourers did manage to secure 
some concessions from their employers. In general, the rioters were unable to ever present a 
truly united front, and collective acts of resistance by the Chinese labourers would be restricted 
to particular mining camps and failed to spread beyond them. As a result, the uprisings were 
typically isolated from each other, as seen in cases such as Jumper’s Mine, Witwatersrand Deep 
Mine, Croesus Mine, and North Randfontein Mine.66  
 
Thus, the scope of the Chinese labourers’ resistance did not extend to a wider resistance by the 
indentured labourers throughout the Rand but, instead, was limited to the issues facing a 
particular group of Chinese labourers in the mining camps they were housed in. This disparate 
nature made suppression of the riots easier for the authorities, as they could isolate and deal 
with them individually, without having to worry about a mass resistance of all 50 000 
indentured Chinese labourers.67  
 
Concerning wages, although initially the Chinese seemed more than satisfied with the level of 
wages they received, the increasing numbers of labourers on the mines in 1905 – reaching 
27 222 from 17 469 in 1904 – caused a reduction in the monthly wages being paid to the 
Chinese indentured labourers.68 The number of Chinese only continued to increase, and later 
in 1905 the total number recorded as being employed on the mines reached over 38 000, 
bringing with it a continuing reduction in the wages of the individual Chinese labourers.69 
Unsurprisingly, the Chinese labourers were far from pleased with this situation, since it had 
been the need for wealth with which to support their families that had first driven them to South 
Africa. As a result, there were a number of riots, at least termed so by white overseers, by 
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Chinese workers on the mines.70 Aurora West, Geduld, Glen Deep, and Croesus mine all 
experienced differing levels of disturbances and riots by Chinese miners during 1905.71 The 
cause of these riots, a dissatisfaction with the reducing wages, was made clear in a letter 
between Alfred Lyttleton and the governor of Johannesburg, when discussing the Chinese 
disturbances on the mines.72 On the matter of wages, however, despite occasional concessions 
(such as at North Randfontein), the overall decrease in the wages paid to the indentured Chinese 
labourers from after 1902 was not stopped, and the mine owners were required to only pay the 
indentured Chinese labourers the contracted minimum wage for their first six months of 
employment, after which the wages were allowed to depreciate.73 Despite several riots in 
response to wage disputes, in the end the indentured Chinese labourers were unable to coerce 
any significant concession from the white mine owners with regards to their salaries.  
 
Aside from wages, the Chinese indentured labourers also protested against the dangers they 
faced on the mines, both from their work and from other miners, predominantly white, on the 
compounds. Protests occurred early on in response to the death of Chinese labourers in 
explosions in underground caverns, with other Chinese labourers often responding by refusing 
to work their own shifts in the aftermath of such accidents.74 Aside from abuse by white miners 
and management on the mines, Chinese labourers were often confronted with the threat of the 
police force, used by the management of the mines to compel them to work. The management 
of the mines would occasionally utilize the threat of the police to compel Chinese labourers to 
work even on Sundays. In one case, on the mine of New Modderfontein, when Chinese 
labourers protested against being so forced, police were called in and opened fire, killing one 
of the labourers.75 That abuse of the Chinese indentured labourers by both the European 
authorities and Chinese mine police was systemic seems evident and received no small amount 
of attention despite attempts by the Foreign Labour Department to consistently downplay the 
incidents as resulting purely from language miscommunications or internal ructions among the 
Chinese indentured labourers. The situation of abuse directed against Chinese indentured 
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labourers on these mines was also covered extensively by local newspapers. Frederic 
Mackarness, a member of Parliament, as early as 1904 pointed to stories in the Strait Times, 
Daily News, Daily Chronicle, Spectator, and Morning Post that all provided evidence of 
ongoing abuses on these mines.76 
 
Another factor in these riots was a noted tendency for Chinese labourers to attempt to find their 
own form of justice, or recompense, in cases of abuse.77 It was noted by the Foreign Labour 
Department that: 
 
If anything goes wrong instead of appealing to the government for assistance, 
they boil up into a rage, take the law into their own hands and settle the matter 
for themselves.78 
 
These riots were most frequent between 1904 and 1906, motivated by the issue of wages and 
abuse at the mines, but a series of changes implemented by the Foreign Labour Department 
and mine owners following their initial experiences curbed the riots. Following 1905, there 
were only four severe disturbances by Chinese labourers on mines, a far cry from the 25 
experienced between 1904 and 1905.79 Despite this, the most violent single incident involving 
the Chinese labourers occurred as late as 1909, on the Village Deep mine, where Chinese 
labourers were compelled to work during the traditional Chinese New Year holiday period, 
which they were not legally obligated to.80 The resulting protest by the Chinese labourers, 
determined not to work, was broken up by police forces resulting in the death of seven of the 
labourers.81 Complaints regarding wages, as well as ill-treatment on the mines, were the reality 
with which the Chinese labourers had to contend once they arrived in British South Africa. 
Additionally, these circumstances often saw them punished by the judicial system of the state, 
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creating a less than hospitable environment but, importantly, the incentive offered by the wages 
was still sufficient to motivate large numbers of impoverished Chinese to come to British South 
Africa in search of work on the mines. 
 
An important detail in the legal proceedings that involved the Chinese labourers was the role 
played by the Foreign Labour Department. In 1905, the sheer volume of cases originating out 
of the mines, with regards to the Chinese labourers, had become impossible for the local courts 
to manage, particularly due to the enduring problems with communication and translation.82 
As a result, legislation was passed which endowed the Foreign Labour Department with certain 
judicial powers over Chinese labourers, a power it executed readily.83 Between 1905 and 1906 
alone the Foreign Labour Department convicted some 2 632 Chinese labourers.84 A result of 
the Foreign Labour Department’s involvement in these cases was a sense of resentment from 
the Chinese labourers. Rather than perceiving the Foreign Labour Department as an institution 
that could assist them, the Foreign Labour Department’s involvement in the punishment of the 
Chinese labourers resulted in it being seen as an institution that oppressed them.85  
 
The discontent of the Chinese labourers did not sit solely with the Foreign Labour Department, 
however, as there were consistent difficulties in securing any form of justice from the regular 
courts of the state as well. Despite the proven and documented existence of abuse by white 
miners and white managers of the Chinese labourers, by 1906 not a single conviction of a white 
miner or manager had been secured in such cases. It was noted by the Secretary-General of the 
Transvaal that not a single conviction had yet been acquired in a case where a white was 
charged with abusing a miner.86 Even in a case where a medical examination confirmed that a 
Chinese labourer had been extensively beaten and flogged, despite his white overseer insisting 
he had only been lightly punished, the court fined the white overseer only a single pound for 
the offence, dismissing the case as trivial. 87  This perception contributed to the Chinese 
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labourers tendency not to file complaints with the Foreign Labour Department with regards to 
things like abuse on the mine and instead, as noted above, often attempted to resolve such 
issues themselves.88 Further contributing to this situation was the issue of language, namely 
the barrier created between the Chinese labourers and white miners and managers.89 Officials 
often cited miscommunications or misunderstandings based on language as the cause of 
disturbances on the mines. 90  The problem of language extended even to those Chinese 
appointed as officers over the other labourers, as most of these originated from the southern 
provinces of China and struggled to understand the northern dialect spoken by the vast majority 
of the Chinese labourers, over 50 000 of the approximately 60 000 labourers who came to 
British South Africa.91 Apart from these issues Chinese labourers also had to contend with 
prejudicial legislation passed by the colonies of British South Africa, specifically in response 
to their arrival. In this matter, though, Chinese labourers were not the only affected body and, 
arguably, it was the smaller community of free Chinese already living in British South Africa 
who would be forced to endure the repercussions of such legislation long after the Chinese 
indentured labourers themselves had been deported from British South Africa by 1910.  
 
The involvement of the Consul-Generals in the issues of the indentured Chinese labourers was 
regarded as contentious. Some authors, such as Philip Snow, have characterized their actions 
as largely being accomplices of the white authorities, rendering assistance to them in 
controlling the indentured Chinese labourers in preference of seeking to improve the conditions 
and circumstances of the Chinese indentured labourers.92 In addition, Snow contended that the 
Consul-Generals prioritization of assisting the South African authorities with keeping order 
was a continuation of the Qing Dynasty’s apathetic position towards its foreign subjects.93 
However, this is a misleadingly simple conclusion, particularly when examining the actions 
taken by the Consul-Generals during the indentured labour experiment. At the outset, it is 
important to distinguish between the two Consul-Generals for the period, as they did approach 
matters differently and Liu Ngai was only appointed to the position of Consul-General in 1907, 
towards the tail end of the entire indentured labour experiment. Liu Yu Ling, as the initial 
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Consul-General, was more involved in the matter of the indentured Chinese labourers than Liu 
Ngai would be. As part of his consular duties, Liu Yu Ling would at times inspect the mining 
compounds, to ensure the Chinese indentured labourers were being treated per the conditions 
of the British and Qing schedule on labour. Liu Yu Ling, in an interview given to the Natal 
Mercury in 1905 left no doubts as to why he was in the Transvaal, positioning his duty of 
inspecting the circumstances of the Chinese labourers on the mines as his primary reason for 
being in the Transvaal: 
 
It is my intention to see the mines at work, and acquaint myself with every 
detail. If I consider they are well treated, I shall say so; if I think the contrary I 
shall not neglect to inform my Government. If, of course, there were none or 
few of my countrymen here, there would be no reason for a Consul being 
appointed.94  
 
In this the Consul-General also alludes to the indentured Chinese having served as the catalyst 
for the establishment of the Consul-General office in South Africa, implying that it is only the 
presence of the Chinese on the mines which prompted the Qing Dynasty to do so. Further 
emphasizing the importance with which Liu Yu Ling, and the Qing Dynasty as a whole, treated 
the well-being of the indentured Chinese labourers, Liu Yu Ling stressed that his position had 
been created through a unique means. As opposed to being appointed by the foreign ministry, 
as was standard practise for a Consul-General, Liu Yu Ling was made Consul-General to South 
Africa by Imperial Edict.95 Liu Yu Ling himself explained it as: 
 
That the Emperor makes the appointment. You see Consuls customarily are 
made by Ministers of our Government, but in this case the position was created 
by Imperial Edict.96 
 
                                                 
94 Rand Daily Mail, Chinese Consul, Views on the War in the Far East, Recruiting for the Mines, May 16, 1905, 
p. 5. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
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Despite this it remains true that the Consul-General was rarely involved in, or consulted on, 
matters of riots as they occurred on the mines. A further consideration was that, as opposed to 
the free Chinese community, the indentured Chinese labourers rarely turned to the Consul-
Generals first when seeking recourse for the problems they faced. However, it should be noted 
that an official policy did exist on the mines on how the indentured Chinese could direct 
complaints to their employers. This system required that any complaints be, first, directed up 
the chain of mine management: from the controller to the manager and then the inspector, and 
after that allowed for a complaint or petition to be taken further to the Foreign Labour 
Department itself.97 As a result, the indentured labourers had a system they were expected to 
use in order to channel their concerns. The fact that they distinctly made less use of the Consul-
Generals than their free counterparts did, could be a result of having an alternative system to 
utilize.  
 
Furthermore, considering the admitted problems with communication, it is within the realm of 
possibility that the indentured Chinese labourers were not fully aware of the fact that the 
Consul-General existed as an individual they could contact. Credence to this possibility does 
exist in the fact that one visit by Liu Yu Ling to a mine, in 1905, was even blamed by a Foreign 
Labour Department inspector as being the cause of a riot there.98 Liu Yu Ling’s visit to the 
Witwatersrand Deep Mine, the inspector alleged, had resulted in the indentured Chinese 
labourers being convinced that the treatment they received was unfair and in breach of contract, 
implying that the Consul-General had actually been responsible for convincing the Chinese 
labourers of this, motivating them to take rebellious action in 1905.99 It is possible, then, that 
considering their limited access to information on the mining premises, that many of the 
indentured Chinese labourers were simply not aware of a means of communicating their 
grievances to the Consul-General. Further evidence that the authorities on the mines sought to 
prevent the indentured Chinese having access to the Consul-General can be found in the case 
                                                 
97 (TAB) FLD 240 76/2, 76/7, 76/8, 76/11: “Complaints by Chinese,” 1906; TAB FLD 241 76/15, 76/19, 76/32: 
“Complaints by Chinese,” 1906. 
98 (TAB) GOV 171 GEN 596/05: “Copy of a Report by Captain Fairfax on the Disturbance which took Place 
amongst Chinese Coolies Employed on the Witwatersrand Deep Mine, Limited,” TAB 173 GOV GEN 665/05: 
“Further Report by Captain Fairfax of the Foreign Labour Department, Regarding the Disturbance on the 
Witwatersrand Deep Mine,” 1905. 
99 (TAB) GOV 171 GEN 596/05: “Copy of a Report by Captain Fairfax on the Disturbance which took Place 
amongst Chinese Coolies Employed on the Witwatersrand Deep Mine, Limited,” 1905; (TAB) 173 GOV GEN 
665/05: “Further Report by Captain Fairfax of the Foreign Labour Department, Regarding the Disturbance on the 
Witwatersrand Deep Mine,” 1905. 
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of the Rose Deep mine riot. On Rose Deep mine, in 1905, the refusal by the night shift of the 
Chinese labourers to enter the mines eventually escalated into a riot.100 During the course of 
the disturbance when mine authorities sought to convince the Chinese labourers to resume work 
they refused to do so until they had spoken with the Chinese Consul-General.101 However, the 
mining authorities would not permit this.102 
 
Liu Yu Ling did maintain a comprehensive report on the treatment of the indentured Chinese 
labourers, reporting back to the Qing Dynasty on their circumstances and attempting to arrange 
for transportation for those who fell ill.103 For the most part, it appears as if Liu Yu Ling’s 
approach to the indentured Chinese labourers sought to find ground between serving to 
safeguard them and seeking not to antagonize the Transvaal government. He made no 
comprehensive protest concerning the treatment of the indentured Chinese on the 
Witwatersrand, but did seek to provide help by organizing for ill Chinese to be transported 
home and for the indentured Chinese to be able to remit money back to their families in 
China.104 Liu Yu Ling was also successful in negotiating a system by which the employing 
Chamber of Mines would pay compensation to the families of Chinese indentured labourers 
who passed away whilst working in South Africa.105 
 
One of the most important areas of Liu Yu Ling’s involvement with the indentured Chinese 
was on a Special Committee established by the Transvaal government in 1906. Between 1905 
and 1906, both the Foreign Labour Department and Chamber of Mines separately organized 
their own committees to attempt to find solutions to the issue of desertions and disobedience 
by Chinese indentured labourers. 106  When both of these committees failed to produce 
satisfactory results a joint Special Committee was established, in April of 1906, by the acting 
Lieutenant-Governor of British South Africa, Richard Solomon. Its specific function was to 
devise better methods through which the Chinese indentured labour on the mines could be 
                                                 
100 Daily Rand Mail: Rose Deep Row, Ten Coolies Charged, Dissatisfied with the Food, June 24, 1905, p. 8. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103C. Hansheng (ed), “Request to the Emperor by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Appointing Liu Yulin as the 
Consul in British South Africa, September 17, Guangxu 30,” A Compilation of Historical Documents, 1, (4), p. 
1721. 
104 (TAB) FLD 84 11/52: “Remittance of Money to China. Money Order System,” 1905. 
105 L. Anshan: China’s Africa Policy and the Chinese immigrants in Africa, p. 60. 
106 P. Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, p. 174. 
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controlled. This Committee, the rather bluntly named Special Committee on the Control of 
Chinese Labourers, consisted of the superintendent of the Foreign Labour Department, the 
general manager of the Chamber of Mines, representatives of the South African Constabulary, 
a resident Magistrate from Pretoria, who would serve as the chairman of the Committee and 
Consul-General Liu Yu Ling.107 It was tasked with devising a method to ensure that the 
difficulties faced by the mines with regards to the Chinese indentured labourers could be 
ameliorated, even if only somewhat.108 That Liu Yu Ling was involved in this Committee 
means that he was involved in the determination of the indentured Chinese experiment to an 
extent. However, importantly, he was merely a participating member, with little power, and 
thus the ultimate outcome of the Committee is not necessarily an accurate reflection of his 
intent. It is impossible to know his exact thoughts on the Committee, or influence on the 
changes it eventually engendered. Yet Liu Yu Ling’s involvement is telling of the role the 
Consul-General did play in assisting the South African authorities in better controlling the 
Chinese labourers. It was noted, within the report of the Special Committee, that Liu Yu Ling 
had advised the Committee that most of the desertions, riots, and disruptive behaviour on behalf 
of the Chinese labourers in general, was the result of the treatment they received. In the Special 
Committee’s report his comments were described as follows: 
 
Secondly, the Chinese Consul-General has given it as his opinion that much of 
the discontent which arose during the earlier stages, and which perhaps still 
exists to-day, is attributable to the fact that the labourer has never before been 
subjected to the discipline under which he has now to work, and which is 
essential for the purpose of proper work and control.109 
 
Similar to the actual complaints made by the indentured Chinese labourers themselves, but 
largely dismissed by the official reports of the Chamber of Mines and Foreign Labour 
Department, Consul-General Liu Yu Ling emphasized that it was the “treatment” of the 
                                                 
107 Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Seventeenth Annual Report: Report of the Special Committee Appointed to 
Consider and Report on the Present Conditions in Regard to Control of Chinese Indentured Labourers on the 
Mine Premises of the Witwatersrand Area, June 1906. 
108 Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Report of the Executive Committee for the year 1906, p. 14. 
109 Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Seventeenth Annual Report: Report of the Special Committee Appointed to 
Consider and Report on the Present Conditions in Regard to Control of Chinese Indentured Labourers on the 
Mine Premises of the Witwatersrand Area, June 1906, Part IV. 
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Chinese labourers that served as the primary catalyst for most of the difficulties encountered 
when dealing with the Chinese on the mines. However Liu Yu Ling attached an addendum at 
the end of the report, in which he explained that he objected to the proposal to erect fences 
around the mining compounds housing the Chinese indentured labourers.110 Liu Yu Ling 
explained that he believed a fence served no practically useful function, that it would not deter 
desertion, as if a Chinese labourer wished to desert he would simply get a permit to leave the 
premises with and desert then.111 Instead, Liu Yu Ling supported the report’s overall argument 
that the situation would be best remedied with an increase in oversight, stating that: 
 
I believe (1) That the present compound should be closely guarded and stronger 
European supervision should be exercised—especially during the night; (2) The 
boundaries of the mines should be marked by posts, and such posts should be 
guarded; That there should be a daily check system uniformly on all the 
mines.112 
 
However, somewhat unsurprisingly, the Committee’s investigations largely downplayed any 
role played by the abuse of the indentured Chinese labourers in either their desertions or 
uprisings, and ignored any role wage disputes played as well, focusing instead on gambling 
and opium, and identifying this as the primary causes of desertion.113 However, this was only 
the official stance of the Committee. In other correspondence members of both the Chamber 
of Mines and Foreign Labour Department were more open to the role played by mistreatment 
of the Chinese labourers by white miners and employers.114 Furthermore, the vast majority of 
all complaints and petitions made by the indentured Chinese labourers were focused on the 
issue of mistreatment by their superiors – white or Chinese Mine Police – as well as disputes 
concerning their wages and their contracts.115 The recommendations made by the Committee, 
                                                 
110 Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Seventeenth Annual Report: Report of the Special Committee Appointed to 
Consider and Report on the Present Conditions in Regard to Control of Chinese Indentured Labourers on the 
Mine Premises of the Witwatersrand Area, June 1906, Addendum to the report. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 (TAB) AMPT PUBS TKP 205 01: “Transvaal Blue Books, Unnumbered. Labour. Report of the Special 
Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Present Conditions in Regard to the Control of Chinese Indentured 
Labourers in the Witwatersrand District, Together with Minutes of Procedure, Minutes of Evidence and 
Appendices,” 1906. 
114 (TAB) FLD 7 147/20/11A: “Secret Telegram, Governor, Transvaal to Secretary of State,” 1905. 
115 (TAB) FLD 240 76/-: “Complaints by Chinese,” 1906. 
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most of which were eventually adopted and enforced on the mining compounds, were detailed 
in the conclusion concerning chiefly the permit system and an increase in security around the 
mines.116  
 
One of the most important successes for the indentured Chinese labourers, the permit system, 
which controlled the movement of the Chinese labourers, was significantly streamlined. A 
uniform system was introduced to more effectively control the traffic of indentured Chinese 
labourers, making it easier for the Chinese labourers to acquire permits to move around during 
the days they were not working.117 At the same time, a much larger number of white miners 
were employed on the mines following the Committee’s recommendation, exercising greater 
surveillance over the Chinese labourers, and more meticulous records were kept of their 
movements via the permit system.118 The Committee’s recommendations were, for the most 
part, successful, and during the latter end of the Chinese indentured labour experiment, from 
1906 until 1910, the number of desertions and uprisings on mines reduced significantly. They 
claimed that: 
 
…statistics prove absolutely that the number of defaulters, deserters, and 
offenders in any one particular mine is in inverse ratio to the control 
exercised.119 
 
As a result, the Chinese indentured labourers’ resistance for the most part served only to 
engender tighter control over the mining compounds, as opposed to any overall relaxation of 
the stringent oversight exercised over them. Thus, the overall resistance of the indentured 
Chinese labourers failed to bring about any significant change in their conditions. That there 
were certain small successes cannot be denied, and should be acknowledged, but ultimately the 
South African authorities were largely successful, via a combination of increasingly stringent 
                                                 
116 Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Seventeenth Annual Report: Report of the Special Committee Appointed to 
Consider and Report on the Present Conditions in Regard to Control of Chinese Indentured Labourers on the 
Mine Premises of the Witwatersrand Area, June 1906, Conclusion. 
117 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 250. 
118 (TAB) FLD 168 34/00: “Report by Major McAndrew, FLD Inspector,” 1905. 
119 (TAB) EC 86 82/06: “Lord Selborne to the Colonial Office, ” 1906. 
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oversight and police action, to compel the Chinese indentured labourers to adhere to many of 
the draconian requirements and conditions of their employment.  
 
The role of the Consul-Generals in this is a complicated matter. Consul-General Liu Yu Ling 
did make several efforts to assist the indentured Chinese labourers and was clearly involved 
with attempting to rectify some of the issues and difficulties they faced, but at the same time 
his involvement in the Special Committee evidenced that he also worked to assist the South 
African authorities in exercising control, even repressive control, over the indentured Chinese 
labourers. However, it is important to bear in mind that the authorities of the Transvaal resisted 
any effort by Liu Yu Ling to interact with the indentured Chinese. When Liu Yu Ling did 
attempt to directly investigate the abuse of Chinese labourers on the mines in 1906 he was 
rebuffed by the Chamber of Mines.120 Furthermore, from the outset of the experiment the 
British authorities, Transvaal government and Chamber of Mines had been determined to make 
the Consul-General as impotent as possible. The powers of the office were left incredibly vague 
but, crucially, the Consul-General was not permitted to visit mines without the permission of 
the authorities and had no power to protest mistreatment or enforce the provisions of the 
Importation Ordinance.121 Liu Yu Ling’s only power was to report back to his government, 
which could do little other than lodge official complaints with the British Empire.122 This was 
made quite explicit in a comment by the head of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, 
F. Perry, who said: 
 
The last thing we want is a petty mandarin, with an army of subordinates, 
registering the individual labourers and certainly black-mailing them in the 
process.123 
                                                 
120 (TAB) FLD 225/62/55: “A. S. H. Cooper to Selborne Regarding Allegations by Mr Cooper whilst in Gaol,” 
1905. 
121 (TAB) AMPT PUBS 51 CD 2026: “Transvaal. Further Correspondence Relating to the Transvaal Labour 
Question. Coolie and Chinese Labourers. 1) Recruiting 2) Contracts of Service 3) Transfer of Labourers 4) 
Passages of Labourers to South Africa 5) Arrival of the Labourers at Durban 6) Care and Treatment of the 
Labourers when Sick 7) Wages 8) Women and Children 9) Return of Labourers to China,” May 1904. 
122 (TAB) AMPT PUBS 51 CD 2026: “Transvaal. Further Correspondence Relating to the Transvaal Labour 
Question. Coolie and Chinese Labourers. 1) Recruiting 2) Contracts of Service 3) Transfer of Labourers 4) 
Passages of Labourers to South Africa 5) Arrival of the Labourers at Durban 6) Care and Treatment of the 
Labourers when Sick 7) Wages 8) Women and Children 9) Return of Labourers to China,” May 1904. 
123 (TAB) FLD 130/19/3: “Consular Matters,” 1903. 
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In the face of this it becomes clear that the British and Transvaal authorities had already set 
themselves against permitting the Consul-General to make any appreciable change to the 
situation of the indentured Chinese.  
 
A further factor to keep in mind was Liu Yu Ling’s lack of leverage or influence. As indicated 
above the opening decade of the twentieth century was a period of geo-political instability and 
weakness for the Qing Dynasty. This left Liu Yu Ling with little capability to coerce any sort 
of compromise from the Transvaal or British authorities. His own grandson, Lau Ka-meng, 
described Liu Yu Ling’s situation thusly: 
 
In his diplomatic life, he was always playing with a weak hand. He represented 
a weak government, negotiating with strong military powers.124 
 
With this in mind Liu Yu Ling’s actions must be understood in terms of the limitations set upon 
him. 
 
In contrast to Liu Yu Ling, few official records of Liu Ngai attempting to assist the indentured 
Chinese labourers or being involved with their difficulties. Considering that Liu Ngai only took 
office late in 1907, as Liu Yu Ling only returned to China in August, it is true that Liu Ngai 
was only involved with the final years of the Chinese indentured labour experiment. In fact, by 
the time Liu Ngai assumed office, the indentured system was already being dismantled.125 
Thus, his lack of recorded assistance is possibly a result of this. Furthermore, by the time Liu 
Ngai was Consul-General the majority of the conflicts on the mines involving the indentured 
Chinese labourers had already been resolved, mostly through an increase in the number of 
white overseers on the mine, restricting and repressing any rebellious actions by the indentured 
Chinese labourers.126 In this light, Liu Ngai was not confronted with the same urgent problems 
                                                 
124 L. Rosario: “Diplomacy at its Best,” Macao Magazine, 17 October 2002.  
125 Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, p. 166. 
126 G. Kynoch. “Controlling the Coolies: Chinese Mineworkers and the Struggle for Labor in South Africa, 1904-
1910,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, (36), 2, 2003, p. 314. 
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that Liu Yu Ling had been. The consistent disturbances on the mines, which had been an 
obvious matter for Liu Yu Ling to attend to, did not exist in the same way for Liu Ngai. This 
possibly explains why he seemed to be less involved with the indentured Chinese labourers 
than Liu Yu Ling himself was. 
 
Despite minor successes the Consul-Generals failed to achieve a significant improvement in 
the conditions of the indentured Chinese labourers. The combination of riots and desertions, 
even with some assistance by the Consul-Generals, managed to secure minor concessions only, 
and for the most part the South African authorities utilized increased repression to control the 
indentured Chinese labourers. The regulations of the Labour Importation Ordinance were 
rarely relaxed and, as indicated, an increase in repression was largely successful in quelling 
disturbances on the mines. At the same time, the role of the Consul-Generals in this was more 
complex than simply agents seeking to assist the Chinese labourers, as shown by Liu Yu Ling’s 
apparent support for more stringent white oversight on the mining compounds. However, there 
was still an effort on behalf of the Consul-Generals of the Qing Dynasty to assist the Chinese 
labourers to some extent, making any dismissal of their role as purely agents of the South 
African authorities control an unfairly general and unfounded one. 
 
4.3 The Consul-Generals and the Chinese of the Transvaal 
 
Unlike their counterparts in the Cape, who had largely avoided discriminatory legislation until 
the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act, the Transvaal community of Chinese had been the target of 
several discriminatory legislative acts before the arrival of the Consul-Generals. In 1885 the 
Transvaal had passed “Law 3, Relating to coolies, Arabs and other Asiatics,” which effectively 
prohibited any Chinese within the Transvaal from becoming citizens of the Transvaal or 
owning fixed property.127 The law further forced the Chinese to pay for and carry passes on 
themselves.128 Even after the Anglo-Boer War, and the establishment of a new Transvaal 
                                                 
127 Statute Law of the Transvaal, 1839-1910, Law 3 of 1885, Relating to coolies, Arabs and other Asiatics. 
128 Statute Law of the Transvaal, 1839-1910, Law 3 of 1885, Relating to coolies, Arabs and other Asiatics, Section 
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government under the auspices of the British Empire, the new government would largely 
reinstate the same provisions in 1903 under the “Bazaar Act”.129 
 
Although not directly targeted by the Labour Importation Ordinance it has been argued, most 
persuasively by Harris, that the arrival of the indentured Chinese labourers, and their effect on 
discourse within South Africa, certainly catapulted the previously ignored Chinese community 
into the spotlight.130 However, during the period of the Qing Dynasty’s Consul-Generals, the 
free Chinese community in the Transvaal would find themselves subjected to several 
discriminatory pieces of legislation.131 Like the indentured Chinese labourers, the free Chinese 
were active in resisting the discriminatory legislation they fell victim to, particularly in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Their role in struggling against racialized legislation in South 
Africa has generally gone comparatively underexamined compared to the struggles of other 
groups within the country.132 In contrast to the indentured Chinese labourers, however, the free 
Chinese community in the Transvaal consistently sought the assistance of the Qing Dynasty’s 
Consul-Generals. They often relied upon them to aid them in their resistance against the 
legislation they were opposed to. Indeed, in 1902 a group of Chinese in the Transvaal actually 
delivered a petition to the Qing Dynasty’s Minister in London, Zhang Deyi, asking for some 
form of representation on their behalf by the Qing Dynasty.133 The involvement of the Consul-
Generals in their resistance was one of the only commonalities between the free Chinese and 
indentured Chinese labourers in the Transvaal, as for the most part both groups pursued largely 
isolated and separate paths, never forming a combined resistance based on their shared 
nationality. 134  The Transvaal Chinese seemed generally disinterested in their indentured 
countrymen.135 
 
                                                 
129 Transvaal Leader, 12 December 1903. 
130 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 238. 
131 (SAB) GG 1320 01 37/27: “Chinese Exclusion Act No. 37 of 1904 Cape of Good Hope Colony. Forwards 
Correspondence with the Union Government in which he Urges the Repeal of the Act,” 1911; SAB GG 900 01 
15/706, 15/557, 37/45, 15/724: “Asiatics: Chinese. Forwards Note by Chinese Minister in London on Subject of 
Treatment of Chinese in South Africa and Requests Minister’s Observation,” 28 April 1914. 
132 K. L. Harris: “‘Strange Bedfellows’: Gandhi and the Chinese Passive Resistance,” Journal of Natal and Zulu 
History, (31), 2013, p. 15. 
133 L. Anshan: A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911, p. 182. 
134 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 54. 
135 Ibid, p. 45. 
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The Transvaal Asiatic Registration Act was the primary cause of resistance among the free 
Chinese in the Transvaal. As a piece of legislation, it built on an earlier bill, the Draft Asiatic 
Amendment Ordinance of 1906. At the time of its promulgation the Draft Asiatic Amendment 
Ordinance stoked intense resistance from both the Chinese and Indian communities in the 
Transvaal. The Draft Ordinance would effectively create a comprehensive and intrusive 
register of all “Asiatics” in South Africa, and key matters such as trading licenses would only 
be made available to individuals who underwent such registration.136 The Transvaal Chinese 
community was quick to involve Consul-General Liu Yu Ling in their opposition to the Draft 
Ordinance, sending a five-page petition to him which he passed on to both the authorities of 
the Transvaal and the British Empire.137 The Chinese community in the Transvaal, headed 
largely by a man known as Leung Quinn, the head of the Transvaal Chinese Association, 
created a comprehensive document detailing their opposition to the Draft Ordinance and 
outlining the onerous consequences it would have for all free Chinese in the Transvaal if it 
were to come into force.138  Furthermore, when a deputation from the Transvaal Chinese 
Association departed to London, to directly present their grievances in connection to the Draft 
Ordinance, they were accompanied by Liu Yu Ling himself, and the Consul-General would 
later deliver their petition on their behalf to the British Ambassador.139 In November of that 
same year the British Governor rejected the Draft Ordinance, effectively preventing it from 
coming into force.140 However, this victory was to be transient at best as, by the next year, the 
Transvaal would promulgate and pass a new act, the Asiatic Registration Act under the 
authority of the newly elected Het Volk party, which effectively established all provisions of 
the Draft Ordinance.141 This time there would be no intervention from the British Empire to 
prevent it due to the Transvaal having been granted responsible government.142  
 
The Asiatic Registration Act became the focal point of both strong resistance by the Chinese 
and Indian communities within the Transvaal. The regulations it enforced complicated matters 
                                                 
136 B. Pachai, “The South African Indian Question 1860-1971,” p. 39. 
137 (TAB) GOV 202 Gen 1005/06: “Petition from Chinese Residents in Transvaal Protesting against Provisions 
of Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance,” 1907. 
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of acquiring trading licenses for all those who opposed it, as without registration it would be 
impossible to acquire such. It is important to understand the intense resistance which existed 
within the Transvaal Chinese community to the Asiatic Registration Act. Although the 
resistance and role played by the South African Indian community has been examined at length, 
the role played by the Chinese has been considerably underexamined, barring some exceptions 
such as the work of Harris. In particular a provision of the registration which required the 
Chinese to have impressions of their fingerprints taken was considered particularly 
dehumanizing and insulting to the dignity of the Chinese as both individuals and their nation.143 
This was predominantly due to the Chinese’s own social experiences, in which the process of 
taking fingerprints was usually reserved only for individuals considered to be criminals, and 
those who had committed grievous crimes in particular.144 As a result many Chinese equated 
the registrations requirement that their fingerprints be taken with the notion that they were, 
inherently by this process, being criminalized and degraded, treated as if they were serious 
offenders or lower-class individuals.145 This opposition to the process of fingerprint taking was 
so intense within the Chinese community that Gandhi, and the respective Indian resistance 
movement, even criticized the Chinese for their intense resistance.146 By the time registration 
closed in November only four Chinese had registered.147 Of these one would return to China 
while another, Chow Kwai, would commit suicide.148 
 
An understanding of some of the harm caused to the Chinese can be found in the contents of 
the suicide letter written by Chow Kwai: 
 
I am going to leave the world, but I must give a public explanation why I intend 
to commit suicide. Since I came to South Africa I have only been in domestic 
service. My dialect is quite different from that of the rest of my countrymen, 
with whom I have very seldom associated. My employer advised me to re-
register. At first, I refused to do so, but I was informed that I would be dismissed 
                                                 
143 (PRO) CO 291/122 40668: “Asiatic Law Amendment Act,” 1907. 
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146 Ibid, pp. 30-31. 
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from my employment. I thought that I should have to lose my situation. 
Therefore, I was obliged to re-register, but I did not know the degradation that 
would follow until my friend talked to me about the registration matter and 
showed me the translation of the law. I found that I would be treated as a slave, 
which would be a disgrace to myself and my nation. I was not aware of all this 
before. Now it is too late for me to repent. I cannot look my countrymen in the 
face. I hope all my countrymen will take warning from my error.149 
 
Chow Kwai was only 24 when he took his life, by hanging, in 1907. Much later this tragedy 
did not go completely unnoticed though. In the Chinese section of the Braamfontein cemetery, 
the Transvaal Chinese Association erected an imposing grave for the young man, with the text 
of his suicide letter upon the headstone. 
 
The intense campaign of free Chinese resistance to the Asiatic Registration Act saw increasing 
numbers of them being arrested throughout 1907, over 2 000, and included the arrest of the 
Transvaal Chinese Association head, Leung Quinn, himself. 150  The imprisonment of the 
Chinese resisters also saw the Consul-General at the time, Liu Ngai, personally step in and 
involve himself in the affair, moving beyond simply relaying petitions on behalf of the 
Transvaal Chinese Association.151 Liu Ngai made several visits to the imprisoned Chinese 
activists during 1907 and 1908, often to ensure that their conditions were satisfactory, and to 
show support for their cause.152 In January of 1908, Liu Ngai personally visited Leung Quinn 
in jail, and the Consul-General made clear both his support for the actions of the Transvaal 
Chinese Community, as well as his opinion of Leung Quinn; 
 
                                                 
149 Indian Opinion, 16 November 1907, p. 370. 
150 B. Pachai, “The South African Indian Question 1860-1971”, p. 39. 
151 (TAB) LD 1563 AG201/08: “Application for Special Permit to visit Chinese Prisoner Leung Quinn from 
Acting Chinese Consul,” 1908.  
152 (TAB) LD 1563 AG201/08: “Application for Special Permit to visit Chinese Prisoner Leung Quinn from 
Acting Chinese Consul,” 1908. 
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The prisoner who up to the time of his imprisonment, was the chairman of the 
Chinese Association in Johannesburg, which body I recognize as representing 
the Chinese Community of the Transvaal.153 
 
It is clearly evident that Liu Ngai was highly active in his support of the free Chinese 
community in the Transvaal, particularly during their campaign of passive resistance against 
the Transvaal Asiatic Registration Act. He was responsible for consistent petitions on their 
behalf, and petitions to the South African government to lift some of their discriminatory 
legislation towards the Chinese. This even earned him an official rebuke from the South 
African and British Governments.154 Liu Ngai also became personally involved in the matter 
of the Asiatic Registration Act by moving beyond simply communicating the petitions of the 
Transvaal Chinese community to the South African authorities, but by being involved directly 
in negotiations between the Chinese Transvaal community and the authorities of the 
Transvaal.155  
 
In addition to this support, Liu Ngai also became personally involved in an internal clash within 
the Chinese community of the Transvaal. Among those Chinese who resisted the Asiatic 
Registration Act there was not a uniform position and two distinct factions emerged. One of 
these factions, the so-called Party of Compliance, were satisfied with initial concessions made 
by the Transvaal government and rejected the campaign of passive resistance as employed by 
Gandhi and the Chinese Association under Leung Quinn.156 Conflict between the two groups 
over the use of the Chinese Associations finances eventually was brought to court in 1908, with 
the two parties opposed to each other in the case of  Leung Quinn v. Ho Ling, Tam Hung and 
Wing Tong Cheong.157 The issue of the Chinese Association’s funds formed the crux of this 
dispute, with the Passive Resistance faction accusing the Party of Compliance of utilizing funds 
                                                 
153 (TAB) LD 1563 AG201/08: “Application for Special Permit to Visit Chinese Prisoner Leung Quinn from 
Acting Chinese Consul,” 1908. 
154 (SAB) GG 1320 37/28: “Action of the Acting Chinese Consul-General in Corresponding Direct with the 
Minister for the Interior in Reference to the Chinese Exclusion Act of the Cape Colony,” 1911. 
155 Rand Daily Mail, The Asiatics. Chinese Register. One thumbprint, February 17, 1908, p. 9. 
156 K. L. Harris: “‘Strange Bedfellows’: Gandhi and the Chinese Passive Resistance,” Journal of Natal and Zulu 
History, (31), 2013, pp. 23-33. 
157 Rand Daily Mail, The Chinese Case. Settlement arrived at, July 22, 1909, p. 10. 
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from the Association which were earmarked for use by the Passive Resistance faction.158 Liu 
Ngai, along with reverends J.J. Doke and Charles Phillips, were involved in the trial, assisting 
in attempting to find a resolution between the two parties.159 The trial concluded after the two 
parties came to a mutual agreement, consenting to certain provisions, with the assistance of Liu 
Ngai and the reverends.160 For the role played by the Consul-General he was, along with the 
pair of reverends, awarded £400 of the sum of money in dispute to use to establish a Chinese 
Ward in the Johannesburg hospital.161 That the Chinese Association was willing to entrust this 
amount to the Consul-General seems to further indicate their consideration of him as a reliable 
ally of their cause.  
 
His efforts to assist in the negotiations between the Chinese Association and the Transvaal 
government eventually bore fruit in a compromise, being reached in 1908, for which he was 
partly credited. 162  This compromise, agreed on by the Chinese and Transvaal Asiatic 
Immigration Ministry, required that only a single thumbprint be taken as part of the registration 
process.163 Furthermore that registration was neither a criminal nor compulsive action, as these 
had been large concerns for the Chinese community in the Transvaal.164 This stood as a 
significant achievement for the Transvaal Chinese community, achieved with the assistance of 
the Consul-General.165 However, this is not to credit the Consul-General with achieving this 
result alone, the amending of the law was the end result of a protracted campaign of passive 
resistance by Indians and Chinese.  
 
Although Liu Yu Ling, in his capacity as Consul-General, seemingly took no action against the 
Asiatic Registration Act, in part no doubt since by 1907, when it was enacted, he was already 
in the process of departing, he did still critique it.166 In his capacity as the Minister to the 
Chinese Legation in London, Liu Yu Ling explicitly denounced the Asiatic Registration Act 
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165 D. Man & M. Yap: Colour, Confusion and Concessions, pp. 155-159. 
166  (SAB) 1320 01 37/42: “Transvaal Draft Municipal Ordinance: Protest by Chinese Minister in England 
Regarding Provisions as Affecting Chinese Residents in the Transvaal,” 1911. 
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as abhorrent to the Qing Dynasty government and that its existence was perceived as being 
highly offensive to all Chinese.167  
 
The compromise surrounding the Asiatic Registration Act would persist into the Union as well. 
The initial immigration legislation of the Union acceded to several demands of the Chinese 
regarding registration, sufficiently so that from 1912 onwards the free Chinese ceased to 
actively resist the legislation.168 The extensive involvement of Liu Ngai, in this matter at least 
lends credence then to the notion that the efforts of the Consul-Generals were of some help for 
the free Chinese community in the Transvaal. Further, when the Transvaal passed the Gold and 
Base Metals Law in 1908, the Transvaal Chinese found themselves once more restricted in 
their capacity to trade.169 Although they had long been denied the ability to mine and prospect 
themselves, the new law also forbid them from trading within mining areas, and further 
classified them within the Act as constituting part of the “Coloured” population of South 
Africa.170 The Act’s explicit classification of the Chinese as constituting a “Coloured” group 
was a particular point of contention to the Transvaal Chinese. Liu Ngai would intercede on 
behalf of the Transvaal Chinese in this matter, protesting the Act to the Colonial Secretary.171 
The Consul-General had three objections against the Act: firstly that it placed Chinese in the 
same category as blacks; secondly that it limited the ability for Chinese traders to gain permits 
to trade on mining areas and lastly that even within those mining areas they were permitted to 
trade they were restricted to very specific areas.172 Liu Ngai’s protests, however, failed to have 
any effect, as the Gold Law remained on the books well past the collapse of the Qing Dynasty. 
There is, however, a clear indication that the Consul-General did attempt to assist the Transvaal 
Chinese community in objecting and opposing legislation which discriminated against them.  
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Liu Ngai also became heavily involved in attempting to combat opium usage by the Chinese 
within the Transvaal.173 He suggested nine provisions the Transvaal government should enact 
to combat the usage of opium. These included that any Chinese opium smoker needed a letter 
permitting them to do so from a doctor, that they would need to subject themselves to regular 
scrutiny by doctors to ensure they were not overusing their opium, that the amount the Chinese 
would be allowed to smoke would be, monthly, reduced, so as to slowly wean them off its use 
and that only pharmacies would be allowed to sell opium.174 These pharmacies, he suggested, 
should then create a record of the amount of opium sold, and to whom it was sold, and all 
smoking shops should be closed and smoking equipment cease to be imported. 175  The 
Transvaal government, however, simply responded to Liu Ngai’s suggestions by insisting it 
had its own existing regulations concerning opium usage, and that those would be sufficient.176 
 
A distinction between the efforts of the Consul-Generals and their successes is pivotal to 
dispelling the idea that they represented a continuing apathy on behalf of the Qing Dynasty 
towards the overseas Chinese. It is clear that the Consul-Generals did, to a significant extent, 
take seriously their duties as guarantors of the wellbeing of the Chinese in the Transvaal, and 
made themselves available to be used by the Transvaal Chinese community as a method of 
directing their complaints to the South Africa government. Even after he had ceased to serve 
as the Consul-General to South Africa, Liu Yu Ling did not relinquish his criticism of the 
treatment of the free Chinese community in South Africa. The support of both Consul-Generals 
to the free Chinese community in the Transvaal was apparent, although their support and 
assistance to the indentured Chinese labourers was markedly less explicit. Further, their support 
for the Chinese labourers was complicated by the role played by Liu Yu Ling in assisting and 
advising the Transvaal authorities on how to better control the Chinese labourers. The support 
offered by the Consul-Generals did, at times, achieve some marginal success, most clearly in 
their assistance in the compromise reached concerning the Transvaal Asiatic Registration Act. 
However, in the Cape Colony their successes were markedly of less significance. 
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Chapter 5: Well-intentioned Impotence: The Case of the Cape Colony 
 
This Chapter explores the Consul-Generals’ involvement with the Cape Chinese. In particular 
it focuses on the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act and the burdens it placed upon the Cape Chinese. 
The role played by Liu Yu Ling in assisting the Cape Chinese to gain exemptions from the 
Exclusion Act as well as his role in solving the difficulties the Exclusion Act raised for the 
Cape Chinese’s ability to renew trading licenses is dealt with in detail. Further Liu Ngai’s 
protests concerning the Exclusion Act are examined, as are his attempts to advise the Cape 
Parliament on legislation to curb the use of opium by Chinese in the Cape. The chapter 
concludes by analysing the attempts by both Consul-Generals throughout the period to attempt 
to assist the Chinese in South Africa but acknowledges their efforts rarely yielded results. 
However, the importance of the establishment of the office of Consul-General, due to its future 
role, is acknowledged as well.  
 
5.1 The Consul-Generals and the Cape Chinese 
 
The small pre-existing community of free Chinese within the Cape Colony had for most of 
their history escaped the attentions of the various white settler administrations. By 1891 this 
population amounted effectively to only slightly more than 200, which no doubt contributed to 
the lack of attention it received from the colonial government in the Cape.1 Thus they most 
likely escaped specific discrimination targeting them more due to neglect on behalf of the 
Colonial administrations than any sort of benevolence. However, as stated above, the 
conversation surrounding the importation of Chinese labour to the Transvaal mines thrust the 
Cape free Chinese into the spotlight just as much as it did the Transvaal Chinese. These small 
minority groups suddenly becoming important parts of the internal political discussions within 
the Cape and Transvaal. In the Cape, this political process led to the Cape Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1904, perhaps the first piece of legislation in South Africa’s history which discriminated 
against a single specific racial group. As pointed out by Harris: 
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The Chinese Exclusion Act passed by the Cape parliament in 1904 was one of 
the first pieces of legislation promulgated in the southern region of Africa where 
a particular 'racial group' was singled out, documented and discriminated 
against. Although it had trans-oceanic antecedents and tapped into this global 
anti-Chinese sentiment, unlike the Chinese exclusion legislation elsewhere, the 
Cape exclusion legislation targeted the entire Chinese 'race’.2 
 
The Cape Chinese Exclusion Act had its origin in the strong opposition throughout the Cape 
Colony to the arrival of the Chinese indentured labourers in the Transvaal. There was little 
ambiguity or uncertainty in this regard. The white population of the Cape Colony was 
overwhelmingly against the idea of Chinese labour being imported in any sizeable amount. 
Evidence for this can be found in the numerous petitions delivered by different towns 
throughout 1903: Kimberley, Cape Town, Paarl, King William’s Town, George, Somerset 
West, Queenstown and Hanover all delivered petitions from their citizenry to the British 
government urging against the importation of Chinese labour or expressing strong concerns 
thereover.3 In addition to these official petitions by the citizenry, numerous South African 
newspapers also expressed a range of opposition to the idea. Both the South African News and 
Afrikaans newspaper Ons Land wrote at length against the importation of Chinese labour.4 
When discussing the adverse reaction of the Cape’s white population to the prospect of Chinese 
labour it must be kept in mind that, at the time, there was a general feeling of hostility towards 
Chinese labourers in many Western states and, more particularly, Western colonies. As 
mentioned before the Cape Colony would pass their Exclusion Act, in 1904, the United States 
of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand would all pass their own variations of 
legislation aimed at curtailing the arrival of Chinese into their borders.5 Commonly repeated 
myths about the moral danger posed by the Chinese, as well as racialist views of their work 
ethic which cast them as threats to the employment opportunities of whites worked to stir up 
resentment against the Chinese throughout the world.6  
 
                                                 
2 K. L. Harris: “Paper Trail: Chasing the Chinese in the Cape (1904-1933),” Kronos Southern African Histories, 
(40), 1, November 2014, p. 1. 
3 (KAB) GH 35/62 5: “Native Labour Question and Chinese Exclusion Act,” 1903. 
4 (KAB) GH 35/62 5: “Native Labour Question and Chinese Exclusion Act,” 1903. 
5 P. Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, p. 35. 
6 (KAB) GH 35/62 5: “Native Labour Question and Chinese Exclusion Act,” 1903. 
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Within the Cape Colony this resentment would become a key feature of the political election 
of 1903-1904 within the Cape.7 The two primary contesting parties within the election, the 
South African Party and Progressive Party, were forced to contend with the question of Chinese 
labour, as it was one which much of their electorate were concerned with. The South African 
Party, for its part, utilized fear of the Chinese to win support for their own firm opposition to 
Chinese labour importation. They also discredited their opponents in the Progressive Party by 
accusing them of tacitly approving of the importation of Chinese labour.8 They also claimed 
the Progressive Party had ties to the mining interests within the Transvaal and, thus, avoided 
opposing the issue of Chinese labour in the Transvaal because they had vested economic 
interests in it.9 Certainly it was a fact that the Progressive Party consistently avoided expressing 
any explicit rejection of the possible importation of Chinese labour to the Transvaal.10 Instead 
they focused on offering assurances of taking practical measures to prevent any such 
importation resulting in Chinese entering the colony.11 The Progressive Party argued that the 
question of Chinese labour importation was for the Transvaal alone to decide upon, as any 
imported labour would be directed towards it.12 Although the Progressive Party did win by a 
small margin in the elections, their leader, Leander Starr Jameson, did admit privately that he 
felt sure the question of the Chinese labour had been responsible for how slight the win was, 
predicting that without it the Progressive Party would have dominated the election 
convincingly.13  
 
Following the conclusion of the Cape election the Chinese remained a contentious political 
issue. The South African Party’s representatives within the legislature pushed for a unanimous 
message to the British government protesting against the importation of Chinese labour into 
the Transvaal.14 The attempt eventually amounted to nothing as by late 1903 the governments 
of the British Empire and the Qing Dynasty had already agreed upon the importation of Chinese 
labour to the Transvaal, and thus any motion by the Cape legislature against it would have had 
                                                 
7 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, pp. 224-225. 
8 Ibid, p. 227. 
9 Transvaal Leader, 15 September 1903; 8 January 1904. 
10 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, pp. 228-230. 
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13 Ibid. 
14 Cape of Good Hope: Debates in the House of Assembly, 2 July 1903, pp. 205-216. 
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negligible impact.15 However, even though it was true that the Chinese importation was now a 
completed matter, with no way for the Cape legislature to possibly prevent it, efforts were still 
undertaken to attempt to allay the concerns and fears of the citizenry of the Cape. It was these 
efforts which resulted in the promulgation of a bill by the Progressive Party that would become 
the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act.16  
 
The Act itself would enjoy broad support from all sides of the Cape Colony’s legislature.17 
Although some of the opposition parties did desire an even more restrictive piece of legislation, 
most members were satisfied with the provisions of the Exclusion Act.18 By the time the Act 
was due to enter the committee stage there was a sole objection within the entire legislature to 
it. Francis Oats, a member of the Progressive Party, would be the only member of the Cape 
Parliament to object to the Exclusion Act.19 Importantly, in his objection to it, he referenced 
the fact that such discrimination was only being pursued because the Qing Dynasty had no 
capacity to leverage political or military force against them. He referred to the difference 
between the treatment of the relatively powerful Japanese Empire when he said: 
 
To his mind the Bill was retrogressive and barbaric, and one which could not 
have been passed if China had a navy like Japan.20 
 
The Exclusion Act effectively forbade any Chinese from residing within the Cape Colony 
unless they were in possession of an official permit granted by the government.21 It possessed 
numerous other repressive features as well, heavily curtailing the access of the Chinese to 
numerous different occupations and, in what should to any South African historian be a familiar 
case, it gave the police of the Cape the right to demand any Chinese man over the age of 18 
years to produce his permit upon their request.22 If the Chinese individual could not produce 
                                                 
15 Cape of Good Hope: Debates in the House of Assembly, 4 May, pp. 430-434. 
16 Ibid, 4 March 1904, p. 7. 
17 Ibid, 4 March, 2, 9, 16, 27 May 1904, pp. 7, 391-402, 528-9, 639-44. 
18 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 241. 
19 Cape of Good Hope: Debates in the House of Assembly, 2 May 1904, p. 402. 
20 Ibid, 2 May 1904, p. 398. 
21 Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1902-1906, Act 37 of 1904, The Chinese Exclusion Act, section 3. 
22 Ibid, 1902-1906, Act 37 of 1904, The Chinese Exclusion Act, section 12. 
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their permit then they could be taken into custody for further investigation.23 Crucially, the 
Exclusion Act did not limit itself to only regulating the immigration of Chinese labourers but, 
rather, applied to all Chinese, including those already living inside the Colony.24 Although the 
South African Party had been most vehement in its opposition to the importation of Chinese to 
the Transvaal, it was the Progressive Party which in many ways brought the free Chinese in 
the Cape into consideration. During the elections of 1903-1904 the Progressive Party had, on 
multiple occasions, utilized the existing community of Chinese in the colony as grounds to 
criticize their opponents, claiming that it was under their authority that these Chinese had been 
permitted into the Cape.25 The Progressive Party’s rhetoric already began to cast the free 
Chinese within the Cape as a problem, construing their presence there as a direct failure of their 
opponents.  
 
Considering this rhetoric, it is unsurprising, then, that the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act would 
so harshly discriminate against the free Chinese in the colony already. However, at the outset 
of the Exclusion Act, the Cape Chinese community was granted the ability to apply for official 
permits, allowing them to continue to reside in the Cape and not automatically excluding them 
as it did any other potential Chinese migrants or labourers.26 The Act did place an onus on the 
Chinese in the Cape though, requiring them to report their location to their local Magistrate, to 
inform them whenever they moved region and also holding them responsible for annually 
registering for their permits again.27 The penalties faced by the Cape Chinese were also made 
considerably more severe. Any failure of the new administrative requirements of the Exclusion 
Act could result in their deportation to China, and any Chinese found guilty of gambling, 
assault or operating a brothel would also be subject to deportation.28 For the Cape Chinese the 
most problematic provision of the Act, however, was section 33. This section detailed that if a 
Chinese individual left the Cape Colony, even if they possessed a valid permit, that upon their 
departure the permit would lapse, and they would not be allowed to re-enter again.29 This was 
a severe difficulty as most of the Chinese living in the Cape had family still in China whom 
                                                 
23 Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1902-1906, Act 37 of 1904, The Chinese Exclusion Act, section 12. 
24 Cape of Good Hope: Debates in the House of Assembly, 2 May 1904, p. 392. 
25 K. L. Harris: “Paper Trail: Chasing the Chinese in the Cape (1904-1933),” Kronos Southern African Histories, 
(40), 1, November 2014, p. 143. 
26 Cape of Good Hope: Debates in the House of Assembly, 2 May 1904, p. 395. 
27 Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1902-1906, Act 37 of 1904, The Chinese Exclusion Act, sections 6, 12 and 
15. 
28 Ibid, 1902-1906, Act 37 of 1904, The Chinese Exclusion Act, section 34. 
29 Ibid, 1902-1906, Act 37 of 1904, The Chinese Exclusion Act, section 33. 
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they periodically visited.30 This section of the Act proved so onerous that it was even amended 
in 1906 to allow Chinese to apply for periods of exemption during which time they could be 
outside the Colony without their permits lapsing.31  
 
Resistance to the Exclusion Act by the Chinese community of the Cape was comparatively 
more subdued than the reaction of the Transvaal community to the Asiatic Registration Act. 
Of course, the different contexts of the two regions must be kept in mind. Of importance was 
that the Chinese within the Cape were considerably more dispersed across the region than the 
community of the Transvaal, making mobilization for protest a more difficult prospect.32 
However, there was not a total lack of opposition amongst the Cape Chinese, and petitions 
were delivered by groups of Cape Chinese to both the British government and the Chinese 
minister at the London Legation.33 In 1908 the head of the Cape Chinese Association, Hing 
Woo, also participated in the Select Committee on Asiatic Grievances.34 At the Committee 
Hing Woo made the case that the Exclusion Act had excessively harmed the Cape Chinese 
community and appealed for a softening of its provisions.35 This would prove unsuccessful 
though, and the Exclusion Act remained part of the Cape Colony’s legislation and would even 
outlast the Cape Parliament, becoming part of the legislation of the Union of South Africa up 
until 1933.36 
 
The arrival of Consul-General Liu Yu Ling in 1905 presented the Cape Chinese with an official 
representative from their homeland. During his term as Consul-General Liu Yu Ling would 
intervene to assist the Cape Chinese on several issues. Liu Yu Ling frequently wrote letters of 
support for the Cape Chinese when they made applications for exemption permits to return to 
China.37 He further wrote on behalf of Chinese who applied for exemption permits to enter the 
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31 Ibid, p. 143. 
32 Ibid, p. 92. 
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35 Ibid, p. xi. 
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Colony as well.38 In particular Liu Yu Ling wrote on behalf of children and wives who sought 
to come over and join their husbands or fathers in the Cape.39 One particular aspect of the 
Exclusion Act Liu Yu Ling became involved in was the question of trading licenses. The 
Exclusion Act had introduced a new provision to regulate Chinese involvement in the sale of 
alcohol, in mining and in trading within the Cape: 
 
Based on this law, licenses for alcohol, mining, merchandise, imports, vending, 
and others cannot be issued to any Chinaman who does not hold a registration 
exemption certificate; these Chinamen also are not allowed to show any direct 
or indirect interest toward the above listed business licenses; any Chinaman 
without a registration exemption certificate cannot sign work contracts with 
anyone holding a license in mining, farming, household help, laundry, industry, 
or any business profession covered under this legislation.40 
 
A complication occurred due to the tendency for the Cape Chinese to return to China for long 
periods of time in a year.41 Although the 1906 Amendment to the Exclusion Act had made it 
possible for the Cape Chinese to do so without automatically falling foul of the Exclusion Act, 
it required that they surrender their permits to the Cape authorities before obtaining an 
exemption and departing the Colony.42 This then caused a further complication, as in their 
absence the Chinese would usually authorize someone else to renew their general dealer’s 
licenses for them, but the Exclusion Act now required that their permits be produced at any 
such renewal.43 Thus any Chinese merchant who took advantage of the Exemption to go abroad 
could not rely on an duly authorized agent to renew their general dealer’s license anymore, as 
they would not have access to the permit necessary for it.44 This caused a great deal of difficulty 
for the Chinese traders in the Cape, and they petitioned for assistance from Consul-General Liu 
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Yu Ling.45 Liu Yu Ling would go on to express the sentiments of the Cape Chinese to the 
Cape’s Prime Minister, Leander Starr Jameson, in a letter sent in 1907: 
 
…I can assure you from the nature of the communications I have received, many 
of my Countrymen who have availed themselves of the provisions of the 1906 
Act have been refused the renewals of their Licenses when applications have 
been made therefore by the person or persons duly appointed by them under 
proper Powers of Attorney.46 
 
Liu Yu Ling would himself recommend in his letter that the government of the Cape Colony 
inform their Post-Office Authorities of the Cape that they inform the respective License Issuers 
if they had in their possession a proper permit for a Chinese individual seeking through an 
agent to renew their license that such a renewal be granted. On the 16th of August, the office of 
the Prime Minister wrote back and affirmed the suggestions, informing Liu Yu Ling that 
instructions would be dispatched to inform the Issuers of Licenses that the simple failure to 
produce a permit would not automatically prevent the renewal of a general dealer’s license.47 
Despite this tangible assistance he rendered, Liu Yu Ling never personally criticized or 
attacked the Exclusion Act during his tenure as the Consul-General. However, he would go on 
to critique the Exclusion Act in 1911, when he was the Chinese Minister of the London 
Legation.48 Speaking on the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act, Liu Yu Ling went so far as to say 
that the Qing Dynasty saw the Act, which deprived Chinese of the capacity to vote or become 
naturalized citizens in South Africa, as deeply insulting, describing it as: “…a grievous 
injustice to the Chinese Nation.”49 Considering that his successor, Liu Ngai, would more 
vocally object to the Exclusion Act with no success, it is possible that Liu Yu Ling saw no use 
in making an ultimately pointless protest at the time. 
 
                                                 
45 (KAB) PMO 222 1231/06: “Chinese Traders – Renewal of General Dealers License,” 15 August 1906. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 (SAB) GG 900 01 15/706, 15/557, 37/45, 15/724: “Asiatics: Chinese. Forwards note by Chinese Minister in 
London on Subject of Treatment of Chinese in South Africa and Requests Minister’s Observation,” 28 April 1914. 
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Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
106 
 
Liu Ngai, as stated, took issue with the Cape Exclusion Act early on in his term and was a very 
vocal critic of the Exclusion Act. In 1908, the year he became the Qing Dynasty’s Consul-
General to South Africa, he sent a letter directly to the new Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, 
John X. Merriman.50 In his letter Liu Ngai protested the drastic nature of the Exclusion Act, 
mentioning also that he represented deputations of the Chinese Associations within the Cape 
Colony: 
 
I am the recipient of numerous petitions from the subjects of his Imperial 
Majesty the Emperor of China domiciled within the borders of the Colony of 
the Cape of Good Hope, directing my attention to the existing hardships and 
disabilities under which they are burdened.51  
 
Liu Ngai made clear his belief that the drastic nature of the Exclusion Act required that it be 
abolished wholesale.52  When the Colonial-Secretary responded to a petition by the Cape 
Chinese Association in which he agreed that certain provisions of the Exclusion Act should be 
relaxed, Ngai reiterated that in his opinion the entire Act should be abolished.53 He contended 
that whatever management of the immigration of Chinese into the Cape Colony would be better 
handled by general immigration laws as opposed to a law specifically targeting the Chinese.54 
It is important to note that Liu Ngai clearly displayed a particular objection to the nature of the 
Exclusion Act singling out the Chinese as a class, hence his preference for Chinese immigration 
to be handled as part of the Colony’s general immigration law. He repeatedly stated: 
 
                                                 
50 (KAB) GH 23/117 117: “General Despatches. Regarding Correspondence with Acting Chinese Consul-General 
Regarding Disabilities under which Chinese Subjects Labour in Cape Colony,” 1908.   
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Regarding Disabilities under which Chinese Subjects Labour in Cape Colony,” 1908.   
53 Ibid.   
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I would again crave leave to point out that the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904, 
being applicable to only one class of the community, namely the subjects of his 
Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China.55 
 
Liu Ngai’s numerous protests were, however, unable to achieve anything. Although Prime 
Minister Merriman did respond, his response was only to inform the Consul-General that there 
was no chance of the legislation being altered let alone abolished.56 He stated that the best he 
could assure him was that the government of the Cape Colony would endeavour to make the 
operation of the law as little of a burden for the Cape Chinese as possible.57 In 1910, Liu Ngai 
would write again, but this time to the Union of South Africa’s political body. Liu Ngai pointed 
out that in light of the creation of the Union of South Africa the legislation, which continued 
to exist, had been created by a defunct political body to address an issue that no longer faced 
South Africa, the matter of the indentured Chinese labour experiment which had ended by 1908 
already.58 He further added that the number of the Chinese population in South Africa had 
dropped significantly since the Exclusion Act had been introduced in 1904, falling from over 
15 000 to approximately 700.59 Liu Ngai once more protested that the law singled out Chinese 
unfairly and prevented them from being able to vote or become naturalized citizens of South 
Africa.60 Liu Ngai’s criticisms of it went so far as to indicate that: 
 
…I may state that so far as I am aware the provisions of this Act are without a 
parallel in the civilized world.61 
 
When his letters to the Minister of the Interior, Jan Smuts at the time, seemed to yield no result 
and the Minister refused an interview with the Consul-General, Liu Ngai also sent copies of 
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his letter to Herbert Gladstone, the first Governor General of the Union of South Africa.62 But 
his repeated petitions would only harden the position of the authorities. Gladstone himself 
commented in a letter to the Minister of the Interior that Liu Ngai had stepped beyond the 
boundaries of a Consul-General, and that his behaviour was “not tolerable”.63 Liu Ngai’s 
repeated letters to Gladstone and Smuts, and requests for personal meetings, seem to have 
eventually resulted in some degree of ire from these authorities and he was briefly recalled to 
China five months after Gladstone had accused him of exceeding consular duties.64 Ultimately, 
despite his vehement opposition, there was no appreciable change in the Exclusion Act and in 
1913, the first immigration law for the Union of South Africa, would largely incorporate the 
provisions of the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act on a national level.65 
 
Although both Consul-Generals did attempt to offer assistance to the Cape Chinese affected by 
the Exclusion Act, and also protested the Exclusion Act itself, one interesting detail of their 
opposition was an element of classism. Liu Ngai himself stated that: 
 
I acknowledge the principle that some undesirable immigrants should be 
guarded against.66 
 
Liu Ngai still insisted the Exclusion Act was too extreme, but he did also display an agreement 
to the idea that not all Chinese were desirable immigrants. This could be seen again in his 
intervention in the case of Jim Ah Chow, a Chinese resident of Port Elizabeth, who Liu Ngai 
requested the Cape authorities to deport back to China.67 Mr. Ah Chow was well-known to be 
the proprietor of a gambling den in Port Elizabeth, based on evidence provided by the Port 
Elizabeth Chinese Association.68 The Consul-General actively sought for him to be deported 
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for he considered him to be an “undesirable individual.”69 In his petitions concerning the 
Exclusion Act, Liu Ngai particularly highlighted that the Act created the impression that 
“...Chinese subjects of any class are undesirable under any circumstances,”70 and stressed that 
the Exclusion Act went too far for it targeted “educated” Chinese as well.71 This sentiment was 
far from strange, as within the Cape Chinese community and the Transvaal Chinese community 
there had been an effort by the free Chinese to disassociate themselves from the indentured 
labourers entering and, at times, even expressing solidarity with those South African groups 
opposed to it.72  
 
As with the Transvaal, Liu Ngai also wrote to recommend legislation to curb the use of opium 
among the Chinese in the Colony.73 His recommendations remained the same as in the case of 
the Transvaal, but the Cape Colony was somewhat more receptive to his appeals. The Attorney-
General for the Colony even expressed gratitude towards Liu Ngai for his suggestions but, 
ultimately, concluded that the cost of these provisions was too much and the problems posed 
by opium consumption, in his opinion, too few to motivate adoption of Liu Ngai’s 
suggestions.74 
 
Regardless of the role class distinction played within the Cape itself, the efforts of both Liu Yu 
Ling and Liu Ngai failed to achieve the goal of abolishing the Exclusion Act entirely. Their 
efforts regarding trading licenses and exemptions, however, showed they were able to provide 
at least some tangible assistance and their petitions and protests indicate that they clearly did 
seek to support the Cape Chinese. That their efforts proved ultimately fruitless must be 
understood in the context of the opposition they faced. Prime Minister Merriman himself, in 
1908, made clear the absolute refusal of the Cape Colony to consider any relaxation of their 
anti-Chinese legislation. When describing to Liu Ngai why the burdens afflicting the Cape 
Chinese could not be removed he claimed: 
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I will ask you to consider that what you call the hardships and disabilities are 
the result of what may be called the conflict of civilizations.75 
 
Against such a resolute opposition, and with the Qing Dynasty lacking any substantive 
economic or political clout to leverage, the best intentions of both Consul-Generals were able 
to alleviate only the smallest of the woes of the Cape Chinese. 
 
5.2 Legacy of the Consul-General’s Office 
 
Thus, the Consul-Generals failed to prevent the most significant of the discriminatory 
legislation targeting the Chinese in South Africa. Restrictive legislation, such as the Cape 
Chinese Exclusion Act, would prove effective in curbing Chinese immigration into South 
Africa almost completely for the better half of the twentieth century.76 In turn, this led to a 
sharp reduction in the number of Chinese in South Africa. By 1910, the entire population of 
Chinese in South Africa had fallen to approximately 700, a considerable decrease from the 
16 000 (including indentured labourers) who had been registered in South Africa in 1906.77 
Although both Consul-Generals did make substantive attempts to materially assist the Cape 
Chinese, and protested against discriminatory legislation targeting them, ultimately they were 
unable to achieve any significant change in the position of the Cape, and later Union, 
governments. As in the Transvaal, the Consul-Generals were receptive to the interests of the 
local Chinese communities, serving as conduits for them to communicate grievances and 
protests to the local South African governments. Whilst the Transvaal Chinese community, 
cooperating with the Indian community and Consul-General Liu Ngai, were able to achieve 
some success in the moderation of the Asiatic Registration Act, the Cape Chinese were unable 
to achieve any significant alterations in the Exclusion Act. Despite this, the overall situation of 
both Chinese communities remained similar, particularly when the Union government 
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extended the provisions of the Exclusion Act over the entire country through the Immigrant 
Regulations Act of 1913.78  
 
The Qing Dynasty’s attempts to protect and assist its subjects in South Africa had, for the most 
part, taken the form of assisting the local Chinese population in their petitions against 
discriminatory legislation, and lodging official complaints with both the South African 
authorities and, at times, the authorities of the British Empire itself. Although the Dynasty’s 
official representatives, the Consul-Generals, took clear efforts to assist and partake in the 
struggles of both the indentured Chinese labourers and free Chinese, to differing extents, their 
capacity for rendering aid was limited at best. The fact that the position of Consul-General 
came into existence a mere eight years before the Qing Dynasty’s collapse is, certainly, 
pertinent to the lack of power or influence the Consul-Generals had in any of their negotiations, 
lacking any true political clout to use as leverage. As a result, they were limited to adding their 
voice, and the official voice of the Qing Dynasty, to the actions of the free Chinese, and usually 
only finding success in the streamlining of minor affairs. This apparent failure does not 
diminish the clear efforts the Consul-Generals took to aide the South African Chinese, even in 
the face of staunch opposition from the South African authorities. 
 
This lack of success, however, did leave behind an important legacy. The office of Consul-
General’s very existence had provided the Chinese communities in South Africa something 
they had never had before: an official channel to the South African government itself. As has 
been demonstrated, from the moment of its establishment the Chinese in South Africa had 
made use of the office of the Consul-General, and though during the tenure of the Qing Dynasty 
they were able to, at best, achieve only minimal progress in gaining equitable treatment within 
South Africa, the Consul-General’s office did leave behind a tool for them to use in the future.79 
It is no surprise, then, that the office of the Consul-General would continue to play an important 
role in the efforts of the free Chinese, past the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, to improve their 
positions in South Africa. 80  Harris noted that the use of the Consul-Generals as official 
channels for communication with the South African government became a pattern that endured 
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long past the Qing Dynasty collapse, with the South African Chinese population continuing to 
utilize the services of the Consul-Generals.81 After the Qing Dynasty the Consul-Generals 
would still be involved in writing on behalf of Chinese to be exempted from the Exclusion Act, 
intervening to assist family members to visit and protesting against the Class Area Bill.82 
Although the Qing Dynasty’s dying efforts to protect and ingratiate itself with its overseas 
subjects were largely ineffectual in the short term, it did leave behind a mechanism which 
would continue to be used by the overseas Chinese in the future. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
The image of the Qing Dynasty as a state that was apathetic to its overseas subjects is a 
persistent one. There exist credible reasons for this, though, with an extensive historical record 
of the Dynasty treating any subjects leaving the homeland as traitors or enemies of the state.1 
This strong opposition within the Dynasty was the part of the Qing Dynasty’s ideological 
continuation of the conservative mores of the preceding Ming Dynasty.2 Although for the 
majority of its existence the Qing Dynasty was vehemently opposed to the emigration of any 
Chinese outside the borders of the state it did, following 1860, experience changes in its 
relationship with its overseas subjects.3 The attitude of the Qing Dynasty towards the Chinese 
overseas can be broken down into three rough, general, phases. The first phase, lasting from 
the foundation of the Dynasty until its defeat in the Second Opium War of 1860, is the period 
for which the Dynasty is best remembered in this regard. This phase saw the Qing Dynasty not 
only embrace the preceding Ming Dynasty’s isolationist policies but, further, pass legislation 
to make emigration an even more arduous task for the Chinese.4 Under the Qing Dynasty any 
form of emigration not explicitly authorized by the government was punishable with 
execution.5 Although the enforcement of such a draconian provision was haphazard at best, the 
Dynasty’s official apathy to the plight of its overseas subjects was made clear in its response 
to the Batavia Massacre of 1740.6  
 
This official policy of apathy would only change under coercion from the Western powers later 
in the nineteenth century. Emigration itself only finally became legal for the subjects of the 
Qing Dynasty after the conclusion of the Second Opium War.7 The war was predominantly a 
tool by which the Western colonial states of the time managed to compel concessions from the 
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Qing Dynasty to their own advantage and a chief concession they sought was access to the 
labour force of the Dynasty through emigration.8 As a result securing the ability for the Chinese 
to emigrate from the Dynasty to these colonies was pivotal and was a crucial part of the 1860 
Peking Convention.9 Thus 1860 signalled the second phase of the Qing Dynasty’s stance 
towards their overseas subjects. The Dynasty now had been coerced into permitting emigration 
but, still, remained for the most part opposed to the notion, with Chinese who travelled abroad 
legally only gaining the ability to re-enter China as late as 1893.10 This second phase lasted 
into the beginnings of the twentieth century, and has no distinct date dividing it from the third 
phase. As emigration became legal the Qing Dynasty found itself in several contractual 
relationships with Western powers, such as Britain, France and the United States of America, 
all seeking to cooperate with the Dynasty and import large masses of poor, unskilled, Chinese 
labourers into their territories to serve as a labour force.11 One result of this new relationship 
was the appointment of more extensive foreign representation by the Dynasty abroad. Often 
states which engaged in contracts with the Dynasty to import Chinese labourers would have 
Consular officials appointed to those states to ensure the fair treatment of the imported 
labourers.12 These Consular officials became the first substantive action taken by the Qing 
Dynasty to safeguard their overseas subjects. 
 
The final phase of the Qing Dynasty’s stance towards its overseas subjects was marked by an 
attempt to at last act as a supporter and defender of their interests. Only occurring within the 
Dynasty’s closing years, from the beginning of the twentieth century until its collapse in 1912, 
this period was marked by the Qing Dynasty’s efforts, often through their Consular agents, to 
attempt to respond to and assist its overseas subjects.13 This change in policy was not the result 
purely of a moral or altruistic awakening within the Dynasty’s government. As is to be expected 
the change was a pragmatic decision by the Dynasty, an attempt to seek an advantage. By the 
twentieth century the Qing Dynasty was a shadow of its former hegemonic self, having lost 
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numerous wars to Western powers, forced to concede territory to them, suffered from 
largescale rebellions such as the Boxer rebellion and a massive economic deficit in part caused 
by a rapidly growing population. The Dynasty had grown politically and militarily weak on the 
international stage, allowing it to consistently be compelled to agree to unfair treaties by the 
Western powers.14 In the Chinese overseas the Qing Dynasty hoped to find advantages to allow 
it to reverse its deterioration. The financial wealth of the Chinese overseas was seen as a 
potential source of income to alleviate the financial struggles of the Dynasty, whilst the 
expertise and modern technologies such Chinese might learn overseas were also seen as crucial 
to modernizing the state.15  Furthermore the threat of revolutionary activity aimed against the 
Qing Dynasty prompted it to attempt to ingratiate itself among its overseas subjects, to reduce 
the risk of political conflict, by convincing them to support the Dynasty.16 Despite this, it 
remains clear that the Dynasty did seek to protect the interests of its subjects overseas in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, and a clear example of the Qing Dynasty’s official efforts 
to assist their overseas subjects can be found in the actions of the Qing Dynasty Consul-
Generals in South Africa between 1904 and 1912. 
 
The arrival of the Qing Dynasty Consul-Generals came about due to the importation of 
indentured Chinese labour to the Transvaal in 1904, for the purposes of working on the mines 
of the Witwatersrand.17 The importation of indentured Chinese labour was an initiative of the 
British Empire which, by 1902, had secured control of the Transvaal in the aftermath of the 
Anglo-Boer War.18 Control of the mines on the Witwatersrand had always been a primary 
objective of the British Empire and, now that they did control them, they were faced with a 
labour shortage preventing them from fully exploiting these mines.19 Early on the British began 
to investigate the potential of utilizing Chinese labour on the mines, studying similar cases in 
the United States of America, and approving of the concept once it was reported back to them.20 
This would eventually result in the Transvaal Labour Importation Ordinance, a piece of 
legislation which would organize for the British Empire to recruit a large body of indentured 
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Chinese labourers from the Qing Dynasty for the purposes of working on the mines of the 
Witwatersrand.21  
 
Although popular with the owners of the mines and the British Empire itself, the Ordinance 
faced near universal unpopularity with the white population of South Africa.22 The opposition 
to the arrival of the Chinese labourers stemmed from two primary fears; the fear that the 
Chinese would outcompete white labourers and as a result dominate the economic markets of 
South Africa and a fear that the Chinese were an inherently immoral people who would present 
a danger to the inhabitants of South Africa.23 This popular animosity against the Chinese would 
prove unable to dissuade the legislation from coming into effect, beginning a period between 
1904 and 1910 in which the Transvaal experimented with the use of over 50 000 indentured 
Chinese labourers.24 However, the animosity would prove to galvanize several discriminatory 
legislative motions by the governments of both the Transvaal and Cape Colony, and the 
indentured Chinese experiment resulted in a considerably more hostile atmosphere and 
environment for all Chinese within the South African territories.25  
 
This animosity was most clearly expressed through two pieces of legislation. In the Cape, 1904 
saw the passing of the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act and in 1907 the Transvaal passed the 
Asiatic Registration Act. It was in the midst of these circumstances that, in 1904, the first Qing 
Dynasty Consul-General Liu Yu Ling arrived in South Africa.26 
 
Although the office of Consul-General had been created initially only to provide the Qing 
Dynasty with oversight of the indentured Chinese labourers in the Transvaal by the time Liu 
Yu Ling arrived in 1905 an official Imperial Edict had expanded the responsibilities and duties 
of the Qing Dynasty Consul-General to expand to all Chinese living in any of the South African 
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territories.27 Even though small in number, both the Cape Colony and Transvaal had, prior to 
the arrival of the indentured Chinese labourers, already contained small Chinese 
communities.28 Despite being treated far from well, these communities had managed to avoid 
being specifically singled out for persecution, at least in part due to how small they were. 
However, the indentured labour experiment thrust all Chinese into the foreground and the 
Chinese communities of the Cape and Transvaal suddenly found themselves under the scrutiny 
of the white population.29 In the Cape Colony this extended to the electoral politics of the state 
as well, the incumbent Progressive Party utilized the mere existence of a Chinese community 
in the Cape Colony as evidence that their rivals the South African Party were not fully 
committed to opposing Chinese immigration in the 1903-1904 elections.30  
 
Two different men served as Consul-Generals for the Qing Dynasty in South Africa, first Liu 
Yu Ling from 1904 until 1907, and then Liu Ngai from 1908 until 1911. Liu Yu Ling was an 
accomplished and veteran diplomat by the time he was assigned to South Africa, having served 
within the Dynasty’s New York, Singapore and London legations and, further, accompanied 
the Dynasty’s Minister as a foreign representative at Queen Victoria’s Jubilee.31 Part of Liu Yu 
Ling’s expertise with foreign affairs sprung from his background as a member of the Chinese 
Educational Mission, a program launched by a Chinese citizen, Yung Wing, who was the first 
Chinese individual to ever graduate from Yale University.32 The Mission saw a number of 
Chinese youths sent to study abroad in the United States of America, mastering English and 
learning about the Western world.33 His time spent there, and serving as a Vice-Consul of the 
New York Legation helped prepare Liu Yu Ling for his Consular responsibilities. By contrast 
Liu Ngai was less widely known. He would serve as both the last Consul-General of the Qing 
Dynasty to South Africa and as the first Consul-General of the Republic of China to South 
Africa as well, only retiring from his duties sometime in 1933.34 Consul-General Liu Yu Ling 
and his successor Liu Ngai were, thus, the representatives of several distinct groups of Chinese. 
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These included the indentured Chinese labourers freshly imported into the Transvaal between 
1904 and 1908, the community of free Chinese living in the Cape Colony as well as the 
community of free Chinese already existing in the Transvaal.35 
 
This responsibility would be put to the test throughout the tenure of both Liu Yu Ling and Liu 
Ngai, as all three groups of Chinese suffered under a range of discriminatory legislation and 
practises within South Africa. The indentured Chinese labourers were largely regulated by the 
Labour Importation Ordinance, a restrictive Ordinance which strictly bound the labourers to 
three-year contracts, after which they would be deported back to China, with the Transvaal 
government being firm in their desire to prevent any actual long term presence of Chinese 
within their borders.36 The Ordinance contained numerous restrictive measures which were 
aimed at preventing the indentured Chinese from moving freely about the state, limiting them 
largely to the mining compounds they were housed in.37 The restrictive nature of the Ordinance 
was even acknowledged within its own time, with multiple members of the British parliament, 
as well as press, comparing the conditions the Ordinance forced upon the indentured Chinese 
to slavery.38  
 
A further amendment to the Ordinance occurred in 1905, largely in response to numerous riots 
by Chinese indenture labourers on the mines, which only increased the repressive character of 
the law. It did so by further expanding the list of actions for which the indentured Chinese 
could be held criminally accountable and granting powers to the Foreign Labour Department 
to assign guilt and punishment without needing to resort in all cases to a Municipal court.39 
The few non-repressive measures within the Ordinance were  largely the result of the Qing 
Dynasty’s involvement in the formulation of the Ordinance, its Minister Ta-Je Cheng having 
participated in its drafting and insisted on the inclusion of safeguards on behalf of the 
indentured Chinese labourers.40 The prohibition on corporal punishment and the creation of the 
Consul-General office to inspect treatment of the indentured Chinese labourers were both 
                                                 
35  https://archive.org/stream/treatiesconvent01chin#page/n9/mode/2up/search/transvaal (12th February 2017): 
Treaties, conventions, etc., between China and foreign states, Published by order of the Inspector General of 
Customs, p. 644. 
36 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 113. 
37 Ibid. 
38 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 130. 
39 Ordinances of the Transvaal Colony, Ordinance 27 of 1905. 
40 P. Richardson: Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, p. 35. 
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included at the behest of the Qing Dynasty.41 Despite this ill-treatment on the mines as well as 
disputes concerning wages created a hostile and repressive atmosphere for the indentured 
Chinese labourers and, between 1902 and 1906, there were over 25 different riots by Chinese 
indentured labourers severe enough to require police intervention.  
 
Generally the role of the Qing Dynasty Consul-Generals in supporting the indentured Chinese 
labourers has been overlooked or, in the case of some authors such as Philip Snow, the Consul-
Generals have been accused of acting not to assist the indentured Chinese but, rather, 
prioritizing assisting the government of the Transvaal to control and exploit the indentured 
Chinese instead.42 There can be no doubt that, to an extent, Consul-General Liu Yu Ling did 
cooperate with the Transvaal government, but he did render substantive aid to the indentured 
Chinese as well, and it is simply inaccurate to ignore this. Liu Yu Ling assisted the indentured 
Chinese labourers by organizing for the transportation of those Chinese who became too sick 
to work back home as well as organizing a system by which the indentured Chinese labourers 
were able to remit money to their families in China.43 Liu Yu Ling was also successful in 
negotiating with the Foreign Labour Department for a pension to be paid to the family of 
Chinese indentured labourers who died during their employment.44 Further, in 1906 Liu Yu 
Ling sat as a member on a Special Committee organized by the Transvaal for the express 
purpose of formulating a system by which the number of disturbances and riots by the Chinese 
could be curtailed.45 Within the Committee Liu Yu Ling strongly emphasised that the treatment 
of the indentured Chinese labourers on the mines was the key source of discontent and 
disturbances.46 
 
Within the Committee Liu Yu Ling supported the streamlining of permits to allow the 
indentured Chinese to move about on their days off, one of the few non-restrictive propositions 
                                                 
41  (SAB) BEP 575 G18/54: “Raadpleging en Koordinasie met Ander Instansies: Sjinese Organisasies,” 7 
Desember 1963. 
42 P. Snow: Star Raft: China’s Encounter with Africa, p. 48 
43 (TAB) FLD 84 11/52: “Remittance of Money to China. Money Order System,” 1905. 
44 L. Anshan: China’s Africa Policy and the Chinese immigrants in Africa, p. 60. 
45 Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Report of the Executive Committee for the year 1906, p. 14. 
46 Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Seventeenth Annual Report: Report of the Special Committee Appointed to 
Consider and Report on the Present Conditions in Regard to Control of Chinese Indentured Labourers on the 
Mine Premises of the Witwatersrand Area, June 1906, Part IV. 
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of the Special Committee which was eventually adopted.47 That Liu Yu Ling seemed to 
consider the treatment of the Chinese on the mine to be problematic is evidenced in his 
statements within the Committee and his reports to his own superiors.48  This position is 
strengthened by the events of the Witwatersrand Deep Mine riot in 1905. This riot, the Foreign 
Labour Department alleged, was the result of a visit by Liu Yu Ling to the mines, the Foreign 
Labour Department explicitly stating that the Consul-General had convinced the Chinese 
indentured labourers there that they were being mistreated.49 At the same time, despite the clear 
efforts he took to assist them, Liu Yu Ling also supported the Special Committee’s 
recommendation for increased surveillance and oversight of the indentured Chinese, preferring 
that course of action to a suggestion for fencing off the compounds in which they resided.50 
Liu Yu Ling’s assistance of the indentured Chinese was tempered by an unwillingness to go 
explicitly against the Transvaal government, as is evidenced in his lack of protests regarding 
the riots or disturbances on the mines. At least partly this can be seen as the result of the 
Transvaal government itself. The indentured Chinese had little understanding of their 
circumstances and situation, due to a lack of effective communication with their white 
overseers and employers, making it possible that many of them were simply unaware of the 
existence of the Consul-General’s office. The case of the Witwatersrand Deep Mine riot, in 
which the Consul-General’s communication with the labourers’ present prompted them to stage 
a protest against what they had been convinced was mistreatment lends some credence to this 
possibility. Further the case of the New Croesus Mine riot, which saw a demand by the Chinese 
labourers to speak with their Consul-General which was never granted, indicates that the 
Transvaal government may possibly have stymied any attempt for effective communication 
between the two groups, leaving the Consul-General somewhat impotent.  
 
                                                 
47 Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Seventeenth Annual Report: Report of the Special Committee Appointed to 
Consider and Report on the Present Conditions in Regard to Control of Chinese Indentured Labourers on the 
Mine Premises of the Witwatersrand Area, June 1906, Addendum to the Report. 
48 C. Hansheng (ed), “Request to the Emperor by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Appointing Liu Yulin as the 
Consul in British South Africa, September 17, Guangxu 30,” A Compilation of Historical Documents, 1 (IV), p. 
1721. 
49 (TAB) GOV 171 GEN 596/05: “Copy of a Report by Captain Fairfax on the Disturbance which Took Place 
amongst Chinese Coolies Employed on the Witwatersrand Deep Mine, Limited,” TAB 173 GOV GEN 665/05: 
“Further Report by Captain Fairfax of the Foreign Labour Department, Regarding the Disturbance on the 
Witwatersrand Deep Mine,” 1905. 
50 Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Seventeenth Annual Report: Report of the Special Committee Appointed to 
Consider and Report on the Present Conditions in Regard to Control of Chinese Indentured Labourers on the 
Mine Premises of the Witwatersrand Area, June 1906, Addendum to the Report. 
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Despite these difficult circumstances, Liu Yu Ling did still attempt to assist the indentured 
Chinese, but his assistance was unable to ultimately significantly affect their circumstances. 
Although he played a role in the streamlining of the permit system, as well as in organizing 
pensions for the families of deceased labourers, transportation for ill labourers and remittance 
of money back to China, the overall character of the Ordinance remained restrictive, and only 
grew more so following 1906. Liu Ngai, the second Consul-General, had little to no 
involvement with the indentured Chinese owing mostly to the fact that he only took office in 
1908, following the completion of the experiment.51 Liu Ngai would, however, be heavily 
involved in the struggle of the free Chinese community of the Transvaal against the Asiatic 
Registration Act. 
 
During the indentured labour experiment the free Chinese community of the Transvaal, 
although not regulated by the Labour Importation Ordinance, was adversely affected as 
demonstrated by Harris. 52  Although the Transvaal community of free Chinese and the 
indentured Chinese labourers were almost completely separate from each other, having little to 
no contact and certainly no coordination against the discrimination they suffered, one trait they 
shared was that both groups received assistance from the Consul-Generals of the Qing 
Dynasty. 53  This assistance became crucial for the Transvaal Chinese in 1906, when the 
Transvaal legislature promulgated the Draft Asiatic Amendment Ordinance.54 The Ordinance 
would have required all male Chinese to register with the government, periodically, reporting 
their location and seeking approval before they moved districts.55 Further, the acquisition of 
licenses for trading would be attached to this registration process, forcing any of the many 
Chinese merchants to undergo it if they wished to continue to operate.56 Liu Yu Ling served as 
a conduit for the discontent of the free Chinese in the Transvaal, passing on petitions and letters 
of protest to the Transvaal government for them.57 Liu Yu Ling would also go so far as to 
accompany a deputation of the Transvaal Chinese Association to London in 1906, joining them 
                                                 
51 G. Kynoch. “Controlling the Coolies: Chinese Mineworkers and the Struggle for Labor in South Africa, 1904-
1910,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, (36), 2, 2003, p. 314. 
52 K. L. Harris: A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912, p. 238. 
53 K. L. Harris, B. P. Wong & T. Chee-Beng (eds.): Rising China and the History of the South African Chinese, 
China’s Rise and the Chinese Overseas, pp. 93-94. 
54 B. Pachai, “The South African Indian Question 1860-1971,” p. 39. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 (TAB) GOV 202 Gen 1005/06: “Petition from Chinese Residents in Transvaal Protesting against Provisions of 
Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance,” 1907. 
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in delivering a protest concerning the Draft Act to the British Government.58 Further, Liu Yu 
Ling delivered a letter to the Chinese Ambassador in London, detailing his opposition to the 
Draft Act as well.59 Although this effort was initially successful, as the British government 
withheld approval of the Draft Act, preventing it from coming into force, by 1907 the newly 
elected government of the Transvaal simply passed the near identical Asiatic Registration Act, 
this time without any intervention from the British Empire.60  
 
The Registration Act proceeded to adversely affect the Transvaal Chinese community, 
complicating the matter of their trading licenses. Importantly the registration process also 
required an impression of fingerprints, an action considered incredibly demeaning to the 
Transvaal Chinese community. This was the result of China’s cultural mores of the time, in 
which fingerprints were largely only taken for criminals, severe criminals in particular, and 
thus the requirement for it was seen as demeaning by the Transvaal Chinese community.61 
Throughout 1907 the Transvaal Chinese community’s resistance to the Registration Act saw 
numerous of them imprisoned, and Liu Ngai, as Consul-General, personally lent his presence 
to their cause. Liu Ngai frequently visited the prisoners and asked for clemency on their 
behalf. 62  Liu Ngai also made clear his support for the Transvaal Chinese Association’s 
resistance to the Registration Act.  
 
Liu Ngai’s involvement extended to negotiating on the behalf of the Association with the 
Transvaal government.63 In 1908 he was credited, along with the Association and the Transvaal 
government, with finding a compromise to suit all parties involved. 64  The compromise 
removed the compulsory aspect of the registration and required only a single thumbprint to be 
taken.65 Although Liu Yu Ling himself was no longer in South Africa by the time the Asiatic 
Registration Act came into force, he did still take time to officially criticize it and complain to 
the British Government over it whilst serving as the Minister in the Chinese Legation in 
                                                 
58 Indian Opinion, October 1906, p. 6. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Statutes of the Transvaal, Act 2 of 1907, Asiatic Law Amendment Act 
61 (PRO) CO 291/122 40668: “Asiatic Law Amendment Act,” 1907. 
62 (TAB) LD 1563 AG201/08: “Application for Special Permit to Visit Chinese Prisoner Leung Quinn from 
Acting Chinese Consul,” 1908. 
63 Rand Daily Mail, The Asiatics. Chinese Register. One Thumbprint, February 17, 1908, p. 9. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
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London.66 Despite this success, the overall situation of the Transvaal Chinese did not change 
significantly, and they were still bound by the registration process. Further, when the Union of 
South Africa’s immigration legislation was promulgated, the Transvaal Chinese similarly 
suffered from the provisions of the Cape Chinese Exclusion Act.  
 
The Cape Chinese Exclusion Act was passed in 1904, at the very outset of the Transvaal’s 
Chinese indentured labour experiment. The Act was passed directly in response to the arrival 
of the indentured Chinese labourers in the Transvaal, the white population of the Cape Colony 
fearing that Chinese would seek to move into the Cape Colony and establish a hegemony there 
stoking the political forces of the Colony to pass the Act, which curtailed Chinese immigration 
enormously.67 The extreme resistance to the potential arrival of Chinese into the Cape was 
clearly evident by the petitions passed by communities throughout the Cape urging action be 
taken to prevent Chinese entering the Colony.68 The Act was supported near-unanimously by 
the Cape legislature, with no party wishing to be seen as pro-Chinese in any shape or form.69 
The Exclusion Act made it illegal for any Chinese to reside within the Cape Colony unless they 
were granted a permit by the government.70 The Exclusion Act further curtailed the mobility 
of any Chinese within the Colony and required that the permits be carried by the Chinese at all 
times.71 Police officers were permitted to request a Chinese individual produce their permit at 
any point in time and, failure to do so, could result in incarceration.72 Effectively, then, it 
created a pass law of sorts. Those Chinese already residing within the Cape were allowed to 
apply for a permit, and thus avoided automatic expulsion.73 However, they were now required 
to consistently report their location to their Magistrate and seek permission before moving 
locations within the Colony.74 The Exclusion Act also made it easier for the government to 
deport any of the Cape Chinese, as any violation of the new administrative requirements of the 
                                                 
66 (SAB) GG 1320 01 37/42: “Transvaal Draft Municipal Ordinance: Protest by Chinese Minister in England 
Regarding Provisions as Affecting Chinese Residents in the Transvaal,” 1911. 
67 K. L. Harris: “Paper Trail: Chasing the Chinese in the Cape (1904-1933),” Kronos Southern African Histories, 
(40), 1, November 2014, p. 1. 
68 (KAB) GH 35/62 5, “Native Labour Question and Chinese Exclusion Act,” 1903. 
69 Cape of Good Hope: Debates in the House of Assembly, 4 March, 2, 9, 16, 27 May 1904, pp. 7, 391-402, 528-
9, 639-44. 
70 Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1902-1906, Act 37 of 1904, The Chinese Exclusion Act, Section 3. 
71 Ibid, section 12. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Cape of Good Hope: Debates in the House of Assembly, 2 May 1904, p. 395. 
74 Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1902-1906, Act 37 of 1904, The Chinese Exclusion Act, Sections 6, 12 and 
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permit, or offences such as gambling and assault, were grounds for potential deportation.75 
Most problematic, for the Cape Chinese, was the stipulation that if they left the Colony then 
their permits would automatically expire, preventing them from entering the Cape again.76 
 
Both Consul-Generals Liu Yu Ling and Liu Ngai would be involved in assisting the Cape 
Chinese against the severity of the Exclusion Act. Liu Yu Ling wrote numerous letters in 
support of the Cape Chinese seeking exemption permits to allow them to visit their homeland, 
but still return to the Cape, and also wrote letters on behalf of Chinese seeking to enter the 
Colony to gain permits, particularly seeking to allow family members to enter the Colony to 
join their spouses or parents. 77  Liu Yu Ling also played a crucial role in resolving a 
complication of the Exclusion Act. The Act had made the process of obtaining a trading license 
difficult for those Chinese abroad with exemption permits, preventing them from gaining new 
trading licenses whilst they were away. However, after he wrote on the issue to the Colony’s 
Prime Minister, suggesting that those Chinese who gained exemption permits be allowed to 
authorize agents to renew the trading licenses in their stead, the government was quick to 
comply, remedying the issue.78 Although he did assist the Cape Chinese in dealing with the 
consequences of the Exclusion Act, Liu Ngai himself did not openly attack the Exclusion Act 
during his tenure as Consul-General. However, in 1911, as the Qing Dynasty Minister in the 
London legation, he did offer up a denouncement of the Exclusion Act, calling it an insult to 
the Chinese people.79 
 
Liu Ngai was a critic of the Exclusion Act early on, denouncing it from the beginning of his 
tenure as Consul-General in 1908.80 Liu Ngai called for the complete abolishment of the 
Exclusion Act, considering it to place an undue burden upon the Cape Chinese, and later all 
the Chinese in the Union of South Africa. He also regarded it as being insulting for singling 
out the Chinese as a people to exclude.81 Unfortunately, once again, neither Liu Yu Ling or Liu 
                                                 
75 Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1902-1906, Act 37 of 1904, The Chinese Exclusion Act, Section 34. 
76 Ibid, Section 33. 
77 (KAB) 1/UIT 17/22 12/10/2: “Chinese Exclusion Act. Exemptions,” 1906. 
78 (KAB) PMO 222 1231/06: “Chinese Traders – Renewal of General Dealers License,” 1906. 
79 (SAB) GG 900 01 15/706, 15/557, 37/45, 15/724: “Asiatics: Chinese. Forwards Note by Chinese Minister in 
London on Subject of Treatment of Chinese in South Africa and Requests Minister’s Observation,” 28 April 1914. 
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Ngai’s efforts were able to affect any substantive change. The Exclusion Act would remain 
part of South African legislation until 1933, long after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty.82 
 
6.2 Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, despite their efforts to help, the opposition by both the Transvaal and Cape 
governments, and later the South African government, left the Consul-Generals unable to 
achieve substantive change in the treatment of the Chinese in South Africa, and following the 
passage of discriminatory legislation the immigration of Chinese into South Africa came to a 
near standstill until 1960.83 The Qing Dynasty’s declining economic and military power also 
left it unable to coerce or compel compromise from the Transvaal or Cape governments, 
leaving the Consul-Generals impotent when dealing with the discrimination their charges 
faced. The explicit opposition by both the populaces of the Cape and Transvaal to the presence 
of any Chinese within their states also left the two Consul-Generals with little room to find 
compromise, as their counterparts sought to largely exclude Chinese wholesale from South 
Africa. It is clear that in its terminal days the Qing Dynasty did consider the treatment of its 
subjects overseas to be “…a grievous injustice to the Chinese Nation,”.84 This was an injustice 
the Dynasty sought to address through its own efforts. Despite finally reversing the traditional 
apathy it held for its overseas subjects, the decaying Empire was ultimately unable to make a 
significant impact on the discrimination they faced within South Africa.  
 
However, despite these failures, by establishing the position of the Consul-General the Qing 
Dynasty had created an institution that would outlast itself, and would continue to render aid 
to the Chinese in South Africa well into the twentieth century.85 The South African Chinese 
community would continue to make use of and cooperate with the Consul-Generals dispatched 
by the Republic of China throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, and the institutions 
of the Consul-General served an important role in the future struggles of the South African 
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Chinese. Harris noted that the use of the Consul-Generals as official channels for 
communication with the South African government became a pattern that endured long past 
the Qing Dynasty collapse, with the South African Chinese population continuing to utilize the 
services of the Consul-Generals and later other diplomatic officers.86 Although they had been 
unable to affect substantive change during their own time, the Qing Dynasty Consul-Generals 
had made clear efforts to assist the South Africa Chinese, and created a foundation for further 
assistance to them in the future. 
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